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ABSTRACT 
TED DOUGLAS ZOLLER: The Dealmaker Milieu: 
The Anatomy of Social Capital in Entrepreneurial Economies 
(Under the direction of Maryann Feldman) 
 
 
This dissertation assesses the characteristics of social capital in the context of regional 
development and argues that the literature’s original conception of the entrepreneurial 
milieu, along with current theory about social capital and networking, overlooks important 
structural implications by observing social capital in the aggregate. Entrepreneurial 
social capital in a regional economy may indeed spur new firm births. However, the 
entrepreneurial economy may also be facilitated by a set of exceptional entrepreneurs 
and investors referred to here as dealmakers, who combine characteristics of seriality, 
brokerage, and mediation previously established in the entrepreneurship literature.  This 
dissertation finds evidence that dealmakers mediate social capital networks in leading 
United States technopole regions and argues that structured social capital, when 
activated through the entrepreneurial network, is more closely associated with new firm 
births than the aggregated social capital referenced in the literature. This analysis 
concludes that the prevalence of dealmaker entrepreneurs and investors, with 
concurrent ties to multiple firms, is a better predictor of firm births than the prevalence 
and density of entrepreneurs and investors alone. This suggests that dealmakers are a 
critical catalyst in the entrepreneurial milieu, lending functional structure to a 
fundamental concept in regional development. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION: SOCIAL CAPITAL 
IN ENTREPRENEURIAL ECONOMIES 
 
 
This dissertation identifies and explores the impact of dealmakers, key social 
capital actors who mediate entrepreneurial and investor networks by maintaining active, 
concurrent ties to multiple firms. By empirically examining the social capital networks of 
12 United States regional entrepreneurial economies, this dissertation determines that 
the share of network actors holding multiple firm ties is associated with greater 
entrepreneurial success, as measured by the birth of new technology-based firms 
(hereafter called new firms). Results show that network actors with three or more 
concurrent firm ties are, indeed, more prevalent in successful entrepreneurial economies 
such as Silicon Valley and Greater Boston, as well as in a set of successful secondary 
technology-based regions, including San Diego, Seattle, and North Carolina’s Research 
Triangle Park (RTP). 
By revealing the importance of multi-firm dealmaker actors in entrepreneurial 
economies, this analysis challenges an inherent premise of much of the existing 
literature on aggregate social capital networks, which treats all actors as equals. In fact, 
empirical results in this study suggest that the structure of social capital networks may 
be as or more important than their density and size. A complementary social network 
analysis reinforces these empirical results by comparatively examining the firm ties in 
each of the sample’s twelve regional social capital networks. The study presents 
evidence that entrepreneurial regions with more dealmakers also produce more new 
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entrepreneurial firms, and the presence of dealmakers is associated with more cohesive 
social capital networks that comprise a supportive entrepreneurial milieu. 
In order to understand the role and characteristics of a dealmaker at the 
functional level, this dissertation presents a qualitative analysis of the social capital 
composition of one of these sample regions—RTP—a leading example of a region that 
actively sought to induce the formation of an entrepreneurial economy through the 
establishment of a research park as a means to agglomerate the region’s research and 
development capabilities and thereby encourage technology-based spinoffs. By using 
RTP as a prototype of a planned technology region as an empirical context, this analysis 
qualitatively examines the characteristics, career paths, and roles of dealmakers in 
entrepreneurial economies and profiles these actors to further understand their functions 
as agents in networked entrepreneurial economies. 
It is hypothesized that dealmakers are more closely associated with a region’s 
success in establishing vibrant entrepreneurial economies that encourage new firm 
births than measures of aggregate social capital currently cited in the academic 
literature. To test this hypothesis, this dissertation frames two research questions 
examined through empirical and qualitative research: First, are regions with a larger 
share of dealmaker entrepreneurs and investors more closely associated with higher 
rates of new firm formation, and are dealmakers a better indicator for successful 
entrepreneurial economies than aggregate measures of social capital currently posited 
by the literature? This may simply lead to a comparison of quality versus quantity, as the 
share of actors with multiple firm ties in a region appears to have far greater impact on 
the success in establishing new firms than the number of entrepreneurs and investors 
overall. 
Second, how do dealmakers influence the regional entrepreneurial economy, and 
what are their career paths and common characteristics that inform their specific roles in 
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mediating entrepreneurial networks? This thesis poses an entrepreneur’s dilemma in a 
regional context: Would you rather be networking at an event with a throng of people 
who have varying experiences, or with a smaller and tightly knit room of people with 
serial and deep experience? While this study will not answer this dilemma for the 
entrepreneur, it will attempt to answer it for the regional policymaker who seeks to 
encourage the establishment of an entrepreneurial economy. 
By examining these research questions, this dissertation contributes to current 
scholarship and: 
1. provides a more refined analysis of the anatomy of social capital in an 
entrepreneurial regional economy, building upon current aggregate network 
analysis to emphasize the role of individual dealmakers as a catalyst for new 
venture creation; 
 
2. specifies the characteristics of the dealmaker in the regional economy, 
explaining how these actors mediate and shape social capital networks in 
entrepreneurial regions and explores how this affects new firm formation; and 
 
3. introduces data analysis methods to identify and examine the characteristics 
of dealmakers by role in the social capital framework of a regional economy 
and further understand their career progression. 
 
This dissertation consists of six additional chapters beyond this introduction. In Chapter 
2, the theoretical and empirical research on social capital’s influence on new venture 
formation is reviewed, providing a foundation for the concepts further developed in this 
research through a review of the sociology, entrepreneurship, and regional economic 
development literatures. Chapter 3 defines the concept of dealmaker posited as a 
researchable construct used throughout this dissertation and provides examples to 
conceptualize this new model. Chapter 4 reviews the methodology used to examine 
structured social capital and dealmakers and describes the data uncovered to study 
them, including a review of the sample frame consisting of twelve United States high-
technology regional economies. Chapter 5 presents an empirical analysis of structured 
social capital and dealmakers and its relationship to the success of these 12 regions in 
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establishing successful entrepreneurial economies. Chapter 6 augments the empirical 
analysis with a qualitative examination of dealmaker social capital in the context of the 
RTP region, describing dealmakers’ career paths, characteristics, and roles in the 
regional economy. Chapter 7 draws conclusions from the empirical and qualitative 
analysis useful for the development of future empirical research on the concept of 
dealmaker and considers the policy implications for the incorporation of the dealmaker 
concept to encourage the establishment of successful regional entrepreneurial 
economies. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL CONCEPTS 
 
 
The entrepreneurship literature paints the anatomy of social capital and the types 
of actors who contribute to vibrant regional economies in broad strokes. In the regional 
development literature, economic sociologists argue that dense network structures 
facilitate new technology-based firms and propose different theories about how social 
capital mechanisms spur regional economic growth (Florida & Kenney, 1988; Saxenian, 
1994). This literature argues that concentrated and specialized social capital networks 
provide the infrastructure to stimulate the formation of new ventures in a regional 
economy (Ahuja, 2000; Bell, 2005; Bruderl & Preisendorfer, 1998; Elfring & Hulsink, 
2003; Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Karlsson, Johansson, & Stough, 2005; Kenney & Patton, 
2005; Kim & Aldrich, 2005; Lavie, 2006; Liao & Welsch, 2005; Myint, Vyakarnam, & 
New, 2005; Senjem & Reed, 2003; Zhang, 2003). However, this literature examines 
social capital in a rudimentary framework, focusing on the aggregated effects of social 
capital created by either entrepreneurs (Audretsch, Keilbach, & Lehmann, 2006; Delmar 
& Davidsson, 2000; Neergaard, 2003) or by investors (Fainstein, 2005; Florida & 
Kenney, 1988; Hsu, 2006; Lerner, 1995; Powell, Koput, Bowie, & Smith-Doerr, 2002). 
These studies of aggregate social capital may overlook a separate class of network 
actors who rise from the ranks of entrepreneurs and investors to bridge entrepreneurial 
networks and motivate the success of entrepreneurial economies. 
Regional economic development theory has long considered social capital 
among the important ingredients of successful entrepreneurial economies, citing the role 
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Table 1. Key Constructs Defined 
Term Definition Functional Description of Use 
Milieu “The structural properties of a regional 
environment which contribute to the 
development of innovations among its 
economic actors” (Camagni, 1991, p. 36) 
The endowment of social capital that 
operates through social networks to spur 
economic transformation in a geographic 
region (Castells & Hall, 1994) 
 
Social Capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The sum of the actual and potential resources 
embedded within, available through, and 
derived from the network of relationships 
possessed by an individual or social unit. Social 
capital thus comprises both the network and the 
assets that may be mobilized through that 
network” (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998, p. 243) 
 
Social capital is the relational resources of 
embedded actors operating and mobilized 
through social networks of “friends, 
colleagues, and more general contacts 
through whom you receive opportunities 
to use your financial and human capital” 
(Burt, 2005, p. 9). 
 
Social Network 
 
 
 
 
 
▪ Node 
 
 
▪ Density 
 
 
 
▪ Centrality 
 
 
 
 
 
▪ Betweenness 
 
 
 
▪ Component 
Social network “consists of a finite set or sets of 
actors and the relation or relations defined on 
them. The presence of relational information is 
a critical and defining feature of a social 
network” (S. Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 20). 
 
Actors (S. Wasserman & Faust, 1994, pp. 94-
95) 
 
Measure of the level of cohesion and 
connectedness in the social network (J. Scott, 
1988, p. 115) 
 
Structural measure of the most central actor (J. 
Scott, 1988, p. 111) 
 
 
 
 
Probability that a distinct actor, i, is “involved in 
the communication between the two actors” (S. 
Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 190) 
 
Connected subsets of nodes are components. 
Unique components are graphs partitioned into 
“two or more subsets in which there are no 
paths between the nodes in different subsets” 
(S. Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 109) 
The set of relationships among specific 
embedded actors in a network, ascribing 
characteristics to the network itself as 
seen through the individual relationships 
between actors 
 
Entrepreneurs and investors 
 
 
Degree of concentration of the 
entrepreneurial network comprised of 
entrepreneurs and investors 
 
A measure of the actors in the 
entrepreneurial network who have the 
greatest degree of connectedness within 
the network, or the actor with the greatest 
influence on the network 
 
The likelihood that a particular type of 
actor serves in a role between 
entrepreneurs and investors 
 
Groups of nodes, meaning entrepreneurs 
and investors associated in a single 
common graph through their respective 
common firm ties. 
 
Brokerage 
 
“People or firms who link units having 
complementary interests, transferring 
information or resources, and otherwise 
facilitating the interests of those not directly 
connected to one another” (Dubini & Aldrich, 
1991, p. 310) 
 
 
An intermediary between entrepreneurs 
and investors, who exploits competitive 
advantages and risk capital, and who 
accumulates rents by mediating among 
actors in the network based on this 
advantage and shaping the network 
Seriality  “Someone who has had experience in multiple 
business startups, and simultaneously is 
involved in at least two businesses” (MacMillan, 
1986, p. 241) 
 
An entrepreneur or investor who has 
concurrent experience with at least two 
business start-ups at one time 
Mediation Mediation allows actors to “occupy structurally 
central positions that link otherwise 
disconnected people and provide differential 
resources” (Mehra, Kilduff, & Brass, 2001, p. 
121). 
A role played by an actor in a network that 
has a an influential and deterministic 
effect on networks, allowing the actor to 
shape the network through the act of 
brokerage 
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of networks of actors as a backdrop or perhaps mechanism of the region’s innovative 
and entrepreneurial capacity. Early conceptions of social capital in regional development 
theory, however, were mysterious and shrouded in obfuscation—situating the 
entrepreneurial functions of an economy as an outcome of its entrepreneurial milieu. 
Audretsch and Keilbach interpret this function as “entrepreneurship capital,” which 
consists of: 
. . . . a regional milieu of agents that is conducive to the creation of new firms. 
This involves a number of aspects such as social acceptance of entrepreneurial 
behavior but of course also individuals who are willing to deal with the risk of 
creating new firms and the activity of bankers and venture capital agents that are 
willing to share risks and benefits involved. Hence entrepreneurship capital 
reflects a number of different legal, institutional, and social factors and forces. 
Taken together, these factors and forces constitute the entrepreneurship capital 
of an economy . . . entrepreneurship capital manifests itself by the creation of 
new firms. (Audretsch & Keilbach, 2004, p. 420) 
 
A clear link is established in the literature between the entrepreneurial milieu and its 
direct influence on new firm formation. It was thought that the milieu combined the 
institutional setting, norms, and social capital to bring about new firm formation in the 
regional economy. However, a lack of precision in the definition of milieu has led to more 
attention being placed on the concepts of social capital currently pursued in the 
literature. 
Regional development researchers have attempted to refine our understanding 
and measure the impact of social capital on the formation of entrepreneurial economies. 
Today the milieu is seen as the endowment of social capital that operates through social 
networks to spur economic transformation in a geographic region (Castells & Hall, 1994). 
This literature does not clearly specify the operational structure of a milieu, but it does 
contribute a conceptual frame that, while remaining largely untested in an empirical 
sense, suggests there is an important interplay among economic actors in a regional 
cluster, and particularly among entrepreneurial actors (Breschi & Lissoni, 2001; Castilla, 
Hwang, Granovetter, & Granovetter, 2000; Shefer & Frenkel, 1998). Other research in 
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this vein further refined the definition of a milieu to mean a regional environment that 
incubates new firms as a function of the various efforts of entrepreneurs: “New 
technologies are often introduced by new firms, created in (and by) the milieux in which 
they appear: the firm is not a heaven-sent agent which freely chooses an environment; it 
is secreted by its environment: it is the milieux which act as entrepreneurs and which 
innovate” (Maillat & Lecoq, 1992, p. 15). This view places more emphasis on the actor 
as opposed to the firm as the mechanism of regional success in entrepreneurship, and it 
suggests that relationships among the relevant firm actors—innovators, entrepreneurs, 
and investors—establish conditions in the aggregate upon which an entrepreneurial 
economy may be based. Researchers therefore attempted to update the ecological view 
of the milieu, which did not carefully specify a role for social capital, in favor of new 
concepts that incorporate the actor explicitly per se into the definition of the milieu. 
These later theorists believed that an enhanced understanding of the interplay of key 
actors in the milieu might help inform the behavior of an entrepreneurial economy. 
A new generation of regional scientists dissatisfied with the definition and 
operational utility of the milieu concept have adapted the rubric of social capital to 
explore the effects of entrepreneurial networks in a regional economy (Breschi & Lissoni, 
2001). Putnam’s early articulation of social capital, built upon Coleman, defined social 
capital as “the features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust 
that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 
1995, p. 67). When applied in the regional economic context, social capital confers 
reciprocity and trust among actors involved in a network, such that the network itself 
becomes an input (Kogut, 1989). 
A deep literature in regional development emphasizes the importance of 
agglomeration economies and the interplay between a region’s innovative potential and 
its entrepreneurial capacity to generate and exploit spillovers to spawn new firms 
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(Anselin, Varga, & Acs, 1997; Armington & Acs, 2002; Audretsch et al., 2006; Carree & 
Thurik, 2002; Feldman, Francis, & Bercovitz, 2005). While relying on more orthodox and 
tested econometric indicators to validate relationships between labor, production inputs, 
innovation spillovers, and new entrepreneurial firm formation, these cluster-based 
approaches have neither directly defined or operationalized the role of social capital at 
the same level as the other core inputs to economic growth, nor have they fully fleshed 
out the mechanism by which social capital plays a role in this process. 
Innovation research based on patent citations was one of the earliest bridges 
between regional science and social capital theory, with specific bearing on cluster 
economics. This may very well be explained due to the empirical accessibility of patent 
citations as a phenomenon that can easily be measured, and for which data was readily 
available. These researchers used forward citations on United States patents to trace 
innovation spillovers to growth in the form of new inventions by individual innovators 
(Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Henderson, 1993; Miyata, 2000; Trajtenberg, Henderson, & Jaffe, 
1997). A later series of contributions related social capital to venture capital—another 
phenomenon that is similarly objectively measurable and accessible (Fainstein, 2005; 
Hsu, 2006; Lerner, 1995; Powell et al., 2002; Wright, Vohora, & Lockett, 2004). In this 
same vein, Shane and Cable (2002) asserted that network ties and reputation had 
considerable impact on the amount of venture capital financing that entrepreneurs 
received. This highly cited paper contributed a new approach to social capital 
relationships among entrepreneurs and investors by treating them as embedded actors 
in a network and considering how social ties influenced the venture formation process. 
Their paper legitimized the link between social capital networks and new venture 
creation at a time when solely economic explanations for entrepreneurial growth 
predominated. 
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Social Networks, Social Capital, and Regional Development 
The application of social capital and networks in entrepreneurship was pioneered 
in the field of sociology, which recognized early the effect of networks on the 
transformation of society and on entrepreneurial economies in particular. The linkage 
among social capital and networks and economic phenomena is advanced by the work 
of Manuel Castells in his book, The Rise of the Network Society, which seeks to explain 
the impact of the information economy, globalization, and the resulting economic 
restructuring of transnational relationships on economic transformation (Castells, 2000). 
Castells, branded early in his career as a milieu theorist, explores how environments, 
cultures, and social capital networks interact to create economic transformation 
(Camagni, 1991). Wasserman, a definitive source on the subject of social network 
methodology more simply states that a social network “consists of a finite set or sets of 
actors and the relation or relations defined on them. The presence of relational 
information is a critical and defining feature of a social network” (S. Wasserman & Faust, 
1994, p. 20). 
By adopting this definition of the social network, it subsumes social capital as a 
component and inexorable part, seeing actors as embedded in a network structure 
defined by the relationships among and between them. The importance of social capital 
theory in the context of networks was amplified by Nahapiet and Ghoshal, who define 
social capital in the context of social networks as: 
The sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, available 
through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an 
individual or social unit. Social capital thus comprises both the network and the 
assets that may be mobilized through that network (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998, 
p. 243). 
 
This analysis adopts this interpretation as the working definition of networked social 
capital. Given its focus on the regional unit of analysis, this dissertation sees social 
capital as an embedded function of regional networks and studies actors through the 
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context of the regional network they operate. This approach is legitimized by the current 
literature. 
Planning scholars have adopted social networking and introduced a new 
paradigm to planning theory, observing society as a networked system wherein social 
capital explains the behavior of network actors (Fainstein, 2005). Burt's structural holes, 
Granovetter’s strength of weak ties, and Aldrich’s small worlds created a common 
language among sociologists and economic development researchers in the area of 
entrepreneurship: a common nomenclature to explain the actions of entrepreneurs in the 
firm-founding process and the effects of the surrounding environment (Aldrich & Kim, 
2007; Burt, 2005; Granovetter, 2005). In this thinking, social capital and networks 
represent a vital ecology that impacts both micro-firm development processes through 
social capital and the macro development of entrepreneurial economies (Aldrich, 1990). 
Entrepreneurship research has a long tradition of studying entrepreneurial 
networks and their effect on entrepreneurial firm success (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986; 
Forsgren, Hagg, Hakansson, Johanson, & Mattsson, 1995; Nicolaou & Birley, 2003). 
The literature has firmly established the importance of networked social capital in 
entrepreneurship, with research citing the prevalence of networking among micro-
business owners and the impact of participation in such networks (Lonier & Matthews, 
2005); the importance of networking on a personal level and its effect on an 
entrepreneur’s behavior (Klyver & Schott, 2005); the positive relationship of relational 
social capital’s role in entrepreneurial growth and venture creation (Liao & Welsch, 
2002); the impact and usefulness of formal and informal networks on entrepreneurship 
(Jack & Robson, 2003); the effect of social capital and network entrepreneurs on venture 
performance (Senjem & Reed, 2003); and one of the most important contributions, the 
network structure of social capital (Burt, 2000). Networking research has since focused 
on one of two areas: the effects of networks on entrepreneurial thinking and behavior 
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and the effects of networks on venture creation and performance. The importance of 
entrepreneurial support networks as a mechanism of regional development has long 
been recognized (Kenney & Burg, 1999; Saxenian, 1994) and has been variously 
termed an “incubator region” (Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, & Lyman, 1990, p. 207), a 
“business discussion network” (Renzulli & Aldrich, 2005, p. 323), the “social structure of 
innovation” (Florida & Kenney, 1988, p. 35), an “ecosystem” (Bahrami & Evans, 2000, p. 
9), the “new economy” (Castells, 2000, p. 11), or a “habitat” (Lee, Miller, Hancock, & 
Rowen, 2000, p. 4). 
Kenney and Patton (2005) posit the notion of the entrepreneurial support network 
as being comprised of a range of actors who “assist entrepreneurs in creating a new 
firm” (p. 202). In the context of an entrepreneurial economy, social capital is a network of 
embedded actors who each mobilize assets by interacting within and influencing the 
network. It adopts Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s view that social capital and networks are 
distinct concepts that are interdependent in practice. Pollock. Porac, and Wade et al. 
(2004) contribute the notion of the network architect as an actor who can “design, build, 
and maintain transactional networks through their [sic] own strategic and profit driven 
activities” (p. 51). This view of social capital implies that individual actors influence the 
network and its related outcomes and differentiates a certain category of actors based 
on their characteristics and roles without explicitly identifying the mechanism. 
This line of research, known today as the “network approach to 
entrepreneurship” (Bruderl & Preisendorfer, 1998, p. 213; Witt, 2004, p. 392), is founded 
on the underlying premise that entrepreneurs use their personal network of contacts to 
acquire resources and information that they are unable to acquire through markets. 
Hypothetically speaking, entrepreneurs are embedded in a social capital milieu: 
Entrepreneurs with larger and more diverse networks will receive more support from the 
network and will become more successful than entrepreneurs with ineffectual networks. 
 13 
Economists and regional scientists who have adopted this proposition extrapolate it to 
explain network success at the level of the cluster or region (Stuart & Sorenson, 2005). 
Planning scholars have adopted it to examine society as a networked system whereby 
social capital is used to explain the behavior of actors in a network (Fainstein, 2005). 
In the entrepreneurship literature, meanwhile, embryonic notions of structured 
social capital have been explored in a framework that also seeks to neatly classify 
network actors into two mutually exclusive categories of entrepreneurs or investors. 
These theories recognize the mediating characteristics of structured social capital in a 
network and attempt to assign these characteristics to various categories of 
entrepreneurs or investors. A fundamental proposition of this dissertation’s analysis is 
that this simple classification misconstrues the nature of mediated relationships among 
entrepreneurial actors, a point we that will be examined later. 
The Problem of Aggregation in Social Networks 
The substantial disadvantage of all these approaches to social capital embedded 
in networks is that they view entrepreneurial phenomena in the aggregate. Glaeser, 
Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002) noted that a “lack of consensus exists because 
economists have by and large adopted social capital frameworks that are based on 
aggregate analyses . . . who define social capital as networks” (p. F438). This lack of 
highly specified and discrete models of social capital has relegated current theory to 
examining social capital effects in a summary manner. Indeed, the roles of key actors in 
social capital networks are not carefully specified, nor are their functions well defined. As 
Kenney and Patton (2005) assert: “While venture capitalists have received the most 
attention, the location of other constituents of the support network, including investment 
bankers, accountants, or persons who are capable of serving on the startup’s board of 
directors, has received far less attention” (p. 202). While there is considerable effort 
placed in understanding the role of the actors in the social network in general, there has 
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not been as much emphasis placed on specific categories of actors or in perhaps a set 
of actors that mediate the aggregate network on behalf of others. While individual sets of 
actors are described, their respective roles in motivating and mediating networks have 
remained largely indeterminate in the literature. 
Focus has been largely placed on two categories of social capital in the context 
of regional economies: entrepreneurs and investors. These two categories are perceived 
as distinct and mutually exclusive and take on very different interpretations when 
comparing aggregate views of social capital—which treat actors in networks in the 
aggregate—with structured views, which consider the roles of certain categories of 
actors in mediating networks. Indeed, by evaluating all actors as equals, certain nuances 
are missed by aggregate studies. Aggregate analyses make it difficult to translate the 
effect of social capital from the unit of analysis of the actor to the region. As Glaeser et 
al. (2002) explained: “The path from individual to aggregate social capital is difficult, 
because of the extraordinary importance of social capital externalities. The complexity of 
aggregation means that the determinants of social capital at the individual level do not 
always determine social capital at the society level” (p. F439). To resolve this challenge, 
a more enhanced understanding of the mechanisms of the network through social 
capital exchange is called for. The network itself assigns specific roles for actors that 
serve to differentiate their functions within the network. Kenney and Patton (2005) 
expressed similar concerns, noting that social capital networks do not experience the 
same “path-dependent clustering suggested by geographers” (p. 201) and that clusters 
in the aggregate vary by industry and therefore do not have homogenous characteristics 
and behaviors. Networks are heterogeneous and take on different characteristics based 
on the nature of relationships among the actors who comprise them. Shane and Cable 
(2002) offer a similar criticism, contending that the correspondence between social 
capital in a geographic context and regional cluster-based economics is not altogether 
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sound and that because purely economic explanations of new venture creation overlook 
the influence of social ties, they are under socialized and incomplete . On the flip side, 
Shane and Cable also argue that ecological viewpoints, which draw on the concept of 
social obligation, are over socialized and overstated. As a result, this literature calls for 
more carefully specifying the structure of social capital so that it may serve as a useful 
construct for entrepreneurship research. Current aggregate views of social capital have 
virtually ignored the potential for a hierarchical ordering of social capital by treating all 
categories of entrepreneurs and investors as equals and selecting one or the other as 
the driver of the entrepreneurial network. 
Structured Social Capital 
This dissertation suggests that the literature’s current view of aggregate networks 
may be enhanced by a more careful understanding of the structural properties of the 
network and those actors who play a mediation role in the network. Structured means 
that there is a difference in how certain actors influence and shape a network and that 
these actors are imbued with properties that allow them to mediate networks 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). By pursuing this question, first theoretically 
and then empirically, this analysis should lend definition to what Markusen (2003) called 
the “fuzzy concept” of the entrepreneurial milieu (p. 701). 
This dissertation argues that both the original concept of the milieu and more 
recent theory relating to entrepreneurial social capital overlook important implications by 
observing social capital in the aggregate (Glaeser et al., 2002). The presence of 
entrepreneurial social capital in a regional economy may be necessary to generate new 
technology-based firms, but to understand how social capital creates new firms, the 
social capital network must be viewed through a structural lens. It is hypothesized that 
the entrepreneurial economy is mediated by exceptional entrepreneurs and investors 
who serve as brokers in a discrete structured network and that these individuals serve a 
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different role in bridging social capital within the aggregate network. This is the departure 
point for this dissertation. 
This alternative view of social capital offers a more careful recognition of 
structured and hierarchical characteristics of social capital. Coleman (1988) defines 
social capital through its structural capacity and function, asserting that it “is not a single 
entity but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: They all consist of 
some aspect of social structures, and they all facilitate certain actions of actors—
whether persons or corporate actors—within the structure” (p. 598). While aggregate 
studies still predominate in the literature, new concepts are being explored to understand 
the structural mechanisms Coleman identified. Early notions of structure in social capital 
build on Granovetter’s (2005) concept of bridging social capital, which is also described 
as cross-cutting social ties which concerns relations across rather than within groups 
that serve to improve economic and social performance (Granovetter, 2005; Iyer, Kitson, 
& Toh, 2005). 
An important building block in the examination of structured social capital is the 
concept of structural holes advanced by Burt (2005). He views brokerage as a function 
among actors in a network who span structural holes and defines those who fill holes as 
network entrepreneurs. “The social capital of structural holes,” Burt wrote, “comes from 
the opportunities that holes provide to broker the flow of information between people, 
and shape the projects that bring together people from opposite sides of the hole” (p. 
65). In this view, brokerage is a structural response to closed networks (or closure)—a 
mechanism that allows brokers to rise above closure by accumulating reputation and 
trust. Brokers play an important mediation role in networks and serve to broker 
information based on their differentiated access to the network as a consequence of 
their status, accrued through their reputation in the network. Burt also regards brokerage 
as a key integrative function producing returns to the network: “People whose networks 
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bridge the holes are brokers rewarded for their integrative work” (Burt, 2005, p. 65). This 
view of brokerage defines not only a hole-spanning function between two distinct but 
mutually dependent communities, but it describes a more complex reciprocal 
relationship among actors in the network, with brokers serving as intermediaries and 
integrators between disparate actors. 
Attempts have been made to apply Burt’s concept of a broker to a geographic 
context in order to understand the social capital contributions of key network actors who 
play the role of economic agents in regional economies. However, this leap to a regional 
unit of analysis that considers macro social networks is multifaceted and complex and is 
susceptible to oversimplification. 
Brokers in the Entrepreneurial Economy 
A pointed debate in regional development theory is underway around the roles 
played by specific sets of actors in social capital networks and how their activities 
support the growth of entrepreneurial economies. While the literature has isolated the 
effects of founders and entrepreneurs (Audretsch et al., 2006; Delmar & Davidsson, 
2000; Neergaard, 2003) and venture capitalists (VCs) and investors (Fainstein, 2005; 
Florida & Kenney, 1988; Hsu, 2006; Lerner, 1995; Powell et al., 2002), a comprehensive 
typology of actors has yet to be developed or tested at the level of the regional 
entrepreneurial economy (Burt, 2005; Winch & Courtney, 2007). Classifying 
entrepreneurial network actors as either entrepreneurs or investors does not account for 
the roles or unique backgrounds of these highly connected broker-actors in the 
entrepreneurial network. A more thorough specification of actors with multiple firm ties 
will require a new theoretical framework of social capital that integrates the concept of 
hierarchy to accommodate those actors who influence and mediate entrepreneurial 
networks. 
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Complementing regional economic development theory, entrepreneurship 
research reveals that social capital networks are a vital component of successful 
entrepreneurial communities and has recognized it as an important research topic 
(Ahuja, 2000; Breschi & Lissoni, 2003; Cantner & Graf, 2004; Cantner & Joel, 2006; 
Fischer, 2006; Kenney & Burg, 1999; Shane & Cable, 2002; Sorenson & Stuart, 2008; 
Zaheer & Bell, 2005). Much of this research is beginning to make the association 
between social capital structure in an entrepreneurial regional economy and economic 
outcomes. It seems critical to determine what makes one network flourish while another 
flounders given that some communities are more successful than others at creating new 
firms.  
One important clue may be found in the category of social capital that 
sociologists call brokers. These broker-actors function as intermediaries between typical 
entrepreneurs and investors in a social capital network, and their mediation facilitates 
the birth of new firms that support the growth of entrepreneurial economies (Myint et al., 
2005; Pollock et al., 2004; Winch & Courtney, 2007). This interpretation of brokerage 
has been primarily used to explain transactional relationships at the level of the firm, and 
focuses on the mediating roles of business service providers such as attorneys, 
accountants, and other peripheral intermediaries as opposed to the central actors who 
most directly influence the establishment of the firm: the entrepreneurs and investors 
themselves. 
An important building block in an examination of structured social capital is the 
concept of brokerage advanced in sociology and organizational theory. Paola Dubini and 
Howard Aldrich (1991) introduced the concept of brokerage in the context of social 
capital and network relationships between entrepreneurs and VCs at the level of the 
firm, defining brokers as: 
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People or firms who link units having complementary interests, transferring 
information or resources, and otherwise facilitating the interests of those not 
directly connected to one another. For example, VCs are probably as important 
for their broker role as for the funds they provide to struggling entrepreneurs, 
because they bring together technical experts, management consultants, and 
financial planners to supplement an entrepreneur’s limited knowledge and 
experience. Some social settings facilitate brokerage, and some associations 
and organizations are themselves brokers in the role they play. . . . Brokers allow 
people to forge contacts that help them leap over otherwise unbridgeable gaps in 
their marshalling of resources. (p.310) 
 
The brokerage concept has been better developed as a researchable construct in social 
capital and social network theory in the field of sociology, but it remains underdeveloped 
in regional science. While attempts to translate the brokerage concept into regional 
development theory have begun (Glaeser et al., 2002), common use of the construct has 
not been fully adapted to explain mediation effects at the regional unit of analysis. 
This analysis adopts the term broker to describe a third party who acts as an 
intermediary between entrepreneurs and investors, who exploits competitive advantages 
and risk capital, and who accumulates rents by influencing multiple enterprises based on 
this advantage. A brokering concept in entrepreneurship has already been identified by 
Winch and Courtney (2007), who define a broker as: 
A third party providing some sort of linkage between two or more other 
firms. These include co-ordinating [sic] and representative roles, but our 
focus here is on those that play a liaison role between firms that are not 
otherwise connected. (p. 748) 
 
Winch and Courtney (2007) apply the concept to understand the role of brokers who act 
not only as intermediaries among firms but among other actors in the network, defining 
brokers as “a distinctive type of actor in networks—the broker, or actor that links other 
actors in the network” (p. 747). However, Winch and Courtney see the broker as a 
particular actor in an innovation process; they do not generalize beyond the immediate 
context to include a broker’s role in the larger entrepreneurial process, nor do they offer 
a framework to understand a broker’s role from an agency perspective. This concept 
closely resembles earlier and more crude concepts of brokerage such as Neergaard’s 
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(2003) notion of the “alpha entrepreneur” (p. 1), an actor discerned from others in the 
network through his strategic networking behavior This view suggests a type of actor in 
the social capital framework who is differentiated from others in the aggregate network 
by his specific and intentional actions—a function that extends well beyond the 
intermediate role traditionally observed in a broker. 
 An important insight in the literature comes from Kogut and Shan (1997), who 
argue that brokerage functions in a network may reshape its structure and behaviors, 
leading to a role well beyond Burt’s bridge-spanning concept: 
If some firms have specific capabilities for information arbitrage, they may 
choose to broker relationships between organizations in different regions of the 
network. In this case, the existing structure is not strengthened but repeatedly 
reshaped. The early pattern of relationships is blurred as more organizations are 
linked together. To address these issues, we examine network formation in terms 
of its structural development, positing network structure as a social fact 
interacting with firm level behavior over time. (pp. 110-111) 
 
Brokers may, in this sense, do more than simply span structural holes, as Burt 
stipulates: They may shape the characteristics and the structure of the network itself. Of 
course, not all actors in the network have equal access to structural holes and thereby 
exploitable opportunities. Brokers are distinguished by their unique ability to exploit 
opportunities selectively and thereby shape the network and their brokered interactions 
with other network actors as a whole. Kogut and Shan’s (1997) article was also the first 
to assert that it is not enough to look at the nature of transactions between firms in the 
aggregate. Instead, the entire network must be considered from the standpoint of how it 
is shaped by broker-actors to understand the nature of inter-firm networking, a point to 
which this analysis returns later. 
The theory that brokers play a central role in shaping networks was carried 
forward in multiple articles following Kogut and Shan’s contribution. Hsu employed an 
agency framework to empirically evaluate the value-added roles and reputational 
advantages of venture capitalists through an analysis of contractual transactions 
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(Hellman, 1998; Hsu, 2001, 2004; Kaplan, 2001; Lerner, 1995). Hsu portrayed venture 
capitalists as active in a range of activities that support entrepreneurs in their role as 
internal directors of the start-up, bringing strategic insight about the threats and 
opportunities in the business environment (Hsu, 2006). Hsu argues that VCs act as 
information intermediaries, providing privileged information access and reducing search 
costs for start-ups seeking appropriate partners (Aoki, 2000; Burt, 2000; Gans, 2002). 
Indeed, a VC is seen as an important intermediary of cooperative commercialization 
(Sorenson & Stuart, 2001), serving to extend the entrepreneur’s network of information 
and contacts, as Rogers and Larsen (in Aldrich, 1990) pointed out much earlier: 
Venture capitalists, and other investors, are probably as important for the 
mediating role they play in spreading knowledge of effective forms as for their 
role in funding start-ups. (p. 17) 
 
Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007a) examined how VCs leverage their central position 
in the entrepreneurial process to shape the network and form investment syndicates, 
improving investment performance for syndicate members. However, the same authors 
call into question whether brokerage functions per se are actually the reason VCs 
enhance their investment performance. Hochberg et al. (2007b) argue that stronger 
investment performance at the fund and portfolio levels is associated with VCs who hold 
central or influential positions in the network. This finding has significant implications for 
brokerage theory, calling into question whether the characteristic that allows certain 
actors to influence the network is a function of brokerage or a product of their expertise, 
reputation, or centrality in the network. 
While considerable work has been done in the field of sociology to understand 
the role of brokerage as a transactional relationship at the level of the firm, no common 
framework has emerged to explain what brokers contribute to regional social capital 
networks and to the success of entrepreneurial economies (Casson & Giusta, 2007; 
Franke, 1999). Franke proposed a central actor playing the role of net-broker in a virtual 
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network web representing the entrepreneurial economy. Casson and Giusta place the 
broker within the context of a rational actor framework, defining brokers as 
entrepreneurs who play a market-making role in a networked economy. This view 
implies that certain entrepreneurs distinguish themselves within the network, playing a 
more deliberate and distinct role as a broker in the enterprise-creation process. Such a 
role suggests that there is a hierarchy in the structure of social capital—perhaps driven 
by prestige and expertise, but this idea remains underdeveloped. 
Pollock et al. (2004) explore the role of brokers as information intermediaries in 
their examination of deal networks in the IPO market. In their construct, so-called 
network architects broker and manage structural holes in mediated markets. Akin to 
Kogut and Shan’s (1997) network-shaping broker, the underlying mechanism was 
identified much earlier by Simmel (1950) who called the behavior “tertius gaudens” (p. 
413)—the role of a third party who benefits from shaping and manipulating the 
relationship between two others. As Burt (2000) has pointed out, the function of the 
tertius gaudens relies on the actor’s ability to bridge the information and resource gaps 
between people who would otherwise remain disconnected. Such a function also 
requires that a “relationship of nonredundancy between two contacts” (p. 18) exists, 
meaning that competition to fill this role is resolved by actors purposefully taking action. 
This view ascribes a more active and deterministic design role for the broker in 
configuring the structure of the social network. The architect, according to Pollock et al. 
(2004), develops a brokerage function as a consequence of serial experience in 
dealmaking relying on “the stock of social resources the broker has accumulated from 
previously successful transactions that can be brought to bear on a current transaction . 
. . . vital in controlling the motivations of the broker in a mediated transaction” (p. 51). 
Though speaking specifically about the IPO market, the notion of the network architect 
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has significant applicability to other mediated markets, including venture capital and 
enterprise creation. 
This dissertation is concerned with the actors who are most responsible for 
generating and supporting entrepreneurial firms by shaping a vibrant regional network. It 
adopts these more active, deterministic, and mediated interpretations of the brokerage 
concept to analyze entrepreneurial dealmakers in the regional economy. This concept 
extends the definition of broker to include a notion of experience, reputation, and 
credibility gained through serial success in dealmaking and used to mediate and shape 
network relationships. These analyses suggest that neither the aggregated analyses that 
predominate the social capital and networks literature, nor the nascent constructs of 
brokerage currently developed in sociology adequately capture the function of 
dealmaker social capital in regional entrepreneurial networks. It is hypothesized that 
instead the dealmaker subsumes the constructs of serial experience, brokerage, and 
mediation currently advanced in the literature into a new synthesis—a novel framework 
that will now be explored. 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
POSTULATING THE DEALMAKER 
 
 
Dealmakers broker information, resources, and human capital required for new 
firms and serve to mediate the firm creation process in the regional economy. 
Dealmakers combine the attributes of both entrepreneurs and investors and bridge the 
critical human capital (entrepreneurs, investors, and other network actors) required to 
establish entrepreneurial firms. In so doing, they span structural holes in the regional 
network to integrate critically required resources supporting the firm birth process. 
Drawing on existing and established theory, this chapter characterizes the role of 
dealmakers at the level of the regional entrepreneurial economy to identify a unique 
synthesis that describes the mediating role they play in a region’s network of 
entrepreneurs and investors and to specify a conceptual model that will be used to 
measure and interpret dealmaker social capital in the entrepreneurial economy—the 
dealmaker milieu. 
The term dealmaker is used extensively and is commonplace in practice among 
entrepreneurs, but it has not been widely adopted in the academic literature. Indeed, a 
search on Google on April 1, 2010 yielded 371,000 returned web pages with dealmaker 
associated with the term investor and 51,600 returned web pages for dealmaker 
associated with the term entrepreneurship. These Google search results demonstrate 
the term’s wide practical use, its association with both entrepreneurs and investors, and 
its relatively more extensive use in the investment community over the entrepreneurial 
community. References to dealmaker in the academic literature, however, are quite 
sparse. Searches performed at the same time on Google Scholar, the same search 
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engine as Google that covers academic literature, returned 696 associations of the term 
with investor and 295 references to entrepreneur, with few of the searches resulting in 
literature from the fields encompassed in this dissertation (economics, regional science 
and development, entrepreneurship, sociology, and strategy research). A thorough 
analysis of all uses of the term using a broader library search strategy yielded no similar 
uses of the term in the academic fields and topical area of this dissertation beyond the 
references cited.  Kuhn (1988) made the first reference to dealmakers in the academic 
literature in his analysis of the investment banking industry. Wright et al. (1997) also 
used the terms “serial dealmakers” and “group creators” to describe entrepreneurs in a 
different context, involved in “a number of intermediate ventures which may or may not 
involve investment and which may or may not be successful . . . [and] are also more 
likely to be involved in more than one venture at the same time” (p. 265). Wright’s serial 
dealmaker is likened to the use of the term serial entrepreneur in the literature previously 
reviewed and suggested an intermediate in the entrepreneurial process, as opposed to 
an actor who actively shapes a network. The only other reference to dealmakers in the 
academic literature in entrepreneurship is from an unpublished conference paper from 
Guo and Nie (2007) who define dealmakers in the more limited sense previously 
adopted by Hsu and Hochberg to mean “venture capital firms as well as angel investors” 
(p. 2397). These more limited interpretations of the dealmaker concept do not capture 
the breadth of the term’s meaning proposed here. 
The dealmaker in this dissertation is much more than a mere intermediate. Akin 
to Malcolm Gladwell’s (2000) prototypical “connector” in his thought-provoking book The 
Tipping Point, the dealmaker suggests that “in the six degrees of separation, not all 
degrees are equal” (p. 36). Dealmakers are differentiated from the typical actor in the 
aggregate network. They are distinct. The concept of dealmaker in use here recaptures 
the Austrian school and Simmel’s (1950) meaning of tertius gaudens—translated literally 
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from Latin to mean “the third who enjoys” or “the rejoicing third”—attributing to the 
dealmaker an enlightened but also opportunistic motivation as part of the entrepreneurial 
network who benefits from shaping and manipulating the relationship between other 
actors. The concept of dealmaker proposed here is an actor who not only connects but 
mediates and brokers relationships so that those involved in the transaction recognize 
the importance of the dealmaker in the process. At the same time, the dealmaker enjoys 
brokering the marriage but may or may not benefit directly from it. The benefits that 
accrue, if there is reciprocity, may be tangible, as in the form of equity, or intangible, as 
in the form of prestige or gained reputational advantage. The dealmaker’s role is much 
more activist, proactive, and deterministic, serving to manage and shape relationships 
through the act of brokerage. 
While what motivates a dealmaker to mediate a relationship varies, it likely 
springs from a desire to build a vital community. There is a sense of responsibility that 
comes about from being a dealmaker. Most actors who rise to become dealmakers likely 
recognize that at one point in their history, another dealmaker assisted them in the 
process. Another insight on motivations stems from a desire to build a culture of 
entrepreneurship in a region or community. Dealmakers in the entrepreneurial network 
care take and nurture their own networks to build a business community that reflects 
what they aspire for the region: to be a vital ecosystem that supports entrepreneurs in 
building companies that reflect their own community goals. This goes well beyond the 
motivation to build a firm. It is tantamount to building a culture. In establishing and 
building the culture and its associated social capital, the dealmaker is building a 
cluster—a critical mass or a network that perpetuates deals like the ones he aspires to 
build next and perhaps building a community around them in the process. 
In the story of Israel’s entrepreneurial ecosystem retold in the book Start-up 
Nation, Senor and Singer (2009) cite the importance of a diaspora in the development of 
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an entrepreneurial culture in Israel. They hypothesize that this diaspora, activated 
through the work of active entrepreneurs and investors in Israel and abroad, served to 
develop a vital and sustained entrepreneurial economy in Israel. In this example, a 
common heritage and national spirit motivated the diaspora. While clearly there are 
other notable examples of diasporas based on cultural or ethnic heritage—most notably 
among the Indus entrepreneurs and the Mormon culture—this dissertation asserts that 
regional community networks are established and mediated by dealmakers motivated 
simply by the desire to build a community that shares their common aspirations for 
place. Moreover, dealmakers are motivated by a desire to assist fellow entrepreneurs 
and investors without promises of tangible reciprocal return. While this desire does not 
need to be motivated by a common nationality or cultural or ethnic affiliations, 
communities are certainly built on these lines. The places built by dealmakers, like the 
diaspora, are defined by their homesteads—the communities where they have decided 
to plant roots. And the tree the dealmakers tend bears fruit in the form of like-minded 
entrepreneurs and investors who also share a vision for what the place has the potential 
to be. Moreover, the dealmaking process allows them to build bridges among 
entrepreneurs and investors that accrue reputational advantage to them, building their 
credibility in the community and their capacity for future dealmaking. 
The insight of the diaspora places focus on the central dealmakers who serve to 
mediate, extend, and shape an entrepreneurial network. The conceptualization of 
dealmakers postulated here has been the result of cumulative observations made by the 
author through a two-decade-long career as an entrepreneur and through working with 
hundreds of individual entrepreneurs and investors in developing their ventures. While 
this dissertation cannot confirm the motivation that drives the dealmaker, any 
evolutionary claims on how the dealmakers form future networks, or how dealmakers 
benefit from the mediation process, it can only hypothesize at this point if dealmakers 
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exist, their characteristics, and their association with successful entrepreneurial 
economies. 
So that a picture can be painted on what is meant by dealmaker in this 
dissertation, a few examples drawn from this experience (but anonymized for 
confidentiality) may serve to clarify the unique role dealmakers are hypothesized to play 
in mediating entrepreneurial networks. 
Example 1. The Serial Entrepreneur Dealmaker: Consider this first example of 
the activist local serial entrepreneur. Rian has had a successful run as an entrepreneur 
and is now involved in her third successful venture. Receiving a substantial payout as a 
result of her last successful exit, she now serves as an investor in two regional angel 
funds and on the board of several promising early stage ventures, while serving as 
chairman of her newest venture. She hosts a get-together called a meet-up at her house 
every quarter for all active entrepreneurs in the region trying to get a start. Her LinkedIn 
account has countless contacts, which she allows to be observed by anyone who is 
looking for an introduction to other entrepreneurs, investors, and service providers. She 
is always happy to make introductions to others on behalf of entrepreneurs she believes 
in. Rian also has an active social philanthropy serving the autism community where she 
mixes those in the entrepreneurial network and culture of the region and those interested 
in supporting this cause. She is called upon by many individuals and organizations for 
both her expertise and for financial support, but she remains very strategic and judicious 
in what she uses her time doing so that she can remain focused on her primary 
objectives: the success of her newest venture, the development of an entrepreneurial 
ecosystem in her community, and her philanthropic goals. 
Example 2. The Corporate Executive Dealmaker: Consider a second example 
of the corporate executive turned entrepreneurial CEO. Shawn worked his way up in 
several high-growth public companies in the telecommunications market in sales and 
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received progressively more responsibility over time to ultimately run the inside sales 
organization of a distinguished public company with an entrepreneurial history and 
culture. While developing his career, Shawn established channel relationships worldwide 
on behalf of his employers and amassed a set of contacts that are unparalleled in the 
mobile communications industry. While he continually received calls from headhunters 
asking that he consider senior sales and business development positions for several 
prominent start-ups, he never pursued them because he was paid better than those 
offers and thought he should be the CEO and not the salesperson for those ventures. 
After a number of such calls, he finally inquires, “Why am I not being called to consider 
CEO positions instead? I oversee a 1,200 person inside-sales division in a high-growth 
private company and have compensation and options valued five times higher than what 
you are offering.” The headhunter responds, “Simple, you are not qualified yet to be 
CEO.” This comment spurs Shawn on. He accepts a C-level position in a venture 
backed by a top VC in Silicon Valley and participates in a successful exit. Following this 
experience, he is offered a CEO position to run another venture backed by one of the 
investors in the syndicate that funded his previous venture. While CEO, he takes it upon 
himself to assist other corporate executives attempting to make the transition to 
becoming CEO and assembles a small angel investment group to support these aspiring 
corporate entrepreneurs in his specialized market. Through active investments, and by 
serving on the board of their ventures, he assists them in making the transition and 
thereby develops a set of high-growth ventures in his community. 
Example 3. Professional Venture Capitalist Dealmaker 
Consider this third example of the professional VC. Just finishing his MBA at 
Wharton, Skip started his career at a high-end services company with an active high-
growth venture management practice based in New York. In this position, he supported 
multiple private-equity financings for high-growth companies and got to know the 
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management of these companies intimately by guiding them through the IPO process. 
He always asked himself, “If these folks can do this, why can’t I?” And after five years of 
working with outside ventures, he decided to do one himself. With the backing of a high 
net-worth investor he befriended during his consulting days, Skip established a well-
timed venture in the e-commerce industry. After a three-year run, he sold the company 
to a major publicly listed information technology company and made considerable wealth 
from the transaction. The venture firm that financed his successful venture asked him to 
join them as a general partner and evaluate new investment opportunities in the 
information technology industry. Again, Skip’s timing was perfect. He rejected a life of 
leisure and daily golf in exchange for a brisk and busy life advising and overseeing 
portfolio companies. The fund was able to raise from institutional limited-partner 
investors hundreds of millions of dollars, and Skip spent eight years with the venture firm 
as a partner evaluating deals, making investments, and serving on boards. But he never 
lost his desire to run his own firm again; and when an opportunity presented itself 
through one of the VC investments in due diligence, he jumped at the opportunity. Skip 
quit the firm, is now the CEO of one of the firm’s portfolio companies, and actively 
partners with firms in complementary markets and industries in the region to assist them 
in building their ventures. While he is no longer investing himself as a partner in a 
venture capital firm, his opinions and advice are actively sought by CEOs preparing their 
ventures for consideration by venture capital investors. He is considered the dean of the 
region’s entrepreneurial network, having successfully exited a company, investing in 
scores more as a venture capitalist, and now returning to his roots to do it again. 
In each of these examples—derived from personal experience—these actors 
play substantial roles that exceed their immediate responsibility to a particular company. 
Moreover, they defy a simple definition of entrepreneur or investor, as all have had 
experience in playing these roles interchangeably and in most cases concurrently. 
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Moreover, their experience and know-how has provided them the basis to mediate and 
shape entrepreneurial networks. 
This dissertation returns to the conceptual model founded on existing theory in 
order to avoid cognitive bias introduced by the researcher’s own views. It postulates that 
there are dealmaker entrepreneurs and investors who leverage their experience to 
occupy a unique role in social capital networks and thereby shape those networks to 
enhance entrepreneurial activity. This concept suggests that social networks may be 
mediated by dealmakers who are facile in the entrepreneurial market as a consequence 
of their serial experience in building, fostering, and funding companies and in developing 
credibility that is actively sought in the market by all stakeholders. Their credibility in the 
market is built on expertise and is perpetuated through serial experience, allowing 
dealmakers to play a strong mediation role in a networked economy. 
Building upon and extending the body of existing theory reviewed earlier, this 
dissertation posits that dealmakers share three primary attributes: 
1. Serial Entrepreneurial Experience: Dealmakers are facile and 
accomplished in establishing new entrepreneurial firms, either through an 
operating or investing role, and these roles are interchangeable. Moreover, 
dealmakers have serial experience and concurrent fiduciary responsibility for 
three or more entrepreneurial firms concurrently. 
 
2. Between Central Mediation: Dealmakers are central actors in the network 
through whom information, resources, and communication flows, allowing 
them to mediate and facilitate relationships between entrepreneurs and 
investors in the firm formation process. 
 
3. Network Shaping Brokerage: Dealmakers mediate between entrepreneurs 
and investors in market transactions and play a role in shaping or configuring 
networks by sharing expertise, information, and resources with others in the 
network with no assumption of tangible return. 
 
These three characteristics, when blended together, represent a unique synthesis not 
previously advanced by existing theory. However, this synthesis is substantiated by 
integrating existing theory and then seeking to uncover these characteristics empirically 
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and qualitatively later. The next sections will outline how these three characteristics are 
combined into a unique synthesis typifying the dealmaker. 
Serial Entrepreneurship 
The first trait that characterizes a dealmaker is seriality. Serial entrepreneurship 
has been less examined in the literature as a structured social capital concept than 
brokerage. Current research associates serial entrepreneurship with the growth of 
business clusters (Rosa, 1998); opportunity identification behavior (Ucbasaran & 
Westhead, 2009); success over novice entrepreneurs in developing networks (Li, 
Schulze, & Li, 2009); business experience (Nicolaou & Birley, 2003); parallel 
entrepreneurship (Alsos & Kolvereid, 1998); policies that support novice entrepreneurs 
(Westhead, Ucbasaran, Wright, & Binks, 2005); and redeployment of human capital 
during bankruptcy (Baird & Morrison, 2005). Serial entrepreneurship, originally termed 
habitual entrepreneurship, was first defined by MacMillan (1986) as “someone who has 
had experience in multiple business startups, and simultaneously is involved in at least 
two businesses” (p. 241). While this original definition has held for the most part in the 
literature on seriality, attempts have been made to distinguish the concepts of serial from 
parallel or portfolio entrepreneurship, with seriality defined as sequential non-overlapping 
business ownership and parallel and portfolio entrepreneurship representing concurrent 
ownership of multiple ventures at one time (Alsos & Kolvereid, 1998; Westhead, 
Ucbasaran, Wright et al., 2005). This analysis maintains MacMillan’s (1986) original 
definition of seriality relating to simultaneous involvement in at least two or more 
businesses. 
Another important attribute of the serial entrepreneur defined in the literature is 
the careful distinction between novice and serial entrepreneurs based on their degree of 
experience (Westhead, Ucbasaran, & Wright, 2005; Westhead & Wright, 1998). 
Nicolaou and Birley (2003), in their important study of academic entrepreneurs, found 
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that those without experience rely more heavily on network structures and third parties to 
span structural holes. In this construct, experienced serial entrepreneurs are an 
important element of social capital supporting novice entrepreneurs, which implies a 
relationship between serial entrepreneurs that extends well beyond brokerage. Instead, 
it suggests a mediation role that defines the relationship between experienced and less-
experienced actors and influences the network structure through which each actor 
interacts. This interpretation lends important insight on the role of the experienced 
dealmaker in entrepreneurial network. There is an implied reciprocal relationship that 
accrues intangible reputational advantages to the dealmaker and allows the serial 
dealmaker to support and mediate relationships in the network on behalf of less 
experienced entrepreneurs. Serial experience leads dealmakers to become prominent in 
the network and span holes. This serial experience imbues dealmakers with status and 
reputational advantage to establish a hole-spanning function that exceeds the scope and 
character of simple intermediation and serves to complement and enhance their role as 
a mediator in the entrepreneurial network. 
Between Central Mediation 
The second trait that characterizes a dealmaker is between central mediation of 
entrepreneurial networks. Because there is not a comprehensive conceptual framework 
of brokerage at the level of the regional entrepreneurial network around which the 
literature may advance, entrepreneurship scholarship has stalled around a simple 
debate over whether entrepreneurs or investors contribute more to the success of social 
capital networks. As we have seen in the examples posed, the roles of entrepreneurs 
and investors often oscillate, switch, and intermingle in such a way that defies this 
distinction. Indeed, the literature’s continued use of mutually exclusive categories of 
entrepreneurs and investors may have inadvertently precluded a third possibility: that 
emerging from both classes are broker-dealmakers who blend the characteristics of 
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entrepreneurs and investors who mediate networks. An effective broker-dealmaker’s 
position in a social capital network may be, in effect, between entrepreneurs and 
investors and central to both. 
Betweenness centrality is an established measure in social network analysis that 
provides objectively measurable data with which to identify brokerage characteristics. It 
measures the extent to which other parties have to go through a given actor to conduct 
their business, defined as the proportion of paths between all pairs of nodes (i.e., actors 
and firms) that pass through a given actor (Peter, 2004; S. Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
Betweenness centrality is used extensively to measure brokerage functions played by 
central actors in entrepreneurial networks and is “interpreted as associated with an actor 
that may have greater power as an intermediary for information or access between other 
actors in the network” (Chiu, 2006, p. 26). Indeed, Kim and Aldrich (2005) assert that 
“actors with high betweenness centrality can act as brokers and take advantage of their 
central position” (p. 86). They go on to add: 
This brokering scenario builds on Knight’s definition of entrepreneurship, wherein 
an entrepreneur derives profits by bringing parties together, creating a market for 
economic exchange, and assuming the risk of a failed transaction. From this 
perspective, entrepreneurs need to cultivate a broad range of relationships to 
maintain high network efficiency and limited overlapping relationships. If 
successful, entrepreneurs holding this network position can become linkingpins, 
integrating previously disconnected local networks. Linkingpin individuals or 
organizations can fulfill three functions: communicating information, transferring 
resources or clients, and serving as role models (Kim & Aldrich, 2005, p. 78). 
 
Borrowing from this insight, this dissertation posits that dealmaker actors with multiple 
concurrent firm ties serve as linkingpin individuals: centrally located actors whose 
positions in the network allow them to access more of the network and identify potential 
opportunities before others, and who therefore broker these opportunities in the network. 
By occupying a position on the critical path of deal flow, dealmakers can connect people 
with complementary information and resources, bring other actors in the network 
together, and selectively and opportunistically broker information flow between them. 
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The dealmakers’ central position between other actors in the network also enables them 
to shape, channel, and mobilize the network to form interest groups and teams, 
investment syndicates, and other functions that support the creation and development of 
entrepreneurial firms (Kim & Aldrich, 2005). 
Network-Shaping Brokerage 
The third and final trait that characterizes dealmakers is their ability to shape 
networks in their role as a broker. The brokerage theory in sociology sets the stage for 
the dealmaker concept, but these functions and their related mechanisms in the social 
network have yet to be fully articulated at the regional level in planning scholarship. 
One body of research attempts to explain these mechanisms through agency 
theory. For example, in order to solve potential agency problems between investors and 
entrepreneurs, several attempts have been advanced to analyze contractual 
transactions between them (Hellman, 1998; Kaplan, 2001; Lerner, 1995). As another 
example, Amit, Glosten, and Muller (1990) suggest that entrepreneurs mitigate 
information asymmetry by involving VCs. Also, Hsu (2001, 2004) empirically evaluates 
the value added to an entrepreneurial enterprise that involves a reputable VC. The 
agency theorists suggest that VCs play an important brokerage role in supporting 
entrepreneurial actors, providing privileged access to information well beyond the 
investment resources they provide to the entrepreneur, and that the reputation of the VC 
acting as a broker enhances the interaction. More recently, Hsu (2006) and others have 
argued that VCs mediate information between entrepreneurs and the market (Aoki, 
2000; Burt, 2000; Gans, 2002). Sorenson and Stuart (2001) also posit an intermediary 
role for VCs in cooperative commercialization, suggesting that VCs partnering with 
entrepreneurs will extend the entrepreneur’s information and contact network. Following 
in the same vein, Sarasvathy, Simon, and Lave (1998) assert that there are fundamental 
differences in the way that entrepreneurs and bankers perceive risk, which may have 
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important implications on how risk influences brokerage roles they play. This suggests 
that social capital related to entrepreneurs and VCs should be not viewed with a 
common lens and that this brokerage role is not confined to investors alone. 
Indeed, current research also implies that a brokerage function exists among 
entrepreneurial social capital operating at the level of a regional network. Research on 
entrepreneurial networks has examined how entrepreneurs shape networks and asserts 
that the characteristics and extent of the entrepreneur’s personal network influences the 
success of the start-up (Dubini & Aldrich, 1991; Witt, 2004). Theories building on this 
network success hypothesis posit a positive relationship between the networking 
activities of founders and the success of the venture (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986), because 
socially embedded ties allow entrepreneurs to acquire resources that are expensive or 
impossible to obtain through markets, such as reputation and strategic customer 
contacts. This suggests that the strength and shape of an actor’s embedded ties might 
be part of the reason that an entrepreneurial venture thrives or fails (Bruderl & 
Preisendorfer, 1998; Witt, 2004). As Bruderl and Preisendorfer (1998) put it: “Those 
entrepreneurs who can refer to a broad and diverse social network and who receive 
much support from their network are more successful” (p. 213). 
Mediation, as an extension of brokerage, is not a practice inherently contained in 
the functional roles of entrepreneurs or investors as individual categories of social 
capital. Winch and Courtney (2007) point out that research assigning a mediating role to 
investors alone (as opposed to entrepreneurs) fails to specify exactly how these 
relationships incorporate a concept of brokerage. Their article brings into focus two core 
elements of the most recent research contrasting the principal-agent approach, which 
emphasizes the role of the actor, and ecological perspectives, which emphasize the role 
of the environment in influencing behavior. The concept of the brokerage used here 
must blend economic theory to understand the role of actors as economic agents, while 
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also understanding their social capital contributions. Blending arguments derived from 
both economic theory and agency theory, this dissertation asserts that the act of 
spanning holes, or bridging relationships, to connect disparate actors in a social capital 
network may be best accomplished by actors whose experience and concurrent firm ties 
span multiple functional activities, blending the roles of investor and entrepreneur to 
serve as a broker in shaping the entrepreneurial network: the dealmaker. 
Conceptual Model 
Building on the concepts established by the existing literature, the dealmaker in 
this study combines three characteristics—seriality, mediation, and network-shaping 
brokerage—that when blended together represent a unique synthesis not previously 
advanced by existing theory. For purposes of this thesis, a dealmaker is defined as: 
A facile and accomplished actor with serial venture experience in 
establishing new entrepreneurial firms who possesses fiduciary 
responsibility for three or more entrepreneurial firms concurrently; and 
plays a central role mediating, shaping, and configuring regional 
entrepreneurial networks to share expertise, information, and resources 
among entrepreneurs and investors, thereby facilitating new firm creation 
and supporting entrepreneurship. 
 
This definition, integrating and synthesizing three established functions of 
entrepreneurial networks in existing theory—seriality, mediation, and brokerage—will be 
evaluated and tested empirically and qualitatively in the forthcoming analysis. 
Figure 1 shows the conceptual model proposed to examine the social capital 
composition and network structure of an entrepreneurial economy and to compare 
aggregate and dealmaker views. The model separates actors in the entrepreneurial 
economy into the two mutually exclusive categories defined by aggregate social capital 
theory: investors and entrepreneurs. It then separates them further based on their roles 
and affiliations with entrepreneurial and finance firms. This mutually exclusive 
designation is derived from the actor’s primary employment or board affiliation, based on 
that person’s title and primary firm affiliation. The subject of interest—the individual actor 
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in an entrepreneurial firm—is qualified as a consequence of his or her direct involvement 
in the formation of entrepreneurial companies, as a member of a firm’s board of 
directors, or as an officer of the company. As a board member or as an officer, the actor 
has fiduciary responsibilities to the firm; holds equity in the firm and/or is compensated 
for his or her services; and, as a consequence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, is 
legally liable for the firm. Because those with fiduciary responsibility for an 
entrepreneurial venture by definition serve as managers or board members of the firm, 
board and firm-tie interlocks are an effective method for identifying dealmakers. 
 
 
Adopting MacMillan’s (1986) definition of serial entrepreneurship as involvement 
in at least two concurrent ventures, this study defines an actor with three or more 
concurrent entrepreneurial firm ties as dealmakers. It then counts the frequency of 
concurrent ties to show the degree to which the dealmaker is connected to 
entrepreneurial firms. This characteristic is not possessed exclusively by a single class 
Figure 1. Conceptual Model 
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of social capital as suggested in the aggregate literature, such as VCs, but is shared by 
entrepreneurs and investors alike (see Figure 1). Therefore, as the number of ties to 
entrepreneurial firms increase, an entrepreneur or investor with a single firm tie 
transitions to a serial actor (two ties) to a dealmaker (three ties). It is further 
hypothesized that while it is practical for an actor to have two firm ties and still maintain 
an operational role in a given firm, it is less likely for an actor to be able to maintain an 
operational role within a given firm when maintaining three concurrent ties, and even 
less likely when assuming four or more ties and so on. While serial entrepreneurs may 
retain an operational role in one or two firms, operational responsibilities to any one firm 
is expected to decrease as the number of firm ties increase due to the enhanced span of 
control involved. And as operational responsibilities for any single firm diminish, the 
actor’s capacity for dealmaking increases. As the number of ties to entrepreneurial firms 
increase to encompass oversight of several firms concurrently (three or more), the 
dealmaker’s role in any given firm will be more limited, but that person’s reach and 
influence on other firms outside his or her core responsibility increases. However, the 
dealmaker remains responsible to the firm in a fiduciary sense as a result of a board or 
managerial tie to the firm. To evaluate the differences that arise in social capital structure 
as these transitions occur, the data on dealmakers is separated by frequency of ties, 
with specific focus on the early transition from three to four or more concurrent ties. 
This study hypothesizes that regions with more dealmakers will generate more 
new entrepreneurial firms. Dealmakers build critical bridges through their core networks 
internal to the region to interconnect human capital, information, and resources germane 
to the firm birth process. It is hypothesized that regions developing a strong network of 
dealmakers and a milieu that supports the creation of dealmakers will also create more 
of the new firm births that are a hallmark of successful entrepreneurial economies. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The data for the dissertation is drawn from the CapitalIQ database, a private 
database maintained and licensed by Standard & Poor's that provides quantitative 
research data and analysis applications to over 4,200 investment management firms, 
private equity funds, investment banks, advisory firms, corporations, and universities. 
This unique private dataset maintains detailed records about private firms, their 
managements, and their boards of directors based on data submitted by the companies 
at incorporation and through the SEC shelf registration process. CapitalIQ has one of the 
most comprehensive cross-sectional datasets of information on private companies and 
entrepreneurial firms available in the United States, which facilitates regional 
comparisons on a common analytical framework. A cross-check of the CapitalIQ data 
with Thomson Financial’s VentureXpert—a comparative dataset that also covers the 
sample regions—confirmed that the firm- and actor-level data were robust, complete, 
and current. 
The dataset provides a snapshot of current and past firm affiliations by person in 
each of the 12 sample regions as listed on December 18, 2009 when the data was 
extracted for this study. This yields a sample of 85,579 individual actors among 22,201 
private entrepreneurial firms. In order to facilitate data acquisition and to identify patterns 
in social networks at the actor level, an algorithm was created to develop unique 
datasets from CapitalIQs formatted files. The algorithm identifies individual actors based 
on their entrepreneurial firm affiliations, their geographic locations, and their parallel 
affiliations as executives or board members of finance firms. By distinguishing clearly the 
 41 
primary employment or board relationships for individual actors (entrepreneurial firms or 
finance firms), the algorithm allows actors to be classified into mutually exclusive 
categories according to their primary role as entrepreneurs or investors, upholding the 
entrepreneur-investor dichotomy framed in the literature. The algorithm also uses the 
affiliation data and geographic screens to build mutually exclusive sets of data for all 
actors identified by the CapitalIQ database who are selected by a consistent and 
common set of characteristics, facilitating uniform comparisons of the data across case 
regions. It further separates actors into groups based on the number of concurrent firm 
ties they hold, allowing for comparison between typical entrepreneurs and investors and 
those with dealmaker traits with multiple entrepreneurial firm ties, both within and across 
the sample regions. Finally, the algorithm uses the affiliation data and geographic 
screens to build mutually exclusive, consistent sets of data for each identified actor in all 
12 sample regions, facilitating uniform comparisons of the data across regions. 
The algorithm identifies all actors affiliated with entrepreneurial firms in the given 
region for the five industry sectors included in the analysis and categorizes their role, as 
follows: 
Entrepreneur: any individual who is identified as having a board, management, 
or operating role in an entrepreneurial firm in the subject region, and who does 
not serve as a key executive of a finance firm inside or outside the region 
 
Investor: any individual who is identified as having a board, management, or 
operating role in an entrepreneurial firm in the subject region, and who serves 
concurrently as a key executive of an investment or equity firm inside or outside 
the subject region 
 
A drawback of the dataset is that it only provides a current snapshot of present and 
former firm affiliations by person and does not allow longitudinal time-series evaluation. 
Snapshot data may present an external validity threat because affiliation data for the 
sample regions on December 18 may not accurately reflect affiliations in the general 
population on that same date. Snapshot data may also fail to provide internal 
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consistency reliability, because affiliations in the sample regions may vary based on the 
date the data is extracted. 
Moreover, because firm affiliations are more readily captured by the database 
provider when firms receive institutional financing, the data likely over report firms 
financed by venture capital, banks, or private equity and under report firms in the small-
business sector, early-stage firms that are not yet documented, or firms that grow 
through revenue without outside financing. This bias is partially corrected because the 
biotech and information technology firms that dominate the entrepreneurial sector are 
much more likely to be financed by venture capital and private equity. 
Firms are selected for inclusion in the database based on a consistent industry-
classification scheme employed by CapitalIQ, which corresponds to standard North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) Code classifications for industries that 
typically generate significant numbers of entrepreneurial start-ups. Data are collected for 
private firms in five categories, representing the sectors from which high-growth, 
advanced-technology entrepreneurial firms are most often derived. Industry 
classifications are retained to allow for analysis of variance at the sector level. The 
sectors are: 
Information Technology Industry Classifications 
Health Care Technology (Primary) 
Information Technology (Primary) 
Telecommunication Services (Primary) 
 
Life Sciences and Biotech Industry Classifications 
Healthcare Equipment and Supplies (Primary) 
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology and Life Sciences (Primary) 
 
These two industries are selected in the study because they are associated with 
significant start-up activity based on innovation and consistently report early-stage 
organization and financing activities used as part of the data collection process to 
accumulate social capital data associated with new firm foundations described later. 
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Information technology and life sciences also represent technology-based industries that 
are clustered in each of the sample regions. Data is retained on the industry 
classifications of each firm through which social capital is associated to test for variations 
in social network patterns that arise by industry. All data and analysis reported in this 
dissertation, however, represent the combined set of industries listed. 
Analytical Strategy and Methodology 
There are two analytical chapters presented in this dissertation: The first 
(Chapter 5) entails an empirical analysis of the social capital structure of the case 
regions, and the second (Chapter 6) involves a qualitative examination of the social 
capital characteristics of actors in the RTP region. While the research questions and 
empirical and analytical approach used are reviewed in detail in each chapter, the 
analytical strategy for this dissertation is outlined here. 
The empirical chapter of the dissertation is divided into two complementary and 
reinforcing analytical strategies based on the same firm- and actor-level data derived 
from CapitalIQ and screened through the algorithm: a social capital composition analysis 
and a social network component analysis. The first analysis empirically evaluates the 
composition of social capital for each of the subject regions and seeks to relate it to 
successful entrepreneurial outcomes as measured by new firm births. The analysis then 
presents correlations comparing aggregate social capital and structured dealmaker 
social capital and measures of successful entrepreneurial economies. The algorithm 
identifies all actors affiliated with entrepreneurial firms in the given region for the sectors 
included in the analysis, and these actors are placed into the two mutually exclusive 
categories: entrepreneurs and investors. The second analysis, evaluating social network 
structure, analyzes the component structure of the overall regional network of 
entrepreneurial firms and actors and compares the social networks in each of the study 
regions based on the characteristics of the aggregate and dealmaker networks. This 
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comparative analysis, based on the same empirical data presented for the social capital 
composition analysis, allows for inferences to be made on how social capital is 
structured at the level of the regional entrepreneurial network and relates network 
structure to the outcomes of the region in giving rise to new firms. The social network 
analysis is performed using a network graph editor called yED, which is used to compute 
and visualize the nodes and firm connections statistically and graphically from the social 
capital analysis from which macro- and micro-network analysis can be derived. This tool 
is used to show the differences in network structure among all 12 sample regions for the 
total network of dealmakers, with network diagrams visualizing the data presented in the 
appendices of this dissertation. 
This qualitative chapter of this dissertation entails a more detailed analysis of the 
social capital composition of the RTP region of North Carolina in the United States in 
order to probe the common characteristics and profiles of dealmakers in this single case 
region in the sample. This analysis utilizes a research strategy undertaken in four 
cumulative and reinforcing qualitative analyses, namely: 
 Content analysis and career modeling: a qualitative analysis of 
biographical data for individuals identified as dealmakers, modeling their 
current and prior positions 
 
 Pathway analysis: a social network analysis to empirically assess the typical 
career progressions of dealmakers, to determine the highest-frequency 
pathways, and to identify the most central positions representing dealmakers 
 
 Betweenness centrality of the dealmaker network: an analysis of the full 
network of dealmakers in the region to identify those who are most between 
central and thereby represent the nodes through which most social capital is 
connected and to identify how dealmakers mediate the network and connect 
aggregate social capital 
 
 Dealmaker profiles: Following the identification of the most degree-central 
actors in the dealmaker network, a qualitative examination is performed to 
identify the most typical career profiles, characteristics, and progressions, 
serving as model profiles to understand typical dealmakers. 
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This qualitative analysis will serve to identify the backgrounds and characteristics 
of dealmakers, identify their likely origins and roles in the context of RTP, reveal how 
dealmakers are connected to one another and mediate aggregate networks, and finally 
establish a set of profiles that dealmakers follow in order to support future scholarship 
and empirical work applying the structured social capital concept of the dealmaker. 
This dissertation employs a structured comparative empirical analysis to cross-
compare social network characteristics and probe more deeply into the characteristics of 
the dealmaker. It presents the results of a structured content analysis of biographical 
data to show typical career pathways of dealmakers and then distills central pathways 
into a series of profiles detailing their social networks relationships, their embedded role 
in the regional entrepreneurial economy, and their professional origins. Those 
dealmakers profiled are selected using a social network analysis technique that 
estimates betweenness centrality, a measure to identify those with the highest mediation 
characteristics in the aggregate network. 
This case study design employs both an empirical analysis and a qualitative 
content and network analysis, which provides two sources of information from which to 
derive evidence to support the case study analysis, thereby improving its robustness 
(Yin, 1984, 1993). Since this project is concerned with the structured analysis of an 
unstructured concept—the entrepreneurial milieu supporting new firm foundings—a 
case-study approach is most appropriate, as it provides a durable framework to explore 
complex social phenomena. 
The drawback of this design is that it is impossible to draw causal conclusions for 
regional development from this project, as it does not provide a sufficient basis for 
scientific generalization (Stake, 1995; Yin, 1984, 1993). However, the analysis is 
structured based on the current theory in the literature and the body of research done on 
this phenomenon to date, thereby improving its leverage on future hypothesis 
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development. Moreover, by using existing theory to design the study and design the 
conceptual framework, this project satisfies Yin’s (1993) assertion that it “not only 
facilitates the data collection phase of the ensuing case study. The appropriately 
developed theory also is the level at which the generalization of the case study results 
will occur” (p. 16).  By constructing and situating the conceptual framework in the context 
of existing theory, this dissertation also draws upon the existing body of knowledge, as 
Marshall and Rossman (1999) assert “ are “derived from a thorough familiarity with 
literature on relevant theory, empirical studies, reviews of research, and informed essays 
by knowledgeable experts” (p. 23). 
It introduces a new level and approach to analyzing empirically social capital 
structure, thereby providing a rigorous framework to test hypotheses. Indeed, this design 
satisfies Yin’s (1993) criteria both for “richness of the context,” meaning that it relies “on 
a single data collection method but . . . use multiple sources of evidence,” and “rigor” 
pursuing “quantitative, distinctive strategies needed for research design and for analysis” 
(p. 3). Therefore this research design will produce case study findings that will enable 
future researchers to formulate and test more precise and informed hypotheses based 
on the concepts investigated in this dissertation (Nooy, Mrvar, & Batagelj, 2005). 
Empirical Context of the Technopole: Signaling Entrepreneurial Intent 
 
This study identifies a similar set of regions for analysis known for their 
propensity to give rise to new technology-based firms. These regions commonly follow 
the model of the technopole, a widely investigated and researched metropolitan planning 
framework in the regional development literature beginning in the early 1980s that 
serves as the sample frame for this dissertation. This theory postulates that these 
regions are well positioned to encourage new technology-based firms as a result of a 
concentrated cluster of technology- and innovation-based industries. It was surmised 
that this concentration of resources would encourage the formation of a supportive 
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entrepreneurial milieu to bring about an entrepreneurial economy. This theoretical 
construct serves as a sampling strategy for this study. Technopole theory prescribed that 
high-technology regions develop a supportive milieu, meaning in this context a symbiotic 
entrepreneurial social capital structure. As this dissertation is concerned with social 
capital, technopoles serve as a means to identify a sample set of regions that sought to 
induce the formation of an entrepreneurial milieu through the adoption of a technology 
agglomeration strategy. 
For three decades regions have tried to copy the success of Silicon Valley and 
transform their regional economies. This type of development, built upon the early 
regional development theory of the technopole, promised to exploit a region’s innovative 
potential and its research and development competencies to transform its economy 
through the establishment of an entrepreneurial milieu. A core element of this theory 
postulated that with the development of the infrastructure of innovation, an 
entrepreneurial milieu would emerge to support the birth of new firms, stimulating the 
growth of an entrepreneurial economy (Breschi & Lissoni, 2001; Löfsten & Lindelöf, 
2003; Shefer & Frenkel, 1998). It was hypothesized that regions that agglomerated 
industrial, university, and government innovation assets, termed technopoles, possess 
robust infrastructure to support entrepreneurial firm birth and development. Decades 
have passed, making it an opportune time to evaluate which technopoles created the 
entrepreneurial milieu they sought and which did not. The technopoles represent simply 
a productive and useful sample frame because these regions specifically pursued an 
entrepreneurial milieu by agglomerating innovation and resources with mixed 
entrepreneurial results. This analysis begins to discern the factors behind those mixed 
results by investigating each region’s social capital structure and identifying 
characteristics in the social capital framework that are consistent with the concept of 
dealmakers. But the scope of this dissertation does not include an examination of 
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technopole theory per se and the validity of this regional development concept. The 
selection of technopole regions as a sample frame is simply a proxy for the signaling 
event for the region’s intent to establish an entrepreneurial milieu. 
While there have been myriad articles, manuscripts, and books written on the 
comparison of technopoles and technology-based regions—both in the United States 
and internationally—very little academic work has been done on the social capital 
implications that account for the variable success of entrepreneurial economies in 
encouraging new firm births. This dissertation adopts the regions that followed a 
technopole regional development strategy as a discrete sample frame. Technopole 
strategies commonly identify regions that sought to increase their entrepreneurial 
outcomes by pursuing an intentional strategy of entrepreneurship. With the adoption of 
technopole agglomeration strategies, these regions signaled their intent to develop a 
supportive entrepreneurial milieu. Technopoles sought to establish a strong 
entrepreneurial social capital framework to encourage the formation of start-up firms 
based on the technology advantage supported through the agglomeration of research 
and development in the region. 
Rogers and Larsen (1984) were the first to address the growth of a high-
technology social capital framework based on entrepreneurship in Silicon Valley Fever: 
Growth of High-Technology Culture, where they characterized the interplay between 
large research-intensive firms and new entrepreneurial firms in the context of an 
agglomerated economy. This early work, which sets the sample frame for this project, 
highlights the research and development profile of the Silicon Valley research complex 
and was the first to identify the role of venture capital and networking in the 
entrepreneurship culture that fueled regional economic growth. Rogers and Larsen 
emphasized innovation agglomeration and the entrepreneurial milieu as critical elements 
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of regional competitiveness, setting the stage for the literature on the technopole 
phenomenon. 
 Following Rogers and Larsen (1984), a series of books were published telling the 
stories of the emerging United States technopoles emulating Silicon Valley’s success—
particularly among secondary regions that are less well known and less understood than 
their celebrated Bay Area counterpart. Smilor, Kozmetsky, and Gibson’s (1988) Creating 
the Technopolis included a comparison of Silicon Valley and Route 128, along with 
evaluations of Cambridge, United Kingdom; Osaka, Japan; the Albany region of New 
York; and the editors’ home region of Austin. A comprehensive comparative analysis of 
the development of United States research parks was completed by Luger and Goldstein 
(1991) fueling greater interest in the role of research and development agglomeration in 
regional growth theory and policy. This was followed by an in-depth evaluation of Route 
128 by Rosegrant and Lampe (1992), which evaluated the Boston region’s unique 
strengths in government, industry, and academia credited for creating the now infamous 
Massachusetts Miracle. Technopolis by Scott (1993) featured the Orange County region 
of Southern California as a model, with an academic examination of geographic 
localization economies, innovation, and spatial agglomeration. 
Saxenian’s Regional Advantage (1994), published two years after Preer, has 
become the most cited work comparing Route 128 to Silicon Valley, likely because of its 
specific treatment of the differences in social network structure between the two regions 
(Preer, 1992; Saxenian, 1994). This was followed by a more exhaustive evaluation of the 
technopole concept by Castells and Hall (1994) that reviewed the characteristics of the 
innovative milieu of both Route 128 and Silicon Valley, accompanied by a score of other 
domestic and international examples. More recent contributions to the literature on 
technopoles include an anthology of essays, Silicon Valley Edge, which specifically deal 
with the intersection of innovation and entrepreneurship (Lee et al., 2000). This 
 50 
literature, clearly rooted in endogenous regional growth theory and emphasizing the 
strengths and features of regional networks in building an entrepreneurial milieu, 
consistently stops short of empirically testing social capital theories (which clearly 
existed at the time) in any systematic way. This represents the departure point for this 
dissertation. 
 In terms of formal structured analysis of social network characteristics of new 
firms and their related social capital structures in the context of a regional economy, 
there are only three key studies done at the level of the technopole. The earliest analysis 
of the underlying social capital structure of Silicon Valley is an article by Castilla et al. 
(2000) that probes the social capital relationships between founders of semi-conductor 
firms, their related venture capital connections, and the organizations that support new 
entrepreneurial firms, namely the accounting and law firms and the investment banks. 
Mayer (2003) develops in her dissertation project a comprehensive analysis of the 
Portland, Oregon region, which she termed the “Silicon Forest” (p.43). While Mayer did 
not leverage social networking techniques, the study did examine the spinoff effects of 
the largest employers in the Portland region using an innovative firm genealogy-tree 
diagramming technique. The most competent analysis to date using social capital 
analysis and networking techniques at the level of the technopole is an analysis of the 
computer-related firm spinouts from Cambridge University by Myint et al. (2005) that 
probes the connections among common founders and their relationships with venture 
capital sources. While social network methodologies are well established and are used 
extensively in other areas of regional science, particularly in Europe, they have not been 
heavily leveraged in studying social capital structure or network-level phenomena in the 
context of an entrepreneurial economy. 
Because the literature related to endogenous growth theory and new firm 
foundings has largely concentrated on regional macro-economic conditions and firm 
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clusters, very little is known about the structure of social capital comprising the 
entrepreneurial milieu. Based on the definitions in the literature, a composite definition 
may be derived to serve as a departure point in operationalizing this analysis, as follows: 
A technopole is a regional economy that promotes technology transfer and 
commercialization through the agglomeration of innovation-based assets to 
enhance networking and cooperation among private, public, non-profit, and 
university institutions and equity capital; to encourage the growth of knowledge-
based businesses and organizations; and to stimulate the development of an 
entrepreneurial milieu supporting the establishment of new technology-based 
firms. 
 
Specifically, this project will focus on the relationship between structured social capital 
and the creation of an entrepreneurial economy encouraging high rates of new firm 
births. 
Sampling Strategy 
This literature has spawned a healthy industry of academic papers and 
publications making economic comparisons between metropolitan regions based on 
their technopole strategies and the characteristics believed to support an entrepreneurial 
economy’s success. This literature represents a productive sample frame, given that an 
expected outcome from technopole theory and the adoption of a technopole regional 
development strategy is the emergence of an entrepreneurial milieu, which may be 
measured through a comparative analysis of social capital. The adoption of the 
technopole strategy therefore serves as a signal of intent to develop a regional economy 
based on technology-led entrepreneurship. The technopole is therefore a convenient 
construct used for the design of this sample. 
This project focuses specifically on what explains variation in entrepreneurial 
outcomes among a relatively similar group of regions endowed with a homogeneous set 
of innovative resources supporting firm birth. In order to address the question of the role 
and structure of social capital, a sample of technopole regions represented a particularly 
fruitful sampling strategy, because they generally sought to induce an entrepreneurial 
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milieu by intentionally agglomerating innovation assets. Moreover, these regions are 
generally cited in both the academic press and in the popular press as hot spots of 
innovation and recognized for their ability to encourage entrepreneurship. However, the 
nature of social capital structure and composition has not been systematically and 
empirically studied in any of the books published on this topic to date, beyond anecdotal 
observation and conjecture. This regional sample therefore serves as a most productive 
sample frame to address the questions of social capital composition and structure 
hypothesized. While it is acknowledged that these findings will not be generalizable to all 
regions, it is hoped that this analysis will provide a critical assessment of the 
assumptions and validity of the social capital dimensions of technopole theory and 
provide insights on the composition of entrepreneurial social capital in technology-rich 
regions to advance current thinking. 
To design the sample, a citation analysis was performed of all book or study-
length projects examining the concept of the technopole in United States regions, 
beginning with Roger and Larson’s Silicon Valley Fever (1984). A citation analysis was 
used to corroborate that each of the metropolitan regions cited by Rogers and Larsen 
was also cited in at least one subsequent book-length project on the topic of technopoles 
published between 1980 and 2000. This yielded the 12 regions shown in Table 2. 
Clearly, Silicon Valley and Boston’s Route 128 represent the most cited regions 
in the literature due to their historic success in building an entrepreneurial economy. 
Among the other regions in the sample, RTP has long been cited in the literature as a 
model of a formally planned technopole, anchored by what has emerged to become the 
largest research park in the United States. Among other domestic technopoles, both San 
Diego and Austin were cited more than twice. The remaining regions were each cited 
once after Rogers and Larsen. These 12 regions serve as the sample frame to be cross-
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compared, with Silicon Valley and Boston serving as prototypes of successful 
entrepreneurial economies. 
Table 2. Regional Citation Analysis of Studies on Technopoles 
 
To evaluate the relative success of entrepreneurial economies at the regional 
level, it is important to identify regions that pursued an intentional strategy of 
entrepreneurship. The following 12 regions derived from the citation analysis serve as 
the sample of this dissertation, shown in Table 3 below with their respective federal 
geographic units, their geographical name references, and their census reported 
populations in 2008: 
Table 3. Geographic Definitions and Population of Sample Regions 
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A geographic analysis of the regions was performed to identify whether these 
metropolitan areas represented a single-core metropolitan area, designated as a 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), or a multi-core metropolitan area, designated as a 
Combined Statistical Area (CSA). MSAs have at least one urbanized area of 50,000 or 
more population, plus an adjacent territory with a high degree of social and economic 
integration with the core as measured by commuting ties. CSAs represent larger 
regional units with broader social and economic interactions characterized by multiple 
metropolitan cores. Where appropriate, the CSA was the preferred geographic unit (with 
seven of the 12 regions classified as CSAs) given that (1) entrepreneurial activity and 
firm locations are generally not confined to the tight geographic boundaries of a single 
metropolitan area, (2) social capital is mobile within a wider geographic region, and (3) 
geographic development patterns vary widely among these regions. In consultation with 
two leading regional scientists (Edward Feser at University of Illinois-Champagne 
Urbana and William Graves at University of North Carolina at Charlotte), this mix of 
MSAs and CSAs was confirmed as an appropriate comparative unit, along with Orange 
County, which was distinctly identified in the technopole literature citations as a county 
and was the only unit inconsistent with a defined federal statistical area. This is 
defensible as Orange County is part of a large metropolitan area (Los Angeles), the 
population of the county roughly represents the mean of the regions included in the 
sample, and the county operates as a relatively distinct economic unit. Geographic 
boundary definitions are derived from the Standards for Defining Metropolitan and 
Micropolitan Statistical Areas.1 
The research design specifies that actor-level social capital relationships are 
analyzed through firms, which are nested within regions, consistent with the conceptual 
                                                 
1 Published by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in Federal Register Notice (65 FR 
82228 - 82238) on December 27, 2000, and updated regularly through the OMB Bulletin series. 
 55 
model shown in Figure 1. The design employs a firm- and board-interlock methodology 
adopted commonly in current social capital and network research to identify senior 
executives, members of boards of directors, and advisors of entrepreneurial firms in 
each of the 12 sample regions (Castilla, 2004; Gulati & Westphal, 1999; Stuart & 
Sorenson, 2005; Williamson & Cable, 2003). The algorithm classifies actors according to 
the number of concurrent firm ties they hold, which allows for identification of ties 
between actors through firms. Given that the central actors of an entrepreneurial venture 
would almost certainly hold board or managerial positions, multiple board- and firm-tie 
interlocks serve as an effective proxy for individuals with multiple firm ties who act as 
dealmakers in an entrepreneurial economy (Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Fich & Shivdasani, 
2006). 
Firm Birth as an Indicator of a Successful Entrepreneurial Economy 
A successful entrepreneurial economy is defined as one with a high birth rate for 
new technology-based firms. Firm birth rate has been established as a reliable indicator 
of successful entrepreneurial economies by myriad studies relating to the formation of 
entrepreneurial networks (Armington & Acs, 2002; Gregorio & Shane, 2003; Huisman & 
Wissen, 2004; Reynolds, 2007; Reynolds, Storey, & Westhead, 1994; Shane, 2004). A 
successful entrepreneurial economy means a metropolitan region which produces a high 
rate of new firms and encourages the formation of new entrepreneurial firms with a 
supportive social capital structure. While it is acknowledged that many economic factors 
contribute to successful entrepreneurial economies, the fundamental purpose of this 
thesis is to test alternative viewpoints in existing theory relating to social capital 
constructs in networks to support future hypothesis formulation and to further empirical 
and qualitative studies. The composition of social capital is examined in 12 leading 
metropolitan regions through two complementary methods: an empirical evaluation and 
then a qualitative assessment of dealmaker social capital to uncover evidence that 
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regions producing high rates of new entrepreneurial firm births are associated with the 
presence of dealmakers. This section establishes and compares aggregate views 
against structured views of social capital by examining the association of aggregate 
networks in supporting new firm births in the region versus the hypothesized role of 
dealmakers in mediating the entrepreneurial economy.
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: REGIONAL COMPARISON 
OF DEALMAKER SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
 
Current scholarship has already established that the density, seriality, and 
cohesiveness of aggregate social capital networks are associated with entrepreneurial 
outcomes as measured by firm births and enhance the economic performance of 
entrepreneurial networks (Dubini & Aldrich, 1991; Hite & Hesterly, 2001). This chapter 
investigates whether these important characteristics of social capital, associated with 
aggregate network theory, should perhaps be segregated as opposed to being 
combined to identify and isolate their separate effects on the formation of successful 
entrepreneurial economies. 
While this thesis does not contest that aggregate networks are a necessary 
condition to encourage the formation of vibrant entrepreneurial economies, it questions 
whether they are sufficient. The hypothesis of this chapter instead asserts that structured 
social capital networks of dealmakers may be a better indicator of regional vibrancy. 
Aggregate and structural social capital concepts are compared to determine which 
construct is most associated with high frequencies of new firm births: dense and 
cohesive aggregate networks of entrepreneurs and investors or dealmaker actors with 
multiple firm ties. Dealmakers with high connectivity and cohesion may in fact be a better 
indicator of firm births in the regional entrepreneurial economy than the dense aggregate 
networks of entrepreneurs and investors most often credited in the literature. It is 
expected that regions with a larger share of dealmakers will be associated with higher 
rates of new firm formation. 
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Density refers to the “extensiveness of ties between persons or organizations” 
(Dubini & Aldrich, 1991, p. 309) and is measured by comparing the total to the potential 
number of ties that would occur if every unit in the network were connected to every 
other unit. Density of social capital is typically turned to as a measure to explain the 
performance of regions as a contingent part of agglomeration theory, which posits that 
density supports the formation of entrepreneurial networks “because of the social 
construction of localized political and cultural assets such as mutual trust, tacit 
understandings, learning effects, specialized vocabularies, transaction-specific forms of 
knowledge, and performance-boosting governance structures facilitating 
entrepreneurship” (Thornton & Flynn, 2005, p. 305). However, is the density of an 
aggregate entrepreneurial network sufficient to explain variation in entrepreneurial 
outcomes? Should the social capital effects of density of aggregate networks be 
separated from cohesiveness and seriality of structured social capital to better explain 
entrepreneurial outcomes? This chapter will investigate this question by empirically 
comparing the composition of social capital of the aggregate and structured social 
capital networks. It will further attempt to sort out how density versus seriality and 
cohesiveness explains the characteristics of social capital in entrepreneurial networks 
that lead to high incidences of firm births. 
The analysis reviews the firm birth histories of 12 United States regions that 
signaled their intent to establish an entrepreneurial milieu and its related social capital by 
following a technopole-based regional development strategy. It then asks whether the 
relative success of each region is more consistent with aggregate social capital theories 
or with a dealmaker hypothesis of structured social capital. Third, it seeks evidence that 
regions developing new entrepreneurial firms have social capital networks with 
substantial evidence of social capital comprised of dealmakers. 
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Regional Firm Birth Findings 
 
Table 4 presents the total number of firm births for the three sample years during 
the full period (1984-2004) and from 1984 to the present for each sample region, 
highlighting specifically three years (1984, 1994, and 2004). The first year sampled 
represents the publication date of the Rogers and Larsen (1984) study, representing the 
initiation of technopole concepts in use as a regional planning concept. In an attempt to 
control for economic fluctuations, the sample years are separated by one-decade 
intervals and were chosen because they represent stable years between recessionary 
periods or preceding the significant venture capital equity bubble at the turn of the 
century. These three sample years are selected to increase the consistency of firm birth 
as a reliable indicator of a vibrant entrepreneurial economy. 
 
 
The number of self-reported firm births in these metropolitan economies is 
consistent with Thomson Financial’s VentureXpert, another dataset that reports new firm 
formation rates. The data shows significant differences between the firm births of Silicon 
Valley (4,765) and Boston (2,225) and the other sample regions (591.4 firms on 
Table 4. Firm Birth Data for 12 Regions, Unnormalized (1984, 1994, 2004) 
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average). Orange County, San Diego, and Seattle report the highest firm birth outcomes 
among the remaining regions in the sample with San Diego producing the most firms per 
capital population. 
Firm birth data is normalized in Figure 2 with 1984 as the base year and 
computing births as an absolute ratio of this result (with 1.0 representing equivalency). 
This normalization establishes relative growth in the number of new firm births as a ratio 
of 1984 births—a proxy for a successful entrepreneurial milieu—to allow for objective 
comparisons. If regional development strategies had established an effective 
entrepreneurial milieu, growth in firm births would increase consistently over the period. 
 
Results indicate that while Silicon Valley, Boston, Seattle, San Diego, Portland, RTP, 
and Austin sustained consistent growth over the three sample years, Phoenix, 
Figure 2. Absolute Firm Birth Changes Over Three Reference Years (1984, 1994, 2004)
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Minneapolis, Denver, and Salt Lake City did not. Orange County largely continues to 
produce start-up firms at the same rate it did in 1984. 
The regions with the highest absolute growth over the period (normalized by 
base year 1984) were Silicon Valley (4.73 times more firms than in 1984), Seattle (3.92 
times), and Austin (3.22 times). RTP, Denver, and Boston experienced even and 
consistent growth over the period, although not as dramatic in absolute terms. It 
indicates that six of the regions in the sample have been successful at sustaining firm 
births since establishing the technopole—with Silicon Valley, Seattle, San Diego, and 
Austin experiencing the highest absolute growth in firm birth rates over the three sample 
years. This data also shows that while all regions experienced some growth in firm births 
between 1984 and 1994, growth was inconsistent from 1994 to 2004, with four regions—
Orange County, Phoenix, Salt Lake City, and Minneapolis—experiencing negative 
growth over the latter decade. Minneapolis experienced the most dramatic drop-off in 
firm births among these four regions. It may be stated generally that Boston, Seattle, 
RTP, San Diego, and Austin experienced consistent growth in firm births over the full 
two-decade measurement period, while only Silicon Valley experienced more dramatic 
growth over this same period comparatively. 
Analysis of Social Capital Seriality 
One way to compare aggregate and structured social capital is to compare proxy 
measures that approximate these concepts. Density, measured in this study as the total 
number of actor-firm ties, is an adequate measure of aggregate social capital. Seriality 
by tie frequency is an adequate measure of structured social capital, discussed earlier 
as a core component of the dealmaker concept. While aggregate studies of social capital 
largely rely on density measures, seriality measures may indeed add additional insight to 
this view of social capital by showing data that reflect the structural properties of the 
network. While aggregate theories would suggest that dense networks are associated 
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with successful entrepreneurial economies, it is hypothesized in this analysis that 
economies with a higher prevalence of serially connected actors will also be more 
successful in producing a higher prevalence of new firm births. While this analysis later 
employs an algorithm that specifies dealmakers with more precise measures to analyze 
characteristics beyond seriality, this initial analysis simply looks at the frequency of 
serially connected actors, meaning individuals who maintain multiple ties to 
entrepreneurial firms. 
A straightforward approach to identify serial entrepreneurs or investors is to 
count the total number of concurrent firm ties for all people associated with 
entrepreneurial firms in the region through their board and management interlock 
linkages. To accomplish this, all actors with board and management ties to high-
technology firms are analyzed to determine the prevalence of total firm connections as 
shown in Table 5. 
Table 5 compares aggregate and structured network characteristics by showing 
all actors in the regional network and their total firm connections by frequency. The 
density of the aggregate network would be estimated by the sum of all connections, 
listed as “aggregate” on the table. But then these data are distributed by frequency of 
connections per actor to tease out the structural characteristics of social capital in each 
sample region. For example, while Phoenix has a dense aggregate network with 2,583 
actor-firm ties, there are 1,953 actors in Phoenix with one firm connection, 43 actors with 
five connections, and only four people with 10 connections, while Silicon Valley reports 
31,221, 22,652, 515, and 77 respectively for the same parameters. These two regions, 
with approximately equivalent regional populations, show dramatically different 
estimates of density and seriality. While causality cannot be asserted from these general 
estimators, the density data appear to support the proposition in the literature that 
aggregate social capital is associated with firm birth. The regions with the highest firm 
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birth (Silicon Valley, Boston, San Diego, and Seattle) also have the densest networks 
with the largest aggregate number of actor-firm ties, also shown in the table, while those 
less successful have less density. 
 
 
It is important to note that state-of-the-art aggregate studies do not discern 
single-firm from serial entrepreneurs and investors at the regional level. Therefore, most 
aggregate studies would overlook the distribution of serial ties, also shown on this 
summary table. The most successful regions in producing a high prevalence of new 
firms are also seemingly associated with structured social capital comprised of a higher 
prevalence of actors with multiple firm ties. Interestingly, the most successful 
entrepreneurial regions in terms of firm birth show both a fat base—with a high 
prevalence of actors with one tie (and therefore high density)—as well as distributions of 
serial ties that are shown by thick tails—meaning higher prevalence of serially connected 
actors. Also the association of regions with high levels of new firm births and the seriality 
indicator appears to improve as the number of ties increase from two ties to dealmakers 
with three or more ties, a topic to be probed later with the data provided by the algorithm. 
Table 5. Distribution of Total Concurrent Firm Connections of All Actors per Region 
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Note that all tables are presented in order of their regional population size, so 
that if this distribution simply varied with population, the frequencies would simply 
diminish as the table is read from left to right. This is not the case, as this data shows 
substantial variation in both density and seriality. 
 
 
As a precursor to this study’s more exhaustive examination of dealmakers, this same 
data as graphed in Figure 3 shows that there is substantial variation in the frequency of 
actors with four or more ties—with 1,026 in Silicon Valley, 297 in Boston, and 49 in 
Phoenix. Actors with 10 firm ties number 89 in Silicon Valley, 10 in Boston and none in 
Phoenix. This suggests some evidence that the structure of social capital varies from 
region to region in terms of seriality. 
Aggregate studies that focus on network density and do not differentiate serial 
ties would universally overlook the differences in seriality among the actors in the 
aggregate network. Regions with a relatively higher distribution of serial connections 
also seem to have experienced success in establishing new firms, suggesting a possible 
Figure 3. Dealmaker Concurrent Entrepreneurial Firm Connections 
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association, particularly for regions with a higher frequency of actors with multiple 
concurrent connections at the dealmaker level (actors with three or more connections). 
This result seems to suggest that firm birth and seriality may be potentially associated. 
However, this simple relationship is not definitive and certainly can neither confirm an 
association nor determine whether this association is as strong as or stronger than the 
density measures usually cited in aggregate analysis. In order to uncover the relative 
effects of density versus seriality in social capital on firm birth, a more in-depth analysis 
of the composition of structured dealmaker social capital is warranted. 
Regional Comparison of Social Capital Composition 
 
As shown in Figure 4, actors with one or two concurrent entrepreneurial firm ties 
compose 97.3% of the average regional sample, while 1.6% have three concurrent firm 
ties, and the remaining 1.1% have four or more. Dealmaker entrepreneurs and investors 
with three or more ties, therefore, consist of the top 2.7% of entrepreneurs and investors 
in the average sample region. While these actors are far less common, this dissertation 
 
hypothesizes that they perhaps may represent the vital few and serve a quite important 
role in the founding of new firms. Figure 4 shows the variation in the distribution of actors 
 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of Mean Total Entrepreneurial Ties per Person 
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with one or two ties and dealmakers with three and four or more concurrent ties. There is 
substantial variation in this distribution by region, with higher percentages of dealmakers 
generally associated with the regions most successful in generating new firms. 
Perhaps as a refinement of aggregate studies, these data provide an insight that 
those regions with the highest percentages of singularly connected actors and relatively 
smaller percentages of serially connected actors have not had sustained success in 
establishing new firms. Singularly connected actors represent the typical profile for rank-
and-file entrepreneurs or investors in a given entrepreneurial economy, and surely the 
supply of single-tie actors will likely influence the frequency of firm foundings. Indeed, it 
is 36 times more likely on average that an entrepreneur will have one or two concurrent 
firm ties rather than three or more in the sample regions. 
But the frequency of serially connected, experienced actors is hypothesized to 
have as much or more influence on regional firm birth outcomes. On one end of the 
sample distribution we find Silicon Valley, with arguably one of the most vibrant 
entrepreneurial economies in the nation, where 86% of entrepreneurs and investors 
have one firm tie, 9.4% have two firm ties, 2.45% have three firm ties, and 2.04% have 
four or more firm ties. On the other end of the distribution is Orange County, California, 
which lags behind other regions in the sample in births of new technology firms. Here 
95.9% of entrepreneurial actors show one firm tie, 3.4% show two firm ties, 0.31% show 
three firm ties, and 0.05% show four or more firm ties. This distribution suggests that a 
hierarchy in the structure of social capital exists in the entrepreneurial region and that 
higher distributions of dealmaker social capital are associated with higher firm birth in a 
given regional economy for this sample. The mean distribution provides a sound  
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Table 6. Entrepreneurial Firm Ties, Role by Social Capital Category, Unnormalized with Number of Companies
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Table 7. Actors in Entrepreneurial Network by Social Capital Category, Normalized by Total Companies 
 
 
Table 8. Frequencies of Actors in Entrepreneurial Network
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Table 9. Total Dealmakers by Category and Ratio of Dealmakers—Average Firm Birth 2003-2007 
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basis of comparison for a more detailed examination of social capital composition 
explored in Tables 6-9 showing the algorithm’s results from the CapitalIQ snapshot data. 
As shown in Table 6, the distribution of firm ties varies widely among actors in 
the 12 sample regions. Table 6 presents the frequencies of all actors in each of the  
sample regions by social capital category, displays the number of firm ties for each 
actor, and summarizes the total number of dealmakers in each region. The total social 
capital network of entrepreneurs and investors is first divided into four categories based 
on their ties to financial firms. These four categories are called: (1) parallel investors, for 
investors with more than one key executive tie to a financial firm; (2) professional 
investors, for investors with one key executive tie to a financial firm; (3) entrepreneur-
investors, for entrepreneurs with non-executive ties with finance firms; and (4) 
entrepreneur-non-investors, for entrepreneurs with no finance affiliations. Within these 
four categories, actors are arrayed by the number of concurrent board and executive ties 
with an entrepreneurial firm (one to seven plus). 
To address the common blending of entrepreneurial and investor roles, 
particularly among dealmakers, the classifications are refined more granularly to 
separate entrepreneurs with financial affiliations from entrepreneurs without financial 
affiliations. Similarly, investors are separated into two mutually exclusive categories 
based on the number and location of their financial firm ties. This is accomplished by 
developing tables of equity and investment firms in the database and cross-identifying 
individuals who are reported as board members or managers of entrepreneurial 
companies while concurrently serving as a key executive of a financial firm. Finally, to 
maintain the dichotomy in the literature between entrepreneurs and investors, a filtering 
methodology was employed to discern whether entrepreneurs-investors are affiliated 
more closely with entrepreneurial firms or with finance firms. The result is four mutually 
exclusive categories: 
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Investor 
 
At least one entrepreneurial firm tie in the designated regions and sectors, plus: 
 
Parallel Investor = concurrently connected as a key executive of two or more 
finance firms inside or outside the region 
 
Professional Investor = concurrently connected as a key executive of one 
finance firm inside or outside the region 
 
Entrepreneur 
 
At least one entrepreneurial firm tie in the designated regions and sectors, plus: 
 
Entrepreneur-Investor = at least one finance firm affiliation inside or outside the 
region, but not as a key executive 
 
Entrepreneur-Non-Investor = no finance firm affiliations 
 
To better discern the differing contributions of actors with multiples ties to 
entrepreneurial firms, this analysis separates dealmaker entrepreneurs and dealmaker 
investors by their frequency of ties, with specific focus on dealmakers with three ties and 
those with four or more ties. 
To facilitate side by side comparisons, all regions are presented in the order of 
metropolitan population size arrayed from the largest to the smallest. Boston and Silicon 
Valley serve as a baseline for comparisons with the remaining 10 regions as the most 
successful regional entrepreneurial economies. If there were no observable relationship 
between entrepreneur- or investor-related social capital and their respective dealmaker 
subsets, one would expect to see these social capital categories vary directly with 
population, which is clearly not the case. 
These distributions indicate that the largest set of actors in all of the sample 
regions are entrepreneur-non-investors, followed second by professional investors, third 
by entrepreneurs-investors, and lastly by parallel investors with multiple concurrent 
finance firm ties. While the numbers in each category seem to vary by the outcome—
variable (new firm births), the general distribution among these categories does not vary 
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significantly. However, it seems plausible from the distribution that individuals with 
dealmaker characteristics (three concurrent ties or more) are more prevalent in the most 
successful entrepreneurial economies. The small variation across the sample in the 
numbers of single-tie entrepreneurs and investors suggests that an aggregated count of 
social capital may be a less reliable predictor of firm births, as all regions seem to 
possess a base of social capital comprised of entrepreneurs and investors. At the same 
time, entrepreneurs with multiple firm ties are more prevalent in regions with more firm 
births, and their numbers vary to a greater degree and with each successful region. This 
suggests that dealmakers may be a better indicator of entrepreneurial success than the 
total numbers or shares of single-tie entrepreneurs and investors in a region generally 
relied upon by aggregate studies. 
Now this thesis turns to the ratio of entrepreneurs and investors to see if there 
are clues as to which group is more important to the entrepreneurial outcome in each 
region. The frequency data for each of the social capital categories for each region 
presented in Table 6 suggest a direct relationship between investor and entrepreneurial 
networks and successful firm births in the sample regions. The ratio of total 
entrepreneurs to total investors ranges from between 81%:19% in the developing region 
of RTP to 86.6%:13.4% in successful Silicon Valley. Although the variance is too small 
to conclude much from this outcome, it suggests that successful entrepreneurial regions 
may have larger concentrations of entrepreneurs relative to investors. The sum total of 
entrepreneurs to investors, when put in the context of regional population size and 
relative success in firm births, suggests perhaps a stronger effect. Seattle and San 
Diego stand out as having the largest entrepreneurial and finance networks as a share 
of population. 
Interestingly, while the total entrepreneurial network is generally comprised of 
85% entrepreneurs and 15% investors, dealmaker investors outnumber dealmaker 
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entrepreneurs in all successful economies. Silicon Valley, for example, has 380 
dealmaker investors or 60% of this category compared to 257 dealmaker entrepreneurs 
(the remaining 40% of the category). Combining all dealmakers, the distributions in all 12 
regions are roughly equal between investors and entrepreneurs with investors as a 
share of dealmakers increasing as ties increase, suggesting the relative importance of 
finance relationships among dealmakers in the entrepreneurial network. 
This effect is better isolated in Table 7, which displays the data normalized by the 
total number of entrepreneurial companies in the sample region. The numbers represent 
a ratio of the number of actors in each category to the number entrepreneurial 
companies in the region. The two regions exhibiting the greatest success in new firm 
births—San Diego and Seattle—show relatively higher ratios of total investors and total 
entrepreneurs per company than other regions: .672 investors and 3.585 entrepreneurs 
in San Diego, and .596 investors and 3.224 entrepreneurs in Seattle. This reflects the 
same pattern shown by the two successful reference regions: Silicon Valley (.591:3.362) 
and Boston (.672:3.646). Austin, also a successful entrepreneurial economy, exhibits a 
similar pattern in terms of investors per company (.698:3.234) but has a relatively 
smaller share of entrepreneurs per company than the other successful regions cited 
here. 
In absolute terms, the structure of social capital networks is discernibly different 
among the four successful entrepreneurial economies of Silicon Valley, Boston, San 
Diego, and Seattle. Most notably, in all four categories of network actors there are a 
higher number of actors with three or more concurrent firm ties. This suggests that 
dealmakers are more prevalent in successful entrepreneurial economies than in less 
successful ones. This appears to be the case particularly among professional investors 
and parallel investors, who show a greater number of entrepreneurial firm ties per 
investor in successful regions than in less successful regions. 
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Table 8 normalizes the data by reporting each category of social network actor 
as a percentage of total network actors in the region. This facilitates a cross-sample 
comparison of actors with multiple firm ties in all four dealmaker categories on a 
percentage basis for the total network. For example, dealmakers with ties to three or 
more entrepreneurial firms in a region represent 4.49% of total investors and 
entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley, 2.88% in Boston, 1.67% in Seattle, 1.99% in San Diego, 
and 1.19% in Austin. In the remaining regions, which are also among the lowest 
performers in the sample in terms of firm births, less than .93% of actors and 
entrepreneurs function as dealmakers, ranging from this frequency in Salt Lake City to 
.36% in Orange County. The same patterns emerge when looking at more advanced 
dealmakers who have ties to four or more entrepreneurial firms in a region: Silicon 
Valley and Boston have 2.04% and 1.17%, respectively, in this category; San Diego has 
.64%; Seattle has .67%; and Austin has .48%, while the remaining regions vary from 
Denver at .41% to Phoenix at .15%.  
Regions that are most successful in generating new firm births also have higher 
concentrations of dealmakers in their entrepreneurial networks. While these results are 
not definitive, the data suggests that regions with greater firm births derive a higher 
portion of their dealmakers from parallel and professional investors, suggesting perhaps 
that a more robust finance infrastructure may be important for developing successful 
entrepreneurial economies. As exhibited in Tables 6 through 8, there is considerable 
variation across regions in the counts and prevalence of each social capital type, though 
they are not proportional, nor do they vary with population. This suggests that network 
actors with multiple firm ties may be a more reliable indicator of entrepreneurial success 
in a region. 
Table 9 summarizes the total number of dealmakers by social capital type and 
then presents the total number of actors per average firm birth in 2003-2007. To control 
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for fluctuations in the economic conditions for each region, the snapshot data of social 
capital composition in a given region is compared to firm births averaged over 2003-
2007 and summarized in Table 9. Looking first at annual firm births, it is clear that Silicon 
Valley earns its reputation as a successful entrepreneurial economy. Its annual average 
of 282.8 firms born was considerably higher than the other sample regions, including its 
larger entrepreneurial counterpart, the Boston region, which produced 96 new firms on 
average per year. Interestingly, Phoenix and Minneapolis (19 and 14.6 firms per year 
respectively) are comparatively anemic in firm births despite their relatively large 
metropolitan populations, while Portland, Salt Lake City, and RTP are roughly equivalent 
in both population and births (13.2, 15.6, and 15.2, respectively). Seattle, San Diego, 
and to a lesser extent, Austin stand out among the comparison regions for having 
greater success in generating firm births relative to their population sizes. 
The dealmaker ratios normalized by average firm birth, presented at the bottom 
of Table 9, show a clear distinction between the ratio of dealmakers to new firms among 
the successful economies of Silicon Valley and Boston and among the 10 remaining 
sample regions. The normalized data clearly show an association between the 
prevalence of dealmakers and firm births in San Diego, Seattle, and Austin that are more 
consistent with the results in Silicon Valley and Boston. 
 In virtually every category of social capital (normalized for average firm birth), 
dealmakers are more highly represented among the successful economies and less so 
in the unsuccessful ones. However, in the two model economies, Boston and Silicon 
Valley, there are generally two dealmakers per average firm birth (1.94 and 2.25 
respectively), while in the other successful economies, there is one dealmaker (0.76 in 
Seattle, 0.97 in San Diego, and 0.56 in Austin). The remaining economies have 
considerably less than .5 dealmakers per average birth, with the exception of 
Minneapolis which has .89, perhaps explained by its relatively sparse network and poor 
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birth results relative to other regions its size. Their relative larger prevalence of 
dealmaker capital suggests that perhaps the entrepreneurial regions of San Diego and 
Seattle may be the best prepared to develop into the next model successful 
entrepreneurial economies should the dealmaker hypothesis prove to be valid after more 
extensive empirical scrutiny. 
Correlations 
 
Table 10 presents a correlation matrix of all categories of social capital and 
average firm birth. The correlation matrix shows simple correlations among six study 
variables: three measures of aggregate social capital (total network, all entrepreneurs 
and all investors), two variables relating to structured social capital (dealmakers with 
three and four ties respectively), and new firm births, the outcome variable of interest. 
 
 
The correlation matrix exhibits a progressively stronger set of correlations between the 
various categories of social capital and average firm birth as they progress from the 
aggregate entrepreneurial network to the structured network of dealmakers and increase 
again as the number of ties increase. The correlation between the aggregate network 
and new firm births is weakly positive at .1612, while aggregate entrepreneurs alone are 
a little better positively correlated at .253. Aggregate investors alone are negatively 
correlated at .054. The negative correlation for single-tie investors in the aggregate 
network suggests that investors with limited ties are not positively associated with new 
firm establishments. For structured social capital measures, the correlations are 
 
 
 
Total 
Network 
 
Entrepreneurs
 
Investors 
 
Dealmakers 
(3 ties only) 
 
Dealmakers 
(4 + ties) 
 
New Firm 
Births 
Total Network 1.000   
Entrepreneurs 0.992 1.000  
Investors 0.917 0.035 1.000  
Dealmakers (3 ties) 0.473 0.958 0.129 1.000  
Dealmakers (4+ ties) 0.374 0.468 0.035 0.958 1.000  
New Firm Births 0.161 0.253 -0.054 0.848 0.935 1.000
Table 10. Summary Correlation Matrix
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progressively stronger, reported at .848 for dealmakers with three concurrent ties and 
improving to .94 for dealmakers with four or more concurrent connections. 
Notably, the weakest correlations are among social capital categories that the 
current literature associates with the aggregate entrepreneurial network (i.e., 
entrepreneurs and investors with one firm tie) and average firm birth. This suggests that 
dealmakers are a better indicator of firm birth than measurements of an aggregate 
entrepreneurial network, as is now advocated in the literature. In general, dealmakers 
with four or more ties are better correlated than the dealmakers with only three ties, and 
the general entrepreneurs and investors in the total network with a single tie, suggesting 
that the concept of dealmakers is perhaps a better measure of successful 
entrepreneurial economies and their ability to promote the birth of new firms. 
While causal relationships cannot be confirmed by a correlation matrix, Table 10 
does suggest that dealmakers are perhaps more closely correlated to average firm birth 
than aggregate social capital measures comprised of single-tie entrepreneurs and 
investors currently advocated and emphasized by the aggregate social capital literature. 
Social Network Component Analysis 
Component analysis is widely used to compare the effects of aggregate density 
relative to the degree of interconnectivity and cohesiveness and of complex networks 
(Angelusz & Tardos, 2006; Boschma & Wal, 2005; Huisman & Wissen, 2004; Kalish & 
Robins, 2006). These data and the associated visualizations (in the appendices) allow 
for an easier comparison of whether new firm births in a region are more closely 
associated with total networks of entrepreneurs and investors or with the subset of a 
region’s actors exhibiting dealmaker characteristics. 
An empirical component comparison is presented in Table 11, with 
accompanying social network diagrams presented in the Appendices A-C showing the 
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same network decomposed from the aggregate to the dealmaker networks, as reflected 
in this study’s conceptual model, as follows: 
Component Analysis for Aggregate Social Capital: compares the primary 
cluster of associated actors and firms and the range of firm-actor ties in the 
region that are disassociated from the main cluster to show the degree of 
cohesiveness in regional networks among entrepreneurs and investors through 
firm ties 
 
Component Analysis for Dealmakers: filters the full component network of 
entrepreneurs and investors to show only those individuals with more than three 
concurrent firm ties, showing the degree of cohesiveness among dealmaker-
related social capital 
 
Results are arrayed from left to right by regional population size to facilitate regional 
cross-comparison of total social capital networks and the subset of those networks 
classified as dealmakers. 
The component analysis comparing the aggregate entrepreneurial network and 
the dealmaker network for each of the 12 sample regions is shown in Table 11. A 
component analysis displays the relative distribution of interconnected and disassociated 
 
 
nodes in the total network. If a node is disassociated, it does not possess a tie to the 
largest cluster of commonly associated nodes in the network and is isolated. In the 
Table 11. Component Analysis:  Aggregate Versus Dealmaker Network 
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context of this analysis, this means that the actor is not part of a cohesive central cluster 
and is isolated from the main network of actors in the entrepreneurial network. 
If dealmakers serve to mediate aggregate networks, this analysis expects that 
regions with substantial dealmaker social capital would have higher ratios of associated 
clusters versus disassociated clusters. Dealmakers would possess common ties to the 
primary entrepreneurial network in the region and therefore be counted among the 
associated clusters. Table 11 presents the total nodes in each network (as a measure of 
density) and the number of nodes associated with the primary cluster (the primary 
interconnected cluster as a measure of cohesiveness). A simple percentage is 
calculated as a crude measure of the degree of cohesiveness in the network, with a 
higher percentage indicating that a greater number of actor nodes are interconnected 
with one another as a percentage of total nodes. This is a simple way to measure the 
degree of density and cohesiveness of both the region’s aggregate and dealmaker 
networks and compare it against the region’s success in firm foundings. 
There appears to be a relationship between regions with more firm births and 
regions with a high degree of cohesiveness measured by associated nodes among the 
aggregated network—for example, Silicon Valley, with 78.7% of nodes associated, and 
Boston, with 68.5% associated. Moreover, San Diego and Seattle, the next most 
successful regions in establishing new firms, show the next highest degree of associated 
nodes, at 56.4% and 54.5%, respectively. However, when considering the same data for 
the dealmaker networks, these successful regions exhibit even greater associated node 
cohesiveness. It is striking that while Silicon Valley has the highest cohesiveness in the 
aggregated network (at 78.7%), that it has almost a completely cohesive dealmaker 
network at 99.83% associated nodes. This simply means that dealmakers in Silicon 
Valley are virtually all connected in a common network, with very few exceptions. This 
can’t be said of the region’s aggregate network. This suggests that there is a great deal 
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of interconnectivity and cohesiveness among dealmakers in successful economies, 
more so than in the aggregate network. Boston follows a similar pattern with 98.09% 
associated, as does Seattle, San Diego, and Austin—all above 90%. 
Perhaps counter intuitively, the regions with lower comparative cohesiveness in 
the aggregate networks, namely Minneapolis and Portland, show very high 
cohesiveness among the dealmaker network. The way to perhaps resolve this paradox 
is to consider the density of these networks. While these aggregate networks are not 
cohesive, they are also comparatively small and less dense networks given their 
population size. Some communities have small aggregate networks, but they appear to 
overcome this by establishing highly interconnected albeit small dealmaker networks. 
This intuitively makes sense, as these two communities have anecdotal reputations of 
being very close-knit. 
Two regions stand out for having small primary clusters: Phoenix with 9.6% of 
nodes associated and Orange County with 10.2% associated. As might now be 
expected, the two regions with the highest percentage of associated nodes also have 
the largest shares of dealmakers within their total entrepreneurial networks. Conversely, 
regions with the lowest percentage of associated nodes also have the smallest shares of 
dealmakers. The large metropolitan areas of Minneapolis, Denver, and Orange County 
have less densely associated networks than the RTP and Austin regions, which are 
comparatively smaller. Three regions—Portland, Salt Lake City, and Orange County—
appear to be in the bottom quartile of the sample in terms of network density and in the 
degree of interconnectedness and cohesiveness among actors in the entrepreneurial 
network’s main cluster. 
The regional variation in network density is especially dramatic when viewed 
through the networks of dealmakers. Most notably, the reference regions of Silicon 
Valley and Boston display significantly denser, more cohesive, and interconnected 
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associated networks than less successful regions. The density and interconnectedness 
of a network do not seem to vary with population either. For example, Phoenix is the 
third-largest metropolitan region in the sample, but its network is the least dense and 
interconnected in the sample. 
 Silicon Valley and Boston’s dealmaker networks exhibit both high density and 
extraordinarily high cohesiveness in comparison to their aggregate networks, both 
exhibiting a large cohesive central cluster. Seattle and San Diego share characteristics 
and networking patterns similar (though on a comparatively lesser scale) to Boston, 
suggesting that these developing regions may be best situated to build a leadership 
position similar to that of Silicon Valley, given their social capital composition. However, 
comparatively speaking, Seattle and San Diego’s combined dealmaker populations are 
less than one-quarter the size of Boston’s, and less than 10% of the size of Silicon 
Valley’s. Indeed, in many of the regions in the sample—most notably Phoenix, Orange 
County, and Portland—one could convene a sample of combined dealmakers around a 
conference table. 
 In advanced entrepreneurial regions such as Silicon Valley and Boston, as well 
as in the emerging economies of San Diego and Seattle, dealmakers appear connected 
to one another through common firm-actor ties in one primary cluster. But in less 
developed economies, the dealmaker networks are not commonly connected and are 
often split into many firm-actor sub-clusters. Less successful entrepreneurial networks 
appear to exhibit less cohesiveness and greater fragmentation among their dealmakers. 
This substantial variation in the dealmaker social capital networks (a great deal more 
pronounced than in the aggregate networks) and in their degree of interconnectivity and 
cohesiveness follows the correlation with firm births presented earlier. 
 This suggests that, as a refinement of existing theories of social capital networks, 
the prevalence of dealmakers in a region is a better indicator of entrepreneurial success 
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than a measure of aggregate networks of entrepreneurs and investors. The frequency 
data on aggregate entrepreneurial and investor social capital—both actual and 
normalized—suggest clearly that strong entrepreneurial and investor networks are 
associated with successful entrepreneurial economies, serving to confirm current theory. 
The proposition that successful entrepreneurial economies, as measured by high rates 
of firm births, are associated with structured social capital and dealmakers exhibiting 
strong serial and mediation characteristics are also supported by this analysis, 
suggesting a new structural dimension be added to update existing theory. 
There is considerable variation across regions in the number and share of each 
social capital type. While the ratios do not vary enough to make strong claims, patterns 
exhibited in all sample regions suggest that successful entrepreneurial regions have 
more entrepreneurs than investors and more of both than less successful regions. This 
finding suggests that existing theories emphasizing the presence of both entrepreneurial 
and investor social capital are valid in explaining successful entrepreneurial economies. 
If causality could be asserted in this case study, it would serve to moderately confirm the 
hypothesis. This analysis lends credibility to the body of theory that associates regional 
entrepreneurial outcomes to aggregate networks of entrepreneurs and investors. For 
example, Silicon Valley’s social network appears to be about five times denser than San 
Diego’s and two times denser than Boston’s, based on the total number of ties among 
entrepreneurs, investors, and firms. 
However, the findings of dealmaker capital suggest that structured social capital 
should be incorporated into current views of social capital. For example, the dramatic 
difference in the prevalence of dealmakers between the two reference regions—Boston 
and Silicon Valley—and the other subject regions indicates a substantial structural 
difference between the social capital networks of advanced successful entrepreneurial 
economies and networks in less developed regional entrepreneurial economies. The 
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frequency and normalized data on dealmakers clearly demonstrate that all four social 
capital categories are associated with successful entrepreneurial economies. 
The correlation analysis reinforces this comparative empirical analysis, showing 
a higher association between dealmakers and firms births than with aggregate 
entrepreneur and investor networks. This correlation improves when comparing 
dealmakers with three ties and average firm births, and it improves even more when 
comparing classes of social capital among dealmakers with four or more ties. This 
suggests that firm births may be more associated with a prevalence of dealmakers and 
especially better-connected dealmakers than with the aggregate network of 
entrepreneurs and investors. This lends support to the proposition that dealmakers may 
play a role in the success of entrepreneurial network, and may therefore serve as a 
better indicator of successful entrepreneurial economies than the aggregate social 
capital indicators. 
Indeed, some of the least successful and anemic entrepreneurial economies in 
this study have so few dealmakers that they could gather in a single room. The 
dealmakers in Silicon Valley and, to a lesser extent, in Boston, would fill a metropolitan 
arena. The findings in this study validate the base of existing theory while also 
suggesting a refinement: The dealmakers among a region’s social capital network may, 
in fact, serve as a more promising indicator variable for the success of entrepreneurial 
economies in generating high rates of firm births than the aggregate measures currently 
advanced in the literature. 
The task of the social network component analysis is to test the proposition of the 
current literature that successful entrepreneurial economies are associated with dense, 
cohesive, and interconnected concentrations of entrepreneurs and investors. Consistent 
with the social capital analysis, the regions with the greatest success in producing firm 
births also possess the densest and most cohesive and interconnected network clusters. 
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But density and cohesiveness do not vary together in all cases. The cohesiveness of a 
dealmaker network appears to be a strong indicator of the success of an entrepreneurial 
economy when combined with a dense network. But the findings also suggest that 
limited density of social capital can perhaps be overcome with improved cohesiveness 
among dealmaker social capital. Thus, the social network component analysis supports 
the assertion that regions whose investors and entrepreneurs are more densely 
interconnected are more successful in generating firm births, but those with cohesive 
dealmaker networks are perhaps even more successful.  
The component analysis further suggests that the degree to which a region 
benefits from a common, dense, and cohesive entrepreneurial cluster is related to the 
number of dealmakers found in the region. The differences in prevalence and 
interconnections in the sample regions among actors in the aggregate entrepreneurial 
network and in the dealmaker networks are substantial. The dealmaker analysis is even 
more strongly correlated, given the degree of difference exhibited region to region. When 
considering the dealmaker networks, the progression from an RTP to a San Diego to a 
Boston to a Silicon Valley is likely more of an exponential progression than a linear one, 
such as that exhibited in the aggregate data. Moreover, large metropolitan areas such as 
Phoenix, where dealmakers are scarce, will likely have a more limited core of assets and 
social capital on which to build. The distributions of dealmakers in the sample economies 
suggest that the most likely regions to emerge as the next Boston are San Diego and 
Seattle respectively. Even Boston must evolve to become the next Silicon Valley, which 
has established both the densest and most cohesive network of dealmakers among the 
sample regions. 
While the dealmaker concept borrows heavily from existing theory on serial 
entrepreneurship (with individuals with deep experience), mediation and brokerage, this 
notion of the dealmaker and the cohesive milieu the dealmakers establish collectively in 
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a regional economy, transcends current concepts of seriality and cohesiveness currently 
articulated in the literature and combines them into a new, researchable phenomenon. 
While it is not possible in this thesis to uncover the causal mechanisms that 
explain specifically how dealmakers influence firm births, these findings support the 
proposition that dealmakers are an important, if not critical, ingredient in successful 
entrepreneurial economies. Dealmakers possess extensive experience in building, 
advising, and operating entrepreneurial firms or in financing them. While these skills are 
necessary to build an individual high-growth entrepreneurial venture, connections among 
actors in the entrepreneurial network may facilitate access to these skills among a wider 
range of firms. Moreover, because a dealmaker’s span of control exceeds a single 
entrepreneurial firm, his or her connections may facilitate diffusion of the information, 
experience, and expertise that is required to develop high-growth entrepreneurial 
ventures. 
The next chapter will look more closely at the bridging and mediation 
characteristics, firm ties, and career histories of dealmakers in this study’s sample, 
paying particular attention to traits or positions that suggest these actors play a brokering 
or mediating role in the network that could improve entrepreneurial outcomes. While this 
thesis has now uncovered an insight that dealmakers may play a critical role in the 
success of entrepreneurial economies, the next task will be to uncover the mechanisms 
through which dealmakers contribute to and perhaps mediate the regional social capital 
network, a concept that will be explored in more detail in the next chapter.
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF RTP DEALMAKERS 
 
 
The role dealmakers play in mediating a region’s entrepreneurial network requires a 
more in-depth analysis. Taking the entrepreneurial network of North Carolina’s RTP as 
an empirical context, this chapter identifies through the firm- and board-interlock 
approach the most central dealmakers in this region to study in-depth how these actors 
mediate relationships between entrepreneurs and investors. The analysis specifies their 
professional origins and career development paths and profiles the typical 
characteristics that blend the functions of both the entrepreneur and the investor through 
an enhanced dealmaker role in a regional economy. 
RTP offers a rich empirical setting for a qualitative case study of dealmakers in 
social capital networks. The RTP region is home to the oldest and largest research park 
in the world. The region has developed one of the highest concentrations of high-
technology employment of any region in the United States and is regarded in the 
regional development literature as a model of a planned technology region (Luger & 
Goldstein, 1991). Among a sample of 12 regions in the United States most cited for 
entrepreneurial success, described in Chapter 5, RTP is the third highest cited. RTP 
exhibits the largest aggregate entrepreneurial network per company formed both in 
terms of the number of entrepreneurs and investors per company of any region in the 
sample per firm birth, as seen in Table 12. 
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Table 12. Number of Actors by Social Capital Class per Company (Normalized)  
 
RTP has a heavy endowment of general entrepreneurial social capital per company but 
an average number of dealmakers among the sample regions (the subject of this 
dissertation’s interest). This distribution suggests that while the aggregate RTP 
entrepreneurial social capital network is more extensive than other regions, it has been 
less successful on a per-firm basis than other regions despite its large aggregate 
network and lags behind more successful regions in the number of dealmakers per 
company formed. RTP has fewer dealmakers per company than six of the 12 study 
regions—the median for the sample. 
To establish some context based on the author’s experience working in the RTP 
entrepreneurial network, RTP has the reputation of having a substantial base of 
technological innovation to draw from; but it has a less mature social capital framework 
of entrepreneurs to draw from to form companies based on this advantage. That 
reputation notwithstanding, RTP benefits from a strong cadre of leaders who have 
sought to encourage the development of entrepreneurial social capital and networking. 
Case in point, RTP is home to the largest entrepreneurship networking organization in 
the United States, the Council for Entrepreneurial Development, whose charge is to 
organize and internetwork the region’s entrepreneurs. This success is evidenced by the 
broad aggregate entrepreneurial and investor network suggested in Table 12. 
However, these efforts have not resulted in as strong an outcome in terms of new 
firm births—the proxy for successful entrepreneurial economies—with well-below 
average results among the sample regions. This large endowment of social capital per 
company in RTP has not resulted in a leading position for the region in its firm birth 
 88 
results, leading only Portland in the actual number of firms formed within the sample as 
shown in the firm birth data reported earlier in Table 4. Nevertheless, the relative growth 
of the number of firms formed in RTP have been consistently growing in absolute terms 
over the period 1984-2004, as shown earlier in Figure 2. A reason for this apparent 
paradoxical result may be RTP’s relatively small share of dealmakers. While RTP has 
the largest aggregated network of single-tie actors per firm, it has a below-average 
number of dealmakers per firm, higher than only five other regions in the sample (the 
median), as shown in Table 12. The combination of the highest aggregate network, an 
average dealmaker network, and low firm birth results make RTP a fertile region to 
examine the nature of dealmakers and their role in supporting entrepreneurial 
economies. 
Dealmaker actors are hypothesized to be centrally involved in supporting the 
birth and formation of entrepreneurial ventures in regional economies as described in 
Chapter 4. This analysis studies these unique actors in the network and their 
characteristics, relationships, and roles in the formation of new high-technology firms. 
This analysis specifically explores where dealmakers originate: Do they arise from a 
network’s community of entrepreneurs, from its community of investors, or do they 
perhaps cross these functional boundaries to blend characteristics of each? It tests this 
question by first identifying the career origins and professional pathways of dealmakers 
in the RTP region of North Carolina to assess if they can be classified neatly as either 
entrepreneurs or investors. Second, it investigates how RTP’s population of dealmakers 
plays a mediating role between the region’s entrepreneurs and investors by identifying 
central dealmaker-brokers in the network by computing the actors with the highest 
betweenness centrality in the network. Finally, it profiles characteristics that are common 
among RTP dealmakers to begin what it is hoped will become a larger conceptual and 
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empirical discussion about the role of dealmakers as embedded actors in a networked 
system, and about their impact on the success of entrepreneurial regions. 
Content Analysis Modeling Dealmaker Professional Careers 
As a first step in this analysis, a content analysis is performed on the biographical 
data of all RTP dealmakers in the sample, and a position analysis is performed to show 
an exhaustive set of positions held by all dealmakers and the career progressions 
derived from the sequences of these positions. This analysis serves two purposes: (1) It 
establishes the dealmaker’s current position at the time the snapshot data was compiled, 
and (2) it provides a set of career progressions common to dealmakers based on 
synthesizing the reported biographical history of each actor. The use of position analysis 
in career progressions in qualitative research is well established in organizational theory 
and is frequently applied in the entrepreneurial setting (Lawrence, 1990; Poole, 
VandeVen, Dooley, & Holmes, 2000; VandeVen & Poole, 1995). Indeed, rational choices 
by actors are seen by Pescosolido (1992) as a function of the career history of actors 
embedded in complex network interactions. Actors’ positions in the network are defined 
by their career progressions, which influence their centrality in the network and their 
potential for brokerage and boundary spanning to influence the network (Sundararajan, 
2008). By studying dealmakers through their histories and their embedded roles in the 
context of the network, clues may be inferred as to their influence on the establishment 
of entrepreneurial firms and the underlying supportive entrepreneurial milieu. 
Data detailing all entrepreneurial firm ties in RTP on December 18, 2009 were 
collected from CapitalIQ and segmented with an algorithm to identify actors with three or 
more concurrent board and officer ties in the region. (A complete description of the 
identification process can be found in Chapter 4.) Complete biographical sketches were 
collected from these individuals to document their chronological professional histories. 
The actors identified by the algorithm meet the definition of dealmaker (with three or 
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more concurrent entrepreneurial firm ties) described earlier. On December 18, 2009, this 
analysis yielded 20 dealmakers in RTP with four or more ties and 42 dealmakers with 
three ties only that were selected for content analysis. While these actors were analyzed 
as a combined set, the distinction in the number of ties was retained to see if those with 
higher firm-tie concurrency played a different role than those who met the definition of 
dealmaker with only three concurrent ties. The full sample of network actors in the RTP 
network contain 3,491 individual actors with board and officer ties, including 206 actors 
with at least two firm ties and 3,223 actors with a single firm tie.  
In order to establish the universe of positions and progressions exhibited by the 
dealmakers in RTP, a content analysis is constructed from the universe of all 
biographical sketches for RTP dealmakers, with the positions arrayed according to the 
career progressions documented in the biographical sketches to account for every 
variation of position and progression in the sample, as shown in Figure 5. An intuitive 
two-character code is assigned to identify each position title included in the career 
progressions described in the biographical sketches of all dealmakers. Individual actors’ 
positions are coded based on the career progressions indicated by their chronological 
biographies. If career steps within typical progressions were either jumped (meaning the 
actor bypassed a typical intermediate step in a ladder) or were omitted in the biography, 
the step is coded as a jump. If an individual has advanced to the dealmaker stage (with 
three concurrent firm ties) but has not advanced beyond three ties, the remaining 
position steps are left blank to represent that person’s career status at time the data 
were collected.  
The content analysis yields 34 unique positions at various stages in the 
progression from initiator to dealmaker. While the working titles of these positions vary 
slightly, there is general uniformity in the scope, focus, and span of control represented  
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 Figure 5. Dealmaker Position Career Progression Models
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by each individual position. The titles assigned to identify all positions in the career 
progression models (Figure 5) closely fit all positions identified through the biographical 
analysis, serving to validate the functionality of the final position models used for the 
social network analysis. 
The positions, in a standardized career progression, are arrayed across four 
career stages through which actors generally progress, from early career stages when 
they may initiate entrepreneurial activity in a single firm (the initiator stage), to the stage 
when they are fundamentally involved in the daily operations of one or more firms (the 
serial stage), to senior positions when they exhibit a span of control beyond a single firm 
(the dealmaker stage), and finally to the stage when they exhibit influence over multiple 
firms concurrently (the advanced dealmaker stage). The position sequences were also 
arrayed into two mutually exclusive categories corresponding to the conceptual model, 
with investor-related positions at the top and entrepreneurial-related positions at the 
bottom. This classification scheme allowed for testing whether the career profiles fit 
neatly into an entrepreneurial or investor classification, as suggested in the aggregate 
literature. 
 A social network analysis is then performed on the coded RTP dealmaker data 
(both position progression and full social network) to identify whether the career 
progressions and profiles identified in the prior literature hold or if new insights can be 
gathered from a micro simulation on the data. The first social network manipulation 
maps the professional progressions using a pathway analysis displayed in Figure 6, 
which records the frequencies of each pathway indicated from the chronological 
biographical record based on the data coded in the career progression analysis 
previously undertaken. 
Career path models have been established as a researchable concept within the 
field of organizational development, specifically applied to researching actors in the  
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context of entrepreneurial firm development (Buttell, 2009; DeMartino & Barbato, 2003; 
Douglas & Shepherd, 2000; Fayolle, 2005). A pathway analysis is conducted of all 
career progressions for the RTP dealmakers. Pathway analysis is a network modeling 
approach that allows for biographical data to be reconstructed visualizing career 
pathways in the same chronological order as presented in the career histories of all 
actors. It should be noted that this method is not being used in this analysis to evaluate 
an actor’s history as a time-series phenomenon, but it is used instead to reconstruct 
biographical data collected for actors at one point in time and assess their career 
progressions historically. The data set of dealmakers provides a common and consistent 
set of complete biographical sketches for each actor. A common career pathway is 
developed for dealmakers to show cumulative effects as entrepreneurial actors reach 
their career pinnacles. Following the career progressions of dealmakers from their 
earliest to ultimate positions, this analysis outlines a set of positions that represents the 
typical career paths of dealmakers. 
A pathway analysis of RTP dealmakers (aggregated to establish a larger and 
more significant sample) shows that the most frequent pathways originate and progress 
through C-level management roles in both public and private companies (20:62 or 32%) 
as opposed to originating through finance (3:62 or 5%) or through start-up 
entrepreneurship (12:62 or 19%). C-level is a term used commonly in private firms to 
describe the senior managers of an entrepreneurial firm, as their titles contain the word 
chief, as in Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Information Officer, 
Chief Marketing Officer, etc. These actors play an executive role with a significant span 
of control and represent key actors in their industries, and they are often compensated 
by receiving ownership equity (shares of the firm’s stock) in the firm. The most common 
pathway trends may be modeled as follows: 
Manager, Large Public  Sr. Manager, Growth Private  C-Level, Private  Chair, Large Private 
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with the next most frequent pathway modeled as follows: 
Mgr, Hi-Growth  Sr Mgr, Growth Private  C-Level, VC-Backed  Partner, VC  Mg. Prt, VC Firm 
A related set of actors follow this same path but initiate their careers in the service 
industry, generally in a consulting or accounting firm that supports high-growth ventures. 
The third most likely pathway begins with the founder of an entrepreneurial firm 
who becomes a serial founder, then generally by his or her second or third venture is 
working more closely with venture capital, and either becomes CEO of a venture-backed 
portfolio company or joins the VC firm as a partner or advisor. This path may be 
modeled as follows: 
Early Stage  Serial Founder  CEO, Venture Backed  Partner/Advisor, VC Firm 
This path suggests that as founders build credibility, competence, and probably most 
importantly, a successful track record in building entrepreneurial firms, they are sought 
by equity investors both for their expertise and for their management acumen in leading 
venture-backed enterprises with larger capitalization. 
 A small but not inconsequential number of dealmakers are derived from highly 
specialized technical backgrounds. They begin their careers as researchers, a path 
which may be modeled as follows: 
University Faculty  University Department Chair or Dean  CEO, Venture Backed  CEO, Chair 
All RTP dealmakers who emerge on this pathway come from life sciences backgrounds 
and build successful companies around their specific scientific expertise, all of whom 
capitalize their enterprises through venture capital investments. As the firms grow, they 
develop board ties and likely invest in similar companies in the same scientific domain. 
Unlike the group of dealmakers who become affiliated directly with VC firms and serve 
as CEOs of venture-backed portfolio companies, most of these founders remain as 
chairmen of the companies they found and serve as board members in the related 
companies, not assuming direct managerial responsibility in these other firms. 
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Despite the literature’s emphasis of social capital associated with investors, very 
few of the dealmakers in the RTP sample are derived from exclusively financial 
management backgrounds. In fact, only one actor initiated his career in investment 
banking and went on to affiliate with investment partnerships, asset management firms, 
and venture capital. In fact, professional senior VCs who evolved into dealmakers came 
almost exclusively from management backgrounds in public, private, or service firms—a 
career progression that may be modeled as follows: 
Mgr, Public-Private-Services Firm  Sr Mgr, Public-Private Firm  Partner, VC  Mg Gen Partner, VC 
Those dealmakers who affiliate with asset management firms later are involved in most 
cases with substantial asset management pools that invest in a large portfolio of 
companies; and they have only indirect ties from a managerial standpoint, each serving 
as a board member of the entrepreneurial firm in which the fund invests. Many of these 
dealmakers are high net-worth actors who invest their own personal wealth through 
structured funds and receive seats on the board as a direct result of their investment, a 
pathway that may be modeled as follows: 
Mgr, Public  Sr. Mgr, Public  C-Level, Public Firm  CEO, Public Firm  Partner, Invest Pship 
In a couple of notable cases, individuals developed close ties with high net-worth 
investors through working in a development capacity with a university or through a 
university endowment and then leapfrogged to the dealmaker stage by forming a fund 
comprised of investors developed through these relationships. 
Now that the common career pathways of dealmakers are better understood in 
the context of RTP, it will be helpful to illuminate the central pathways that dealmaker 
careers follow based on the same data. To amplify the most frequently pursued career 
pathways, these pathway data are then manipulated again using a betweenness 
centrality measure to indicate the nodes through which career progressions most 
frequently flow. In this application, the node is the position, and the career pathway is the 
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set of links between the positions defined in the biographical data. A social network 
analysis is performed using a network graph editor called yED, which both visualizes the 
nodes and connections graphically and calculates the betweenness centrality values to 
determine the most central nodal career positions. In this case, a program was 
developed to keep the positions fixed as static nodes, with the event of interest being the 
career progressions indicated by the pathway analysis. 
Betweenness centrality is calculated to identify the most likely career paths for 
the dealmakers and is used in a different context later for the full dealmaker network to 
identify the most central actors. The same measure of betweenness centrality is used for 
both procedures, as follows: let gij denote the number of geodesic paths from node i to 
node j, and let gikj denote the number of geodesic paths from i to j that pass through 
intermediary k. Then the betweenness centrality is defined as follows: 
The measure is, in effect, k’s share of all shortest-path traffic from i to j, summed across 
all choices of i and j (Borgatti & Everett, 2006). Betweenness centrality is a measure of 
the extent to which an actor is between, or falls on the geodesic path(s) between, other 
actors in the network (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). This manipulation has the effect of 
amplifying the most central nodes in the network through which the pathways pass most 
frequently—in this context betweenness centrality serves as a key indicator of the most 
common career paths followed by the dealmaker. 
Given the relatively small sample size of dealmakers in RTP (i.e., 62 actors of 
3,491 in the total RTP network, or 1.78% of the sample), it is useful to calculate central 
pathways to observe common patterns, although the sample size does not allow for 
causality to be inferred. It simply is a visual representation of the data that enhances the 
author’s ability to describe pathway phenomena. The betweenness centrality analysis of 
the RTP dealmaker sample shown in Figure 7 amplifies the effects on the position nodes 
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and clearly shows that the most central pathway to dealmaking is as a C-Level manager 
of a private or venture-backed firm, most frequently after serving as a senior manager or 
vice president of a public or private firm among the small sample of RTP dealmakers. 
Actors who advanced to the dealmaker stage were most likely to serve as president, 
CEO, or chairman of a high-growth private company. The second most likely path is for 
the dealmaker to serve as CEO or chairman of a public company and then go on to 
become a partner in an investment partnership or bank that invests in a wide cross-
section of private companies, as the visualization shows with the enlarged nodes 
representing the most central pathways through which dealmakers advance in their 
career. 
The next most frequent central career progression is for an actor to first serve as 
a C-level executive in a private venture-backed firm and then as a partner in a venture 
capital firm, after which many actors in the sample advance to serve as managing 
general partners of venture capital firms. The betweenness centrality analysis suggests 
that VCs per se are not the most central dealmakers as a consequence of their role in 
the venture capital firm. It is their prior experience in developing private venture-backed 
companies that gives them the expertise they utilize as venture capital investors to assist 
high-growth companies. This confirms the perspective held in the literature that VCs play 
an important role supporting emerging companies by lending managerial experience to 
firms and serving in a critical advisory function beyond the capitalization they bring (Hsu, 
2004). 
Based on the content and pathway and betweenness centrality analyses, a set of 
general inferences can be made on the origins, characteristics, and typical backgrounds 
of dealmakers in the context of RTP. It is acknowledged that these data cannot be 
generalized to other settings or to other regions at other points in time. However, the 
insights gleaned from this qualitative assessment may support the formation of future 
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hypotheses to be tested empirically. They also provide insights on the characteristics of 
dealmakers in the context of RTP, a point returned to later.  
To the extent it can be summarized in this small sample, dealmakers can be 
described through their careers in each of the four stages outlined in the early content 
analysis as follows: 
Initiators—Early Positions of Dealmakers (Stage 1). In virtually all cases in 
the RTP sample, the entry-level or first position in the initiator stage represents a staff or 
line role in an existing enterprise. The exceptions were independent actors, namely early 
stage founders and university faculty or administrators. While most dealmaker profiles 
did not initiate their careers in the financial field, those who remained as investors 
generally initiated their careers in entry-level positions in investment banking or asset 
management. Generally speaking, individuals who completed their careers leading an 
asset-management or investment or merchant-banking firm initiated their careers in this 
field. Interestingly, RTP dealmakers who principally had careers in venture capital rarely 
initiated their careers in investment banking. In fact, there is a clear difference in career 
paths for dealmakers in asset management and for those in venture capital, with the 
former more likely coming from private equity or banking and the latter from corporate. 
Those actors who are managers or entrepreneurs within existing firms in RTP 
began their careers as entry-level managers or in a line role in either large public 
corporations, high-growth private companies, or in consulting and services companies 
that served high-growth companies. Those who went on to play senior management 
roles in high-growth private companies generally began their careers either in public 
companies or in other high-growth private companies. A small but not inconsequential 
number of RTP dealmakers initiated their careers in services companies, generally in 
positions that served high-growth private companies such as high-growth practices in 
consulting and accounting firms. 
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Given that the sample of dealmakers in RTP is derived from information 
technology and life sciences, it is not surprising that many of the dealmakers initiate their 
careers as founders, since many early advanced-technology firms in these fields rely on 
the specialized expertise of the founder. Another specialized set of dealmakers initiated 
their careers as university faculty or administrators. In all cases among the RTP 
dealmakers, these actors possessed distinctively unique scientific capabilities and 
backgrounds that first allowed them to found companies and then to influence the future 
development of other companies in the same scientific domain. In all cases, these actors 
are considered leaders in their specific scientific domains and represent a first mover in 
the advanced-technology market where they compete. 
Serial Stage–The Defining Position for Dealmakers (Stage 2).The serial stage 
represents the defining position that prepares an entrepreneurial actor for a future as a 
dealmaker. It is apparent from the content analysis of the biographical sketches that at 
this stage, actors become acquainted with the market and acquire skills needed to 
become dealmakers. This exposure sometimes comes through direct experience within 
an early stage private company or through supporting or participating in a financing 
event relating to a growth company. Among investors, three typical position profiles 
emerged from the content analysis: an analyst-level position within a financial or 
securities firm, a director-level position in an investment or merchant-banking firm, or a 
position at the associate or principal level in a venture capital firm. Those working in 
securities or in banking typically possess competence in financial engineering and in 
high-level financial analysis relating to market-level investment opportunities in the 
aggregate, as opposed to the firm-level financial analysis. Venture capital associates 
generally possess financial modeling skills at the firm level, combined with strategic 
market and management insight related to the industry in which they principally invest. 
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Within the entrepreneurial manager profiles, three typical position profiles 
emerge from the content analysis, namely: (1) a senior manager or vice president level 
of a public company; (2) a position at the same level in a high-growth private company; 
or (3) a partner or principal level in a related services company, specifically in the 
management consulting or accounting fields and specifically in their high-growth 
management practice area. Those actors who work for public and private companies 
generally specialize in a specific market domain or in a specific set of skills, such as 
engineering, development, marketing, or business development. It is unclear if any 
specific expertise acquired at the serial stage better qualifies actors to advance to the 
dealmaker stage. It is more common, however, to find individuals with technical 
backgrounds at the serial stage in the life sciences sector than in the information 
technology industry, while information technology favors business development. 
Among typical entrepreneurial founders in the sample, the content analysis 
uncovered two typical career profiles: serial founders, meaning firm founders who went 
on to found a second or third company, and specialized scientific-thought leaders who 
served as department heads or deans of significant academic units involved in research 
related to the firm. In the case of serial entrepreneurs, several actors were discovered to 
have experience founding more than two companies in a series. In most cases the later 
companies were larger, more sophisticated, and generally had venture or equity 
financing. This indicates that serial experience in founding firms increases credibility 
among large-scale equity investors—generally VCs—who value the founder’s 
experience in building new enterprises. Indeed, the literature has already revealed that 
the serial entrepreneur’s path is well worn among those who emerge as dealmakers in 
the entrepreneurial economy (Alsos & Kolvereid, 1998; Li et al., 2009; Westhead, 
Ucbasaran, & Wright, 2005). 
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Actors coming from senior-level academic positions were generally recognized 
as leaders in their scholarly fields because of their research prominence and history of 
innovation; and they had advanced to lead their research group, department, or school. 
In all observed cases, this expertise was highly focused in a new market area 
experiencing high growth or in a representative technology that was a first mover in its 
discipline. Many actors at this stage pursued an entrepreneurial opportunity in parallel 
with their academic roles, generally serving as the Chief Executive Officer of the firm 
they found based on their innovation. Many of these actors retained a relationship with 
their research groups and universities throughout their entire careers, particularly among 
those involved in the life sciences sector. 
Dealmakers–Impact Outside of the Firm (Stage 3). The third stage in the 
career progression—the dealmaker stage—represents individuals who lead enterprises 
and whose backgrounds indicate they are beginning to influence actions outside the 
boundaries of a single entrepreneurial firm. These actors are officers of their firms, 
generally holding board seats, and who are fiduciarily responsible for the financial results 
of their enterprises. Moreover, they have significant influence over the cluster of firms 
they partner with or invest in and have substantial credibility within their industry domain 
based on their biographical history. Indeed, these individuals are generally sought after 
for opportunities to either run or invest in high-growth private firms as a consequence of 
their prior experience. In RTP they represent the top 1% of actors in the network. 
 Among investors, there are three typical positions in the dealmaker stage: 
principal of an investment partnership, junior partner in a venture capital firm, or partner 
in a venture accelerator—a holding company based on an internal fund investing in 
multiple companies. Actors involved in investment partnerships were generally involved 
in large private equity funds, funds of funds, or in hedge funds and had indirect 
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relationships with firms as investors through large funds with multiple portfolio 
investments.  
Among entrepreneurs, dealmakers previously served in C-level positions in 
public, privately held, and venture-backed companies or in related services companies 
advising high-growth firms. This pool of dealmakers are generally considered for 
president and CEO positions in public and private firms in the next stage of their careers, 
assuming they have not already assumed the position of Chief Executive. At this 
juncture in the career progression, an actor's career is generally defined as either having 
management expertise in a large public company or having been qualified to be on the 
management team of a high-growth private or venture-backed company. It is not clear 
from the content analysis whether it is more likely for an executive to emerge as a 
dealmaker from either a public- or private-company management background, although 
it is more likely for an actor in an implementation role of a public company to transition to 
the C-level of a private company rather than vice versa. However, it is interesting to note 
that the distribution of dealmakers in the sample come from both large public company 
and small private company backgrounds alike. 
Also among entrepreneurs at the dealmaker stage were CEOs of venture-backed 
companies who emerged from backgrounds as serial founders of entrepreneurial 
companies. This career progression represents the fastest way an actor in any career 
progression achieves the role of CEO in a private company and emerges as a 
dealmaker. While the evidence is not definitive, it appears based on the content analysis 
that CEOs at this level oversee much earlier, smaller firms than what is typical at the 
dealmaker stage. It has been established by the literature that many serial founders 
serve as the interim or early CEO while the company is transitioning through its early 
growth phases, with many being replaced by professional CEOs when the needs of the 
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company have outgrown the founder’s capabilities (N. Wasserman, 2003). This would 
explain the early advancement of founders to CEO positions. 
The content analysis also reveals that a number of individuals who serve as 
CEOs earlier in their careers often serve as CEOs of larger firms later, and many go on 
to advise several venture-backed private firms while leading a company concurrently. 
Also among dealmakers, scientific experts who emerge from university faculties often 
serve as the initial CEOs of the firms they found; but from the qualitative analysis in 
RTP, it is also more likely that they will continue in their roles longer as the firms 
progress, likely as a result of their long-term value to the development of those 
companies and their products and services. 
Advanced Dealmakers—Reaching the Career Pinnacle (Stage 4). The fourth 
and final stage—the advanced dealmaker stage—represents terminal positions held by 
a small set of actors in an entrepreneurial economy who represent those at the top of 
their respective career ladders, representing the top half of 1% of all actors in the case of 
the RTP network. Interestingly, most actors in this analysis (and in the RTP region in 
general for that matter) never achieve this pinnacle. Indeed, of the 3,491 actors identified 
through the board linkage strategy in RTP, only 20 (.58%) were serving on four or more 
boards of directors concurrently at the time the sample was drawn. While the dealmaker 
stage is characterized by the most active, central, and inter-networked actors in the 
entrepreneurial economy represented by this sample in RTP, there are many roles that 
dealmakers play, as evidenced by the career progressions in Figure 6. Generally those 
who rise to this level are CEOs or partners of their respective firms; and many serve as 
chairmen, managing directors, or managing general partners overseeing the entire 
enterprise. Another common pattern is that while serving in these roles, dealmakers hold 
significant oversight over several other firms outside their primary firm affiliation, while 
generally serving as chairmen of the board. 
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 Among investors, dealmakers generally advance to the partner level of asset 
management firms, investment partnerships and banks, or venture capital firms. The 
most senior of these dealmakers served as chairman, managing director, or managing 
general partner of their respective investment company. Among entrepreneurs, 
dealmakers serve as president, CEO, or chair of public and private companies, with 
many concurrently holding advisory responsibilities and equity positions in investment 
partnerships, private equity firms, or in venture capital funds. 
A typical pattern was found among successful public company CEOs, who joined 
investment partnerships or made direct investments in high-growth companies following 
their tenure leading a public company. These public CEOs serve on multiple boards 
concurrently, either as a consequence of directly investing in the firm or more probably 
due to their status within the industry and their ability to provide entree to key customers, 
partners, and potential acquirers. Unlike their private company counterparts, most of the 
public CEOs following this pattern have sufficiently high net worth that they become 
investors in their own right, many forming investment partnerships and private equity 
firms to manage their own investment portfolios. In this way, former public company 
CEOs become both strategic advisors to the management of private firms helping them 
access key growth markets, while concurrently playing the role of investor. 
Another common pattern that emerges from the content analysis is a series of 
private CEOs oscillating between venture capital firms and growth companies, many of 
whom are drafted to run companies that are part of venture capital portfolios. A hybrid 
scenario commonly found in the content analysis is that of individuals who serve as 
entrepreneurs-in-residence of venture capital firms and who are called on to lead 
portfolio firms as CEO when needed, particularly at critical times in the firm’s 
development. These individuals defy simple classification as entrepreneurs and 
investors. 
 107 
These results indicate a symbiosis between senior managers and VCs, many of 
whom become interchangeable in a typical venture-backed company. The content 
analysis also revealed, perhaps counter intuitively, that many professional VCs were first 
trained to run companies and served as senior executives of private firms, most of which 
were venture backed. The typical training for a professional VC in RTP begins in 
corporate management as opposed to financial management. This point is probed 
further in the social networking analysis that follows. 
Findings: Full Network Betweenness Centrality 
In order to understand the role of dealmakers in the embedded context of the 
networked economy, a third social network manipulation is performed for the full RTP 
entrepreneurial network. Again, betweenness centrality is measured for all ties in the 
aggregate network to identify the dealmakers with the highest betweenness centrality. In 
this case the node is the individual actor (as opposed to the position as before). In this 
context, high betweenness centrality measures are proposed as an indicator of a central 
brokerage or mediation function played by dealmakers in the aggregate RTP 
entrepreneurial network. These actors represent the most central nodes in the network 
through which the highest number of actor ties flow, suggesting that they play a possible 
mediation function (either actively or passively). 
A full entrepreneurial network of actors for RTP was derived from all board and 
management linkages among the full set of entrepreneurial ventures in the region, as 
shown in Figure 8. The full network was analyzed for the embedded characteristics of 
dealmakers with the highest betweenness centrality among all actors in the 
entrepreneurial network through board and management firm ties. The full network 
consists of 2,520 actors in the entrepreneurial network among 475 firm nodes in RTP, 
exhibiting a dense and highly central core cluster, a less dense secondary cluster, and 
one-third of the network disassociated from the two core clusters. All of the actors who 
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have advanced to the dealmaker or advanced dealmaker stages are associated with the 
core cluster and share a common interconnected network with the exception of three 
dealmakers who are associated with a weak and fragmented secondary cluster and 
none with the disassociated firms. This indicates a dense, centralized, interconnected, 
and cohesive network operating in the RTP entrepreneurial economy, with the 
dealmakers sharing several key bridging and overlapping ties. Among the dealmakers, 
14 of the 20 in RTP are interconnected in a common cluster, with three interconnected in 
a secondary cluster and three independent of any cluster. 
As shown in the Appendices D and E, the most between-central actor in the main 
cluster is a serial executive associated with the largest venture capital firm in RTP, who 
has served as CEO of several venture-backed, high-growth companies over the last 10 
years. The most between-central firm, Inspire Pharmaceuticals, is one of the oldest and 
most successful high-growth biotechnology firms in RTP, with a history of spinning off 
new companies, which may explain its degree-central position in the network. 
The full RTP network was then decomposed to isolate the effects of all 
dealmakers, with the networks derived showing only actors with these tie characteristics, 
as seen in Figure 9. In order to isolate and easily observe the most central actors in the 
network, the betweenness centrality computation from the aggregate network carries 
forward to this smaller and more focused visualization showing only the dealmaker and 
firm nodes. 
Betweenness centrality serves to estimate brokerage characteristics among 
actors in the full network consistent with the notion of dealmakers. This estimator 
establishes the actors through which all ties in the full network flow, suggesting a 
substantial mediated function being played by dealmakers. As seen in this network 
diagram, all of the dealmakers in the RTP region are connected to one another directly 
in a common, dense network. Those dealmakers with the highest centrality scores are 
 112 
identified on the diagram with the overlays superimposed on the figure corresponding to 
six typical profiles (P1-P6) detailed next. Based on the full social network diagram of 
RTP, these actors are shown in their embedded context in Figure 9, and the nature of 
their relationships with others in the network is analyzed and common characteristics 
discussed. These dealmakers were studied in depth to establish a set of profiles and to 
uncover evidence on their characteristics and identify any possible mediation functions 
that they contribute to the regional social capital network. 
The dealmakers with the highest betweenness centrality in the aggregate 
network are examined on a case-by-case basis to identify prototypical profiles. In these 
profiles, common characteristics are described, including their inferred contribution to the 
network as an entrepreneur or investor, their positions in the network, the nature of their 
connections to others, and their hypothesized roles. These profiles have been 
anonymized to protect confidentiality. A series of six profiles are presented that 
correspond to the most typical patterns found in the career progressions in the 
dealmakers’ analysis, as shown in an updated Figure 10, with the dealmakers’ profiles 
highlighted as the culminating position in the career progression and corresponding to 
the overlays in Figure 9 (Profile 1 is marked P1 and so on). 
The betweenness centrality analysis of RTP’s dealmaker community reveals four 
typical profiles highlighted in Figure 9 among advanced dealmakers with four or more 
concurrent ties: (1) Professional Private Company CEO, (2) Professional Private 
Company CEO Turned VP, (3) Professional VC, and (4) Serial Private Investor. Two 
additional profiles appear among dealmakers with three ties only: (5) Serial Entrepreneur 
and (6) Bridge Builder Intermediaries. Building upon the findings of the pathway 
analysis, the following sections provide descriptions of the characteristics of these typical 
profiles among dealmakers in RTP, showing their roles in the network, their typical 
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professional backgrounds, and their varied roles in the formation and mediation of 
entrepreneurial firms in the regional economy. 
Dealmaker Profile 1: Private CEO (shown on Figure 9 as P1). 
Both the pathway and betweenness-centrality analyses reveal the importance of 
the professional private company CEO among the dealmakers’ network. These 
dealmakers generally have a progressively successful record in running private 
companies, with backgrounds characterized by deep industry expertise, prior history at a 
senior level in related public and private companies, and close ties to various capital 
sources. These dealmakers are sought after for their business development experience, 
abilities to develop and manage a team, and their focus on building operational and 
business processes. Three of the dealmakers in the RTP network typify this profile. All 
three are specialized in specific industry domains—application development, 
telecommunications, and biotech respectively—and due to their management 
experience and business development contacts are called to serve on the boards of 
outside companies. While as a private CEO one is generally offered a board seat in the 
company that one runs, what makes these individuals unusual is that they can 
concurrently serve on outside boards. For example, one of the dealmakers in this profile 
is CEO of a venture-backed company, while serving on the boards of two private 
companies and a venture-backed company. It is also interesting to note that this 
dealmaker serves as the chairman of the Council for Entrepreneurial Development in 
RTP, the largest entrepreneur networking organization in the region. This pattern is 
consistent among all of the professional CEOs in this category. 
While all of the professional managers fitting this profile have strong 
entrepreneurial credentials, it would not be appropriate to classify them as 
entrepreneurs, as in most cases they did not found the companies that they operate. In 
fact, most developed the skills that qualified them to run private companies as senior 
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executives within large public companies, where they developed the business 
development contacts to support the growth of a new company as CEO. 
Dealmaker Profile 2: Private CEO Turned VC (shown Figure 9 as P2). 
Another set of professional CEOs are more closely embedded with institutional 
venture capital. This profile is characterized by a dealmaker who oscillates between the 
role of private-venture CEO and partner of a venture capital firm. While these roles are 
not standardized and easy to identify, the content analysis of the biographical sketches 
of the CEOs makes it clear that their primary value to the venture capital firm is 
attributed to their management experience running private companies. In fact, in all of 
the cases among the dealmakers in RTP, each actor assumed a partnership role in a 
venture capital firm and subsequently served as CEO for one of the venture capital firm’s 
portfolio companies. Two of the most central dealmakers in the RTP network typify this 
profile. It is perhaps not surprising that both have formal relationships with the leading 
venture capital organizations in RTP: Intersouth Partners and Aurora Funds. However, it 
would be inappropriate to classify them as VCs and investors given their substantial 
backgrounds running entrepreneurial companies. 
These two examples represent two different career progressions: (1) transitioning 
from a high-growth public company to run private companies and then joining venture 
capital; and (2) founding an entrepreneurial company, founding a second company 
backed by venture capital, and then serving as an executive-in-residence within a 
venture firm. While these types of roles are not standardized in any given firm, it is a 
very common pattern within venture capital to employ in-house management talent who 
can later be deployed to serve as a CEO of one of the firm’s portfolio companies. While 
both of these dealmakers originated from different backgrounds, this was the role they 
played in the venture capital organization. 
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The most highly degree-central dealmaker in the RTP aggregate network fits this 
profile, namely a corporate executive who becomes a C-level executive of a private 
company and then becomes a partner in a venture capital firm, thereby serving as the 
model for the private-CEO-turned-VC profile. This dealmaker is connected to eight firms 
concurrently, representing the VC on the portfolio company boards. However, this 
dealmaker’s background suggests that beyond his role as an investor, he is sought after 
for a board position as a consequence of his managerial experience and expertise. This 
profile is representative of the highest frequency career progression and pathway 
exhibited in the RTP network data, as shown in Figure 9. 
This same pattern is evidenced in the network surrounding the second 
dealmaker fitting this profile, in this case a serial-entrepreneur-turned-VC executive-in-
residence. In this case, the second dealmaker is associated with a separate VC firm 
than the first. The board-linkage networks overlap but are not shared, suggesting that 
the two VC firms these dealmakers represent do not invest together. Indeed, a cross-
check of the CapitalIQ data shows that none of the firms these dealmakers advise are 
part of a shared syndicate among the VCs. The overlap in the network connections, 
therefore, may be explained by the fact that this dealmaker’s management expertise 
largely overlaps the same industry domain. It is interesting to note that as of this writing, 
the first dealmaker cited has recently announced his departure from the venture capital 
firm he is associated with to run one of its largest portfolio companies as its Chief 
Executive Officer. Given the career progression noted in this profile, one would expect 
these dealmakers to oscillate between running companies and a VC role over time. 
Dealmaker Profile 3: Professional VC (Figure 9 as P3). 
The second most frequent profile in the dealmaker pathway analysis represents 
the professional VC. These dealmakers are characterized by early professional 
experience in public corporations or in the service sector, leading to progressive 
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expertise in venture capital investing. Individuals in this profile seldom serve as CEOs of 
portfolio companies and are valued for their expertise in overseeing multiple portfolio 
investments concurrently. While the CEOs profiled earlier had a greater degree centrality 
and possessed more concurrent board ties, professional VCs have higher betweenness 
centrality, meaning that more ties flow through this actor in the network than through the 
actor who has the greatest number of connections. This is consistent with theory that 
says VCs mediate among entrepreneurs in the network and connect resources among 
multiple ventures in a region. As the model profile, the founder of the largest venture 
capital firm in RTP is the dealmaker with the highest betweenness centrality in the total 
network. While the literature would indicate that finance and investing acumen would be 
the core competence of the VC, it is interesting to note that even this dealmaker began 
his career in the services industry at the partner level serving high-growth companies. 
Not surprisingly, other dealmakers that fit this profile in the RTP network are the leaders 
of the three largest venture capital investment firms in RTP and share a similar career 
background. None of them have ever run a company, but they do have corporate 
experience in the service industry. While one would expect that a VC would have 
multiple board seats, the professional VC profile is not the progression that represents 
the highest number of concurrent board linkages in RTP. This is contrary to a widely 
held assumption and fundamental theoretical construct in the entrepreneurship literature. 
Dealmaker Profile 4: Serial Private Investor (shown Figure 9 as P4). 
A final profile among dealmakers with four or more concurrent ties in RTP is 
represented by a special class of investors who are not affiliated with professional 
venture capital, but who instead work with institutional funds to invest their own personal 
net worth. There are two dealmakers in the RTP network that fit this profile. While these 
two dealmakers may be commonly termed serial investors, they represent two distinct 
and disparate career progressions. The first is a successful former venture capitalist 
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from the Boston area who retired from the industry and now co-invests in early-stage 
entrepreneurial companies with angel investors. This dealmaker explicitly states in her 
biographical sketch that she uses her extensive expertise gained from her years in 
professional venture capital to support early stage companies to develop growth 
strategies and attract long-term capitalization. The network ties in this social capital 
profile show not only the connections to her direct investments but to the syndicate 
partners with whom she works as co-investors. 
The second serial private investor in RTP is a former corporate vice chairman of 
a Fortune 10 information technology company and has formed an investment 
partnership to invest his net worth with other high-net-worth individuals in structured 
private equity deals. This class of investor maintains a portfolio that consists of 
conventional financings and investments, with a minority percentage of capital deployed 
in earlier-stage private financings. While this type of investor does not invest all his 
committed capital in early stage investments—such as would be the case with some 
venture capital firms—he does represent an important class of equity investor for new 
firms in RTP. While both dealmakers featured here have widely different career 
trajectories, they share a common capability to attract later-stage capitalization to the 
ventures in which they invest, perhaps explaining their between centrality in the 
aggregate network implying a strong mediation role. It is hypothesized that these 
dealmakers are sought after by firms for their ability to attract long-term financing 
partners leading to successful growth and exits. 
Due to their backgrounds, they share a common credibility among sophisticated 
investors, and their involvement in a venture represents an endorsement of the potential 
success of the venture. Both of these dealmakers are regarded within RTP as respected 
opinion leaders in the private investment community. Both lend their credibility and 
expertise to third-party private investment groups, while contributing their capital as part 
 118 
of their own personal investment strategies. An important difference, however, between 
these two dealmaker profiles is that while one is focused on early stage investing and 
has deep experience in this arena, the other is qualified for long-range capitalization and 
private equity strategies, with an emphasis on later-stage growth financing and exits 
through mergers and IPOs. 
 Dealmaker Profile 5: Serial Entrepreneur (shown Figure 9 as P5). 
 While the four profiles previously reviewed encompass actors who possess four 
or more firm ties and have generally reached their career pinnacles, this profile 
represents serial entrepreneurs who possesses three concurrent firm ties and are 
relatively earlier in their respective careers. While these individuals are still reasonably 
early in their careers, it is hypothesized that they serve in important bridge spanning 
roles the network of the RTP entrepreneurial economy, linking key resources and 
serving as intermediates to support the development of an entrepreneurial culture in the 
region. While the literature has focused widely on the start-up entrepreneur, this 
particular profile of dealmaker has already had multiple start-ups to his credit and has 
gained credibility in building a series of companies. The term serial entrepreneur is 
generally used to describe this profile given that dealmakers who follow this pattern 
generally execute companies in the same industry domains of their first start-up, and this 
is a recurring pattern. There are three dealmakers that fit this profile in the case of RTP. 
According to the biographical data, the serial entrepreneurs identified in RTP are 
specialized in their identified industry domain—application development, mobility, and 
biotech, respectively—but have branched out to advise other companies within their 
industry specialization beyond the companies they currently oversee. While they 
generally serve as CEOs of the ventures they found, unlike other CEOs profiled, they 
are not considered professional CEOs (as they generally do not have industry 
experience), nor do they have formal affiliations with venture capital. In all three cases, 
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these founders are regarded as opinion leaders within the RTP entrepreneurial economy 
and are sought for their expertise in their specific industry domains and markets. While 
the network analysis indicates that there are close cooperative relationships with venture 
capital, these relationships are generally held at arm’s length. While this dealmaker 
profile fits most closely the concept of an entrepreneur in the literature, it is important to 
note that the contributions of these dealmakers go well beyond the founding of the 
ventures that they initiate, developing strong relationships with multiple companies in the 
RTP cluster based on the nature of their connections in the aggregate network. 
Dealmaker Profile 6: Angel Bridge Builders (shown Figure 9 as P6). 
A second notable class of dealmakers with three ties serves as intermediaries in 
the network, characterized by high betweenness centrality among the widest array of 
actors in the network. This profile is characterized by individuals who serve both 
entrepreneurs and investors as service providers in the regional entrepreneurial 
economy. The two dealmakers who typify this profile are an active RTP corporate 
attorney and venture accountant respectively. While both of these dealmakers formed an 
entity to do structured angel investing in early stage companies many years ago, their 
roles and positions in the network indicate a much more substantial contribution to the 
development of social capital in the RTP entrepreneurial economy. In fact, none of the 
three concurrent firm linkages that qualify them as dealmakers are associated with 
ventures they invested in through their investment partnership. As an example of the 
dealmaker’s bridge-building role in the social capital of an entrepreneurial region, it is 
interesting to note that one of these dealmakers founded the leading entrepreneurial 
networking organization in RTP, the Council for Entrepreneurial Development, further 
suggesting a unique bridge-spanning and cluster-development role played by the 
dealmaker in this profile.  
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Both of these dealmakers are differentiated from other profiles based on their 
vocational background and technical expertise, each possessing skill sets and expertise 
that allow them to support new firms through their unique bundle of capabilities. In the 
case of RTP, these two bridge-builder dealmakers cite experience with supporting 
multiple successful private ventures in their biographical sketches, while serving in a 
fiduciary role for only three concurrent firms. Indeed, the biographies indicate that both 
dealmakers cited possess the deepest experience with the widest array of firms in RTP 
in a non-fiduciary role. Put more simply, these dealmakers serve as intermediaries and 
have the widest breadth of contacts among the RTP entrepreneurial community. While 
only fiduciary ties would appear in the algorithm, the biographical information and 
position descriptions for this profile suggest that they have much greater impact on a 
broader range of firms than any other category of dealmaker, well beyond the fiduciary 
ties identified through this analysis. The bridging roles of attorneys and accountants in 
the entrepreneurial networks have been previously cited in the literature, which appears 
confirmed by this analysis (Kenney & Patton, 2005; Lee et al., 2000). However, the 
existing research on bridging capital roles of intermediary service providers has been 
based on interview data and qualitative analysis. This is the first time to the author’s 
knowledge that these intermediary relationships have been operationalized quantitatively 
within an existing network pattern based on third-party data. 
Discussion 
The findings of this qualitative data and social network analysis suggest that 
drawing a sharp distinction between the entrepreneur and the investor oversimplifies and 
misspecifies the structure of social capital in an entrepreneurial economy. Among these 
dealmakers, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in terms of their backgrounds and 
roles, with very few who could be neatly separated into either the entrepreneur or the 
investor category. Indeed, dealmakers in RTP universally blended these two functions. 
 121 
This analysis suggests that the simple classification of actors in the network as 
entrepreneurs or investors is more likely appropriate for actors in the earlier stages of 
their career development. As actors progress to the dealmaking stage, these roles are 
blurred, if not combined. The simple dichotomy of the entrepreneur and the investor is 
insufficient to understand the wide array of roles, progressions, and contributions made 
by dealmakers in the entrepreneurial economy. Case in point: Returning to the two 
mutually exclusive dimensions of the conceptual model presented in Chapter 3 of the 
dissertation—investors and entrepreneurs, we discover that the six prototype profiles 
that emerge from the structured content analysis do not fall neatly into these categories, 
as demonstrated by the pathway analysis. Generally speaking, dealmaker career 
pathways oscillate between roles that would be associated with entrepreneurial and 
investment roles. 
This calls into question the fundamental dichotomy in current theory. These 
findings may call for a more sophisticated and descriptive classification of actors to study 
those who are most central to the entrepreneurial firm development process. Most of 
these dealmakers defy simple classification, as the pathway analysis demonstrates. The 
pathway and social network analysis reveal a set of actors who functionally combine 
features of both investors and entrepreneurs concurrently. While there are profiles that 
do fit this paradigm—specifically the professional VC who falls more closely in the 
investor prototype and the serial entrepreneur who may be classified as an entrepreneur 
as the literature suggests, there are several career progressions that show clear 
transition from entrepreneur to investor and, in some cases, back again. These roles 
transition throughout the typical career progression of the dealmaker and do not fit the 
dichotomous model. Even among professional VCs and serial entrepreneurs, where the 
similarities are the closest, this analysis finds that the former begin their careers as 
entrepreneurs and the latter often become investors—again defying simple 
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classification. As actors in the entrepreneurial economy advance to dealmakers, their 
roles evolve to fuse features of entrepreneur and investor, indeed bringing these two 
elements of social capital more closely together. 
But probably most significant in this qualitative analysis is the finding that the 
most central dealmakers in the RTP entrepreneurial economy are those who serve as 
CEOs of high-growth private companies. Some develop from an entrepreneurial founder 
background, some grow up within high-growth private companies, but most begin their 
careers working in the corporate environment as opposed to initiating their careers with 
a start-up in the garage as the literature suggests (Audia, 2005). In fact, the RTP sample 
of dealmakers demonstrates that the founder entrepreneur is not the most likely 
dealmaker profile. The most likely dealmaker is a product of an existing public or private 
enterprise, who then transitions to a more senior role leading a private company as 
President or CEO. In fact, very few dealmakers are the original founders of the 
enterprises they go on to run (3:62 or 5%). This fact conflicts with the assertions in the 
current entrepreneurship literature, which largely emphasizes the founder entrepreneur 
as a dominant profile. 
Among the dealmakers, founders and serial entrepreneurs appear and contribute 
significantly to the entrepreneurial economy, possessing strong ties with investors and 
other entrepreneurs based on their embedded characteristics in the RTP network. While 
the sample of RTP dealmakers is not large, the findings suggest that the serial 
entrepreneur is quite important to the entrepreneurial economy in serving the bridge to 
other entrepreneurs. However, to characterize the serial entrepreneur as the most 
important dealmaker in an entrepreneurial economy, as the literature suggests, would be 
inconsistent with the findings in RTP. 
Also, among dealmakers, there is another most interesting class of 
intermediaries who serve as bridge builders in linking the social capital of the region. 
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These individuals serve high-growth companies, often providing legal and financial 
management and accounting services; and through their work, they serve to integrate 
and bring together investors and entrepreneurs (Granovetter, 2005). Indeed, we find that 
many of the dealmakers in the RTP sample initiate their careers in the service economy 
or in capacities where they work with companies as a service provider. It is telling that 
many of the professional VCs in RTP also come from this background, having been 
trained in service companies that work with high-growth entrepreneurial firms. These 
intermediaries deserve closer attention in the future research on dealmakers. 
The betweenness centrality analysis suggests that dealmakers may play a more 
active brokerage function in the RTP network, hypothesized to mediate between 
entrepreneurs and investors and perhaps motivate the network. Indeed, those with the 
highest number of concurrent ties to entrepreneurial firms also hold roles that allow them 
to influence multiple firms beyond those to which they are fiduciarily responsible. 
Moreover, the betweenness analysis that isolates dealmaker capital verifies that all 
dealmakers are connected in a common network separated from one another by less 
than one degree of separation in the case of RTP. This suggests an enhanced 
interpretation of brokerage than what has been suggested in the sociology literature. It is 
hypothesized that dealmakers, as a consequence of their deep serial experience and 
their prominent roles in the network (based on their relative seniority and background), 
serve to mediate the network and facilitate communication and resource exchange 
among other actors in the aggregate network. While the only evidence that can be 
brought to bear to support this claim is the secondary biographical data and descriptions, 
the betweenness centrality manipulation shows clearly that dealmakers are positioned 
appropriately in the network to serve in the mediation role that is surmised. 
In order to understand dealmakers, a revised classification or typology is required 
to account for the intermingling of the entrepreneur and investor roles that appear in the 
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career progressions of these important actors in the entrepreneurial economy. Research 
in entrepreneurship can fruitfully adapt to discover the vital symbiosis between 
entrepreneurs, corporate leaders, financing experts, investors, and intermediaries who 
comprise the most active segment of social capital in the entrepreneurial economy. Also, 
while this examination largely speaks to the role of dealmakers in the birth of new firms, 
the findings suggest a new hypothesis, which is that dealmakers may play a facilitation 
role in post-founding maturation and development of firms. While this cannot be claimed 
by the analysis presented here, the mediation functions played by dealmakers most 
likely benefit the firm not only during the birth process but also during its development 
and maturation process. 
The social network analysis contributes a set of common profiles to future 
scholarship and provides an empirical framework through which structured social capital 
can be quantitatively measured and qualitatively evaluated. The dichotomy of the 
entrepreneur and investor may give way to a more comprehensive typology of 
dealmakers that account for the effects of seriality, brokerage and mediation 
hypothesized in this dissertation as a new concept of structured social capital.
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
REFLECTIVE CONCLUSION: THE DEALMAKER MILIEU 
 
 
This dissertation proposes a new conceptualization of the social capital 
framework that supports the establishment of entrepreneurial economies and proposes 
the dealmaker milieu. Dealmakers are hypothesized to play a central role in motivating 
the regional entrepreneurial economy and mediating the social networks that support for 
the formation of new firms. The concept of the dealmaker reframes the debate among 
academic researchers and policymakers about how a successful entrepreneurial 
economy is established. While the latest thinking is largely dominated by a two-
dimensional definition of social capital, oscillating between two alternative viewpoints 
that attribute success to the entrepreneur or the investor, dealmakers combine both of 
these functions and add a vital third dimension. While current aggregate social capital 
theory places entrepreneurs and investors in a neat and tight x-y axis, the dealmaker 
offers a functionality that operates on the z axis. 
The argument of this dissertation does not take issue directly with the proposition 
in the current literature that successful entrepreneurial economies result from dense and 
vibrant aggregate networks of entrepreneurs and investors. Indeed, the findings of this 
dissertation are consistent with and serve to confirm current theory, showing that regions 
generating high rates of firm births are associated with the presence of viable and dense 
entrepreneurial social capital structures. While causal inferences cannot be drawn from 
this sample, both the empirical and social network analyses suggest that while an 
interconnected network of entrepreneurs and investors may be a necessary condition for 
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the establishment of a successful entrepreneurial economy, it is not sufficient. The 
empirical comparison and component analysis suggest the following: 
1. While aggregate networks are associated with new firm births, structured 
dealmaker networks appear better associated. 
2. Regions with relatively better success in establishing new firms are generally 
better endowed with dealmakers, and the most successful regions have more 
dealmakers per average firm birth than less successful economies. 
3. Successful regions have both a higher aggregate density of entrepreneurs 
and investors but similarly have an even higher degree of dealmakers per 
firm. 
4. Successful regions with cohesive dealmaker networks are associated with 
success in establishing new firms, and regions with dense and cohesive 
dealmaker networks are even more highly associated with successful firm 
birth outcomes. 
5. The component analysis suggests that regions with relatively weaker and 
less dense aggregate networks may be able to overcome this deficit with a 
more cohesive dealmaker network. 
For economies to achieve sustained success in generating new technology-
based companies, this analysis suggests that they must possess a vital network of 
dealmakers. Dealmakers leverage their experience and multiple firm ties to build bridges 
among actors in the social capital framework and serve as examples, enhancing the 
quality of interconnections among the entrepreneurs and investors active in a network. 
However, this analysis questions the assertion in current theory that all 
entrepreneurs and investors are created equal. Instead, this study suggests that there 
may be sets of dealmakers whose network ties span multiple firms; who may build 
critical bridges between all entrepreneurs and investors in aggregate regional networks; 
 127 
and who may thereby mediate, motivate, and enhance the networking characteristics of 
the regional entrepreneurial economy. The principal outcome of this dissertation departs 
from the existing literature, which perhaps overemphasizes the role of entrepreneurs and 
investors in the aggregate in establishing entrepreneurial economies. This study 
suggests that the existence of dealmakers may in fact be a better predictor of the 
establishment of a successful entrepreneurial economy than the number of 
entrepreneurs or investors in the region or other traditional measures of aggregate social 
capital. This study also suggests that there may exist a critical symbiosis between 
individual entrepreneurs and investors and the dealmakers who may build bridges 
among them. 
The concept of the dealmaker has been built upon the foundation of existing 
theory and complements current active models in research. The concept of dealmakers, 
who merge features of serial entrepreneurs and investors, adds functional dimension to 
the aggregate views of social capital. Dealmakers represent an amalgam of three tested 
concepts from theory: seriality, brokerage, and mediation (see review of this literature in 
Chapter 3). While these three independent concepts are known and tested mechanisms 
in the empirical literature in entrepreneurship, the dealmaker concept represents a 
unique synthesis serving to integrate and extend the existing interpretations of these 
functions to imply a much more active, coordinative, and deterministic role for 
dealmakers in the regional entrepreneurial network. This case study and empirical 
examination suggests that theory based on aggregate social capital does not sufficiently 
explain the important brokerage and mediation functions played by dealmakers in 
successful entrepreneurial milieux. 
Evidence is brought to bear in this dissertation that dealmakers serve in a 
mediation role that exceeds the interpretation of a simple brokerage or intermediation 
function isolated by Burt and the sociologists. The high betweenness centrality estimates 
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in the regional social network suggest that dealmakers may mediate if not motivate an 
entrepreneurial network. While this qualitative analysis could not demonstrate why these 
actors are most central, it is hypothesized that they are sought after by other actors in 
the network for their serial experience in building ventures, for their knowledge of 
venture finance, and for their broad array of connections throughout the network which 
allow them to shape network outcomes. 
Dealmakers are surmised to play an important role in motivating an 
entrepreneurial economy. Following evidence gleaned from RTP, dealmakers generally 
are among the most facile entrepreneurial actors in the economy. While they typically 
have serial experience in founding, operating, or investing in entrepreneurial firms, this 
case study suggests that their experience provides a basis for them to serve as catalysts 
and as central brokers of information, resources, and insights that are critical to the 
formation of new companies. The biographical analysis suggests that they are valued for 
their unique perspectives and abilities in the firm formation process, for their access to 
critical network connectivity, and to important resources and contacts required to 
establish a new firm. In a sense, dealmakers serve as the catalyst of highly 
entrepreneurial economies. While all that could be demonstrated through this case study 
was the strong association of active and vital entrepreneurial communities and the 
presence of dealmaker social capital, it could very well be proven through further 
empirical work that dealmakers are the critical catalysts required to establish and sustain 
a brisk and active entrepreneurial economy characterized by high frequencies of new 
firm births. 
This dissertation also demonstrates that the dealmaker’s role and position in the 
entrepreneurial network is complex. Dealmakers come from all walks of life. They are 
serial founders, corporate CEOs, professional venture capitalists, high net-worth angel 
investors, professional managers, and highly skilled innovators, technicians, and 
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scientists. But the sample of RTP dealmakers shows that they are most likely to serve as 
a C-level executive in a company prior to becoming a dealmaker. A dealmaker’s 
accumulated experience as a serial entrepreneur, manager, or investor may be 
especially valuable to other actors who require critical skills, linkages, and resources to 
support the development of their own entrepreneurial firms. But this experience isn’t 
confined only to the process of founding a firm. 
Indeed, most of the RTP dealmakers spent time in high-level corporate positions 
which allowed them to accumulate experience and relationships with important business 
development contacts, many of whom may serve as potential customers, partners, or 
acquirers of the firms the dealmaker supports. With a wide array of contacts and 
accumulated experience, dealmakers are shown to transcend a single venture or firm to 
have ties and influence multiple firms concurrently and therefore may command an 
enhanced span of control and influence in shaping the network. In this manner, they may 
mediate or broker relationships within the social capital network and thereby exert a 
significant influence on the regional entrepreneurial network as a whole. 
But just as importantly, the content analysis of biographical data shows that 
dealmakers represent a class of actors who have the greatest expertise, experience, 
and know-how in building high-growth companies. While some develop their expertise in 
a specific industry domain or technological area, most dealmakers have a 
heterogeneous and varied background, combining deep technical or operational 
expertise with wide and varied experience. Moreover, the typical dealmaker has direct 
experience in building high-growth private companies and has a wealth of business 
development contacts within both public and private companies, as shown by the 
pathway analysis. This result suggests that the most central dealmakers come from 
managerial backgrounds with public and private companies, as opposed to the serial 
entrepreneurs or VCs who have been celebrated by the literature, at least in the context 
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of RTP (Audretsch et al., 2006; Delmar & Davidsson, 2000; Fainstein, 2005; Florida & 
Kenney, 1988; Hsu, 2006; Lerner, 1995; Neergaard, 2003; Powell et al., 2002). Most 
dealmakers have been trained first in public companies or in the service sector, which 
prepares them to assume senior roles in high-growth private companies where they 
repeat this habit continuously and over time transition to a dealmaker role and assume 
the role of the investor. 
Indeed, their actions in facilitating the establishment of new firms may serve to 
produce a deeper pool of entrepreneurial social capital that serves to perpetuate the 
region’s economic vitality. While the total population of entrepreneurs and investors 
serves as the foundation of the aggregate entrepreneurial economy, it is surmised that 
the presence of dealmakers amplifies dramatically the interconnections, carrying 
capacity, and impact of the network. Analyses of both social capital composition and the 
social network component structure suggest that while the density of entrepreneur and 
investor networks in a region plays a significant role in its success generating firm births, 
the presence and cohesiveness of dealmaker networks separate regions that are highly 
successful from those that are not. 
The empirical setting of RTP, however, suggests that the context of the regional 
economy matters. Dealmakers in RTP come from corporate roles and backgrounds. 
Based on the current literature in entrepreneurship, the expectation is that these highly 
central actors would be serial entrepreneurs and venture capitalists (Alsos & Kolvereid, 
1998; Baird & Morrison, 2005; Hsu, 2006; Kenney & Patton, 2005; Lerner, 1995; 
Westhead, Ucbasaran, & Wright, 2005; Wright et al., 1997). Therefore, RTP represents 
a counterintuitive result. Although this finding cannot be compared to other regions given 
the limitations of this research design, this result certainly suggests that economic 
context matters. RTP represents one of the largest formal concentrations of corporate 
research and development enterprises in a research park setting in the United States. 
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Given the unique interplay between start-up companies and larger corporate partners in 
RTP, it may likely inform who emerges as dealmakers in the context of the regional 
economy. While one may expect the model of the garage entrepreneurs celebrated in 
Silicon Valley, in RTP the dealmaker may very well be quite different, and more likely a 
corporate entrepreneur (Audia, 2005). 
Contributions to Future Theory Development 
This dissertation advances current concepts in the scholarly literature to refine 
current thinking and research constructs. First, it places dealmaker social capital in the 
context of established aggregate social capital constructs in explaining successful 
entrepreneurial economies, and it specifically focuses effort on the underlying anatomy 
of social capital, understanding the dealmaker in terms of his or her role in mediating 
social capital networks. This dissertation makes contributions to the literature germane 
to the origins, roles, and characteristics of dealmakers who mediate entrepreneurial 
networks; and it develops a new way to characterize and measure social capital in the 
context of the regional entrepreneurial network. 
Second, it specifically examines the enhanced brokerage and mediation roles 
played by dealmakers in the regional social capital network, seeking to better 
characterize the nature of their between central role as embedded actors in the network. 
While the specific mechanism cannot be causally established by means of this 
qualitative analysis, an enhanced understanding of the role, origins, and common 
attributes are revealed for RTP dealmakers through the career pathway, betweenness, 
and profile analyses based on the content of the biographical data. This allows for the 
shaping of a stronger understanding of dealmaker social capital, particularly in the 
context of a planned research park technopole. 
Third, it advances a new qualitative framework to examine and visualize social 
capital data in the context of networks. This dissertation has sought to extend available 
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quantitative and social network analysis strategies to enhance the descriptive power of 
the qualitative case study. The dealmaker algorithm allows access to publicly available 
commercial datasets and extracts and recompiles the data in a way that allows for 
enhanced and quantitatively accessible empirical analysis. This data retrieval and 
analysis technique will allow for the adaptation of more sophisticated qualitative analysis 
techniques. Moreover, it outlines a set of methods that could be used for more 
comprehensive empirical examinations of the same concepts. 
Limitations  
 
It is recognized that this analysis has some important limitations. First, the author 
acknowledges that this project may be subject to endogeneity threats by associating 
dealmakers with successful entrepreneurial economies. It is an open and proverbial 
question whether dealmakers facilitate and motivate entrepreneurial economies or 
successful economies generate dealmakers. Of course, the same criticism could be 
levied against the aggregate social capital data that dominates the comparative 
literature: Do successful economies generate more entrepreneurs and investors, or do 
more entrepreneurs and investors make economies successful? The theoretical logic of 
this analysis is that network actors with multiple firm connections are a better proxy for 
dense, cohesive entrepreneurial networks than the number of individual entrepreneurs 
and investors a network sustains. 
Second, the snapshot data used in this dissertation may present an external validity 
threat because affiliation data for the small sample of regions cannot be generalized to 
reflect affiliations in all regions nor the general population. Snapshot data may also fail to 
provide internal consistency reliability, because affiliations in the sample regions may be 
different at other points in time than when the sample was drawn. Furthermore, because 
firm affiliations are more readily captured when firms receive institutional financing, the 
data likely over report firms financed by venture capital, banks, or private equity and 
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under report firms in the small-business sector, early stage firms that are not yet 
documented or that grow without external financing. This bias is partially corrected 
because the biotech and information technology firms that dominate the entrepreneurial 
sectors in this study are much more likely to be financed by venture capital and private 
equity. 
Third, clearly there are other threats to external validity posed by the relatively small 
size of the sample (12 regions) and the use of secondary data. These threats have been 
mitigated through the use of established social networking analysis techniques to 
attempt to bring rigor to this qualitative assessment. Social network tools focus the 
analysis on the actors exhibiting dealmaker characteristics from a variety of regional 
contexts and support a more detailed qualitative examination of the sample of actors in 
the RTP entrepreneurial network. The content analysis, pathway analysis, and 
betweenness centrality assessment were all intended to sharpen the theory posited by 
this study, namely that dealmakers combine both entrepreneurial and investor social 
capital to play an important brokerage role in regional entrepreneurial networks.  
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, it is acknowledged that this study design 
introduces additional external validity threats stemming from the fact that the study’s 
findings are not generalizable beyond the twelve regions analyzed. It is difficult to protect 
against these threats at the regional level of analysis used here due to the volume of 
data required. While this study analyzes regional characteristics with large samples of 
firms (n = 22,329) and even larger samples of associated senior executive and board 
members (n = 86,036), in the end it can only draw inferences about what these 
differences mean for regional economies. While the 12-region sample used here is large 
enough to discern variations and uncover intriguing patterns among entrepreneurial 
networks, it does not provide a sufficient basis for scientific generalization (Yin, 1984). 
Because the unit of analysis is the region, it is impractical to identify sufficient regions to 
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allow for more advanced statistical, regression-based, or econometric analyses—a task 
for future empirical work. However, the social network analysis and algorithm 
supplement the case study and extend the analytical power of the project to enhance 
qualitative understanding and insight and to support future theory building. 
Finally, the conceptual model employed in the dissertation allows for a test of 
existing theory in a transitive fashion, but a qualitative research design like the one used 
here does not allow for an assertion of causality. Case studies do provide a rigorous 
framework for testing hypotheses by drawing upon multiple sources of evidence, with 
data converging in a triangulating fashion (Yin, 1993). This study accomplishes this by 
employing three complementary analytical approaches: an empirical social capital 
analysis to examine the data, a social network analysis to examine and characterize the 
social networks for the 12 subject regions, and a qualitative content and network 
analysis of dealmakers in RTP.  
Notwithstanding these stated limitations, the case study format does support an 
expansion of regional development and entrepreneurship theory and the development of 
a new analytical framework to explain differences in social capital composition and 
structure for regions with successful entrepreneurial outcomes, thereby advancing 
theory building for future quantitative analyses. Since this study is set in the context of 
established theory, the case evaluation is intended to influence the development of new 
research, to account for deficiencies uncovered in current theoretical paradigms in the 
literature, and to encourage the development of nascent concepts of dealmaker social 
capital set in the context of regional entrepreneurial networks. The specific empirical 
analyses and social network analyses conducted in the dissertation uncover intriguing 
associations among (1) dealmakers with multiple concurrent firm ties, (2) mediated, 
cohesive entrepreneurial networks, and (3) productive entrepreneurial economies 
measured as new firm births. These insights suggest that existing theory should be 
 135 
extended to explore structured social capital networks, and to fully understand the 
overall impact of social capital structure in the establishment of entrepreneurial 
economies to include the new concept of dealmaker. 
Policy Implications 
The results of this dissertation suggest a number of important implications for 
future policy considering the insights on dealmaker social capital—the dealmaker milieu. 
First, policy oriented toward enhancing entrepreneurship should be directed well 
beyond the construct of the firm to include the dealmakers associated with the firm and 
indeed the regional network. This analysis lends support to the proposition that 
dealmaker actors in social capital networks are associated with higher rates of new firm 
formation in regional entrepreneurial economies. Future examinations of policy should 
look beyond an aggregate assessment of rank-and-file entrepreneurs and investors and 
should instead place particular attention on dealmakers. While many policies 
implemented today are most concerned with how individual entrepreneurs and investors 
behave, policy may be better informed by seeing the implications of policy as the effect 
of the entire network, particularly among those in the network who mediate relationships 
and resources. Policies intended to encourage entrepreneurship tend to focus on the 
needs of the firm as an entity. This dissertation suggests instead that the needs of the 
central actors in the entrepreneurial network should also be the focus of policy. 
Second, dealmakers may help both inform effective public policy and represent 
an efficient network through which policy change may be implemented. Dealmakers 
influence multiple firms. Therefore, public policies may be designed to work in parallel 
with the dealmaker—to facilitate their work and facilitate policy through their work—and 
thereby encourage the formation of new entrepreneurial ventures. Moreover, once new 
policy is adopted, this same set of actors may be used to communicate and facilitate 
policy changes. While policymakers likely already consult with those entrepreneurs and 
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investors held in highest regard by the community, the algorithm used to identify these 
dealmakers may be used to select from actors in a wider array of industries, 
backgrounds, and capabilities that a typical personal social or affiliation network would 
otherwise overlook. Dealmakers may be seen as a social capital network that facilitates 
new policy adoption and evaluation, leading to a virtuous circle of policy that reinforces 
elements that support the network and modifies policy that do not. 
Third, a persuasive case can be made that for regions to encourage the 
formation of a successful entrepreneurial economy, they may need to enhance the 
function of their regional network by encouraging ties among dealmakers and between 
dealmakers and actors in the aggregate network. While this study cannot speak to the 
mechanisms that lead to the establishment of a dealmaker social capital system, it does 
suggest that policy may be better informed by placing emphasis on the dealmakers in a 
given economy whose influence serves to shape the entrepreneurial network. While this 
analysis is mute on this specific evolutionary mechanism that gives rise to dealmakers, 
Feldman has identified the role of entrepreneurs in the context of the cluster as an 
evolutionary mechanism of regional economic growth (Braunerhjelm & Feldman, 2006; 
Feldman et al., 2005). Under the same logic, it stands to reason that regions should aim 
to develop stronger cooperative ties among entrepreneurs and investors and encourage 
multiple linkages to seed their networks with dealmakers derived from their own regional 
populations. Dealmakers will then emerge from the cadre of regional entrepreneurs and 
investors in the aggregate network, thereby perpetuating a vital network. Future theory 
building will need to investigate this evolutionary concept more fully, identify the 
mechanism by which dealmakers support the evolution of entrepreneurial social capital, 
and more closely specify the mediation role they play in supporting and perhaps 
facilitating the evolution of the entrepreneurial network. 
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Fourth, there is some data in the analysis that suggests dealmakers may be 
recruited to work in a region with a less dense and cohesive entrepreneurial network. 
Indeed, many of the biographical sketches of RTP dealmakers included evidence of 
active ties and in some cases split time between the subject region and another locale. 
In some cases, dealmakers split time between two regional offices, for example Atlanta 
and RTP, and in a of couple cases, Silicon Valley and RTP. For regions that do not have 
as strong a track record in developing an entrepreneurial economy, it may be possible to 
encourage these linkages by establishing ties with dealmakers in other economies and 
building routines that would encourage the development of linkages among the region's 
existing entrepreneurs, investors, and dealmakers both within and outside the region. 
Policies that seek to enhance recruitment and migration of dealmakers from the outside 
into less developed and mature entrepreneurial networks may in fact serve as a catalyst 
for the maturation of the regional network and perhaps to seed the establishment of a 
stronger dealmaker cadre in the region. Moreover, the analysis suggests that regions 
with limited density among their regional network of entrepreneurs and investors may be 
able to overcome these limitations by enhancing the cohesiveness among their existing 
dealmakers. This may be accomplished through policies that encourage dealmakers to 
communicate or perhaps even collaborate and cooperate in the formation of new 
entrepreneurial ventures to seed the development of a dealmaker milieu. 
Fifth, the analytical strategies and methodologies employed in this dissertation 
may serve to complement existing cluster-based economic development analysis 
strategies currently in use. This may extend cluster-based approaches in regional 
economic theory to identify corresponding and reinforcing elements of social capital that 
play a role in the formation of clusters. This analysis suggests that cluster approaches 
would be significantly supported by building complementary social capital frameworks 
based on the dealmaker concept, placing a face of the most central actors in the cluster. 
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Dealmaker actors in a given cluster may be identified and recruited to lead proactive 
strategies to develop more advanced or new industry cluster taking full advantage of the 
region’s current social capital endowment within core industry concentrations. Regions 
that understand how their social capital reinforces their industry clusters may be in a 
better position to develop and maturate these clusters to fuel future regional growth. 
Directions for Future Research 
It is impossible to generalize the findings presented in this thesis and to assert 
causal mechanisms to definitively alter regional development theory. For this to be 
possible, the dealmaker concept will have to undergo more rigorous quantitative 
examination involving a larger universe of regional economies. While prior work has 
noted this potential and relied on qualitative methods to begin identifying these 
influences, this dissertation provides a conceptual model and a set of potential 
quantitative measures that may be developed to accomplish the wider task. 
 Should the concept of the dealmaker prove to be a fruitful alternative view of 
structured social capital complementing the current body of research, this concept will 
open avenues to the pursuit of new theory in structured social capital, seriality, 
brokerage, and mediation and will serve to facilitate a more comprehensive 
understanding of specific actors in vibrant entrepreneurial economies. Indeed, this 
dissertation proposes, perhaps boldly, a dealmaker’s milieu as a prototype for the 
successful entrepreneurial region. The implications of this line of research are 
significant, as it may allow future researchers and policymakers to focus their efforts on 
those actors whose presence and behaviors have the most influence on the 
establishment and development of successful entrepreneurial economies. 
Beyond this dissertation, future research could further probe some important 
mechanisms that are not revealed in this analysis and that require better specification, 
namely the: 
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 differences and interplay between serial entrepreneurs and investors; 
 
 specific mechanisms of brokerage implied in social capital frameworks 
internal and external to the region; 
 
 changing nature of dealmakers as the number of concurrent firm ties 
increase; 
 
 evidence how the regional economic and socio-demographic context 
influences the role and characteristics of dealmakers; 
 
 role of dealmakers in establishing, developing, and sustaining successful 
entrepreneurial milieux; and 
 
 potential evolutionary mechanisms that unfold among dealmakers to 
establish and sustain the milieux through time. 
 
These questions suggest that, first, the tie between dealmaker capital and a successful 
entrepreneurial milieu will have to be established more concretely using an expanded 
quantitative research design. Secondly, more robust studies will involve an empirical 
cross-evaluation of dealmaker capital in multiple regions, with a focused analysis of how 
dealmaker characteristics change in different regional contexts. Third, an in-depth 
analysis will be required to ascertain the differences between and behaviors among 
classes or categories of individual dealmakers, extending the typology defined in this 
dissertation. Lastly, this case study points out that the structure of social capital should 
be studied in an evolutionary format considering the origin, development, and structure 
of social capital and how entrepreneurial actors are embedded in a networked context. A 
time-series analysis of changes in social network structures would be most helpful in 
informing this question. 
This analysis suggests that future research on dealmakers should account for the 
development of experience over time and for their professional progression as a defined 
process. Indeed, this dissertation finds that early career stages are much simpler to 
model than those at the later stage, especially among dealmakers, who generally 
combine the attributes of both investor and entrepreneur. Dealmakers simply defy simple 
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classification. This dissertation concludes that dealmakers are central actors who 
mediate entrepreneurial economies and asserts that they should be studied in their own 
right as a distinct phenomenon and as a compelling agenda for future research. These 
empirically driven cases, and the results presented here, hopefully will stimulate interest 
about the nature of hierarchical social capital and the unique role of dealmakers in the 
entrepreneurial economy.  
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Note to Appendices 
 
The empirical and component analyses presented in this dissertation is supported 
through a series of component analysis social network visualizations contained in the 
Appendix A-D that present the same data in this dissertation in the form of network 
visualizations. The social network component analysis is performed using a network 
graph editor called yED, which allows for the empirical and visual comparison of the 
differences between network structures of dealmakers among the 12 sample regions. 
The network diagrams compare aggregated social capital networks with a 
decomposition of the same network isolating only dealmakers by means of a component 
analysis. These visualizations show that most firms that are independent of the primary 
cluster have limited or no ties with other actors in the primary entrepreneurial network. 
The disassociated and independent clusters for the social network can be easily 
discerned from the primary cluster. This analysis not only shows the degree to which 
actors and firms are interconnected by common ties facilitating communication and 
reciprocity, but it also reveals the degree to which entrepreneurial firms are 
disassociated with each other in a region—indicating a lack of cohesiveness in the 
network. The following Appendix contains the following social network visualizations: 
Appendix A, shows the component analysis of the aggregate networks for the 12 sample 
regions; Appendix B shows the same network with only dealmakers with 3 or more 
concurrent ties, and Appendix C shows it for dealmakers with 4 or more concurrent ties. 
Appendix D shows a detail of the RTP aggregate network with centrality computed, and 
Appendix E expands this detail to the two highest between central nodes; lastly, 
Appendix F shows the RTP dealmakers with four or more ties. 
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Appendix A. Component Analysis: Total Regional Network of Entrepreneurs and Investors in Firm Clusters
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Appendix B. Component Analysis: Dealmakers (Three-Plus Concurrent Ties) 
 
143
 144 
Appendix C. Component Analysis: Dealmakers (Four-Plus Concurrent Ties) 
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Appendix D. RTP Aggregate Network with Betweenness Centrality 
 
Appendix E. RTP Aggregate Network Highest Firm-Actor Betweenness Centrality
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Appendix F. RTP Advanced Dealmakers Network (Four-Plus Concurrent Firm Ties) 
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